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This is the eighth Corruption Assessment Report providing an overview 
of the state and dynamics of corruption in Bulgaria and Bulgarian anti-
corruption policy. It analyzes the main results and risks of the anti-
corruption process from the period immediately preceding Bulgaria’s 
accession to the EU through to the first months of EU membership.
The report builds on regular monitoring of the spread of corruption, 
its trends, evaluations of the anti-corruption efforts and initiatives 
implemented by government institutions and by civil society, as well 
as a number of suggestions and recommendations on anti-corruption 
measures, including considerations related to the administration of EU’s 
structural funds. 
In addition to the main corruption indexes which have consistently 
displayed lower values throughout 2006 and early 2007, the report 
draws on authoritative international surveys to assess corruption levels in 
Bulgaria in comparison to EU member states.
Furthermore, Bulgaria’s EU member status demands that national 
anti-corruption initiatives are implemented in close coordination with 
EU and international efforts in this area. Therefore, corruption would 
be most appropriately measured and assessed by a common EU 
benchmarking methodology as the most reliable yardstick for international 
comparisons.
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5INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade ago, the Center for the Study of Democracy  launched 
the anti-corruption initiative Coalition 2000, as a public-private effort to 
counter corruption in Bulgaria. In 1998, the Coalition published an Anti-
Corruption Action Plan “Clean Future” for Bulgaria. In the same year, the 
European Commission published its first Progress Report on Bulgaria’s 
preparations for EU membership. Later, the Corruption Assessment Report 
was introduced as a comprehensive evaluation process looking into both 
the prevalence of corruption and the delivery of government policies. 
The series of Corruption Assessment Reports as an annual culmination of 
Coalition 2000’s overall efforts in the last decade have succeeded in:
•  placing anti-corruption high on Bulgaria’s political agenda, and
• providing essential input into the emergence of the necessary 
anti-corruption infrastructure in Bulgaria in terms of strategies, 
legislation and institutions.
The best practices of Bulgaria’s experience were applied in other 
transition countries and utilized by international organizations as feasible 
approaches to mainstreaming anti-corruption monitoring on a wider scale. 
The present Corruption Assessment Report offers an overview of the spread 
of corruption and the trends current throughout 2006 and early 2007–a 
period marked by EU accession as a pivotal event in recent Bulgarian 
history–and outlines the new risks and challenges that the government 
and society will have to face in tackling corruption. The factors fostering 
corruption are of increasingly international nature and need to be 
confronted through initiatives with the joint participation of EU states, 
so as to produce an anti-corruption effect of matching scope. Therefore, 
the report focuses on the international dimensions and challenges to 
anti-corruption.
The forms and dynamics of corruption in the last decade are rooted in 
several clusters of structural factors in present-day Bulgarian society:
• the country’s political model, the will of the political parties and 
elites and the available mechanisms of civil society monitoring;
• the level of development of economic institutions and the rules 
governing economic enterprise, the presence of monopolies in 
entire economic sectors, and the level and dynamics of overall 
economic development;
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• the sustainability and effectiveness of the rule of law, and the 
efficiency of the judiciary and law-enforcement as evidenced in 
their capacity to detect and punish offences;
• the level and scale of organized criminality and the extent to 
which it has penetrated the institutions of the state, political life, 
the economy and civil society;
• the scale and efficiency of civic counteraction to corruption.
The dynamic of these factors determines the major corruption trends in 
Bulgaria. Various domestic and international studies of recent time have 
captured similar patterns of corruption’s level and structure. The major 
conclusion drawn with the help of both Coalition 2000’s Corruption 
Monitoring System as well as the most authoritative international 
surveys is that corruption practices in Bulgaria (notably administrative 
corruption) are on the decline. According to a number of international 
indexes, corruption in Bulgaria stands at a level comparable to that of 
EU Members such as Italy, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Czech 
Republic or with particular indicators even lower than Greece, Poland, 
and Romania. The trend of growing corruption victimization observed 
in 2004–2005 has been reversed as indicated by the lower number 
of bribes paid by the general population and businesses. Compared 
to November 2005, businesses were victimized twice as rarely in the 
beginning of 2007. 
It is especially important that reduced corruption in Bulgaria has been 
achieved in a context of a lower level of economic development 
compared to any EU country which is an indication of highly intensive 
anti-corruption efforts.
Notwithstanding positive developments, rates of corruption remain high 
in Bulgaria and are still above EU average. In contrast to the significant 
decline of administrative corruption among the general population 
and the business sector, political corruption involving members of the 
government, MPs, senior state officials, mayors and municipal councilors 
remains a serious challenge yet to be tackled. Following the completion 
of privatization and the decrease of discretionary customs control 
zones along the country’s borders as it joined the Union in 2007, the 
management of state assets (including land, public works, and other 
property) together with public procurement and concession granting 
mechanisms are becoming the key areas of political corruption 
risks. 
The government’s efforts to curb corruption among elected officials and 
senior civil service are perceived as lacking and ineffective. There is a 
growing body of public opinion that political corruption is on the rise, 
almost institutionalized in the corrupt networks that came to be known 
as “loops of companies”. Coupled with the amelioration of major social 
problems such as poverty and unemployment, this has driven Bulgarians 
for the first time in the last decade to identify corruption as currently 
the gravest problem in society. 
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Changes to the penal law have harmonized national legislation with 
applicable international anti-corruption legal instruments but have not 
generated the expected sharp increase in corruption-related trials and 
convictions. Neither harsher restrictions to prevent conflicts of interest 
and personal enrichment through public office, nor stricter sanctions 
for breaches of official duty, including removal from office, have been 
introduced. Corruption-related offences account for a negligible share 
of the total number of crimes detected and punished in Bulgaria. Many 
proceedings end at a rather early stage of the criminal process and over 
60 per cent of them do not even make it to court but get terminated 
already at in pre-trial phase. Only around a quarter of the preliminary 
proceedings launched go all the way to a verdict. 
These facts highlight the relevance of recommendations made in 
previous Corruption Assessment Reports that ‘soft’ anti-corruption 
measures (awareness campaigns, training public sector employees, codes 
of ethics, etc) have exhausted their potential. There are new challenges 
and efforts must shift to correcting the structural and institutional 
deficiencies that breed corruption with a special focus on the efficiency 
of the judiciary and law enforcement, on an unyielding enforcement of 
anti-corruption rules, and on effective criminal sanctions for corruption.
The government’s criminal justice policy is all the more relevant in light 
of EU membership whereby Bulgaria must meet certain cooperation and 
security commitments. Given the current environment of virtual impunity 
for political corruption, there is a real threat that the opportunities 
of EU membership will be hijacked by private interests. This may 
revive administrative corruption, especially with the likely forthcoming 
freedom from strict international monitoring and its disciplining effects 
on the government. The capacity of the Bulgarian state, business and 
civil society in countering corruption will be tested by the degree to 
which the management of EU funds in the period 2007–2013 would 
be effective and transparent. Depending on Bulgaria’s preparedness for 
administration and co-financing, the EU will have allocated between 500 
million and one billion levs already by the end of 2007 and this amount 
will be increased by over 600 million levs annually from 2007 to 2009. 
Thus, corruption risks would rise in proportion to the rapidly increasing 
funding fuelled by several other factors. The Bulgarian government and 
administration still lack sufficient capacity to design and deliver public 
policies as exemplified by the delayed and imprecise measures for 
the implementation of the 2007–2013 EU-funded operational programs. 
The absence of clear public policies and priority areas facilitates the 
emergence of corrupt networks of government officials, the administration 
and companies to channel EU money towards certain businesses and 
the creation of cartels in lucrative economic sectors. As an EU Member 
Bulgaria will have fewer mechanisms available to regulate the business 
environment as any domestic anti-corruption effort will be contingent 
on the level of corruption among the country’s main commercial and 
investment partners. 
Public–private partnerships remain integral to the success of the anti-
corruption process after Bulgaria’s EU accession. The government’s 
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Strategy for Transparent Governance, Prevention and Countering of Corruption 
2006–2008 has set forth the framework for this partnership, while 
competent public bodies, such as the Commission for Prevention 
and Countering of Corruption and the Parliamentary Anti-Corruption 
Committee, have continually drawn on civil society experience to design 
and implement anti-corruption measures.
The standards against which anti-corruption progress is evaluated 
are constantly being raised alongside growing public demands and 
expectations. Domestic corruption levels from the recent past are no 
longer the appropriate yardstick to measure Bulgaria’s performance. 
As both the mechanisms of corruption and its effects are increasingly 
international, it will be EU and international best practices that will 
set the standard. Therefore, the next logical step in this process is the 
development of EU’s own methodology for benchmarking corruption. 
Having an EU corruption benchmarking instrument would significantly 
enhance the credibility of EU’s policies in this area and would strengthen 
the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives both at home and in the 
EU.
1 The CMS methodology is presented in detail in Clean Future. Anticorruption Action Plan. 
Monitoring. Corruption Assessment Indexes, 1998.
2 The maximum value of this and all other indexes referred to hereinafter is 10 (highest 
level of corruption victimization) and the minimum value is 0 (absence of corruption).
In 2006, the monitoring of the spread of corruption in Bulgaria took on a 
specific social and political connotation. It was a year marked by intense 
efforts to prepare the country for accession to the European Union. It was 
to be established to what extent the efforts of the Bulgarian government 
institutions, civil society, business, and media had met the commitments of 
tangibly curbing corruption. The situation registered in 2006 also outlined 
Bulgaria’s position at the time of joining the community of the advanced 
European states and constituted a frame of reference for assessment of the 
country’s subsequent progress in reducing corrupt practices. Furthermore, 
Bulgaria’s EU accession put the assessments of the spread of corruption in a 
new context. The factors shaping corruption and its implications increasingly 
take on international dimensions and transcend the national framework. The 
domestic anticorruption initiatives and their impact are ever more dependent 
on concerted international efforts to curb corruption. In its turn, this calls for 
a new approach to assessing and measuring corruption based on common 
all-European standards allowing for reliable international comparisons.
In this new situation, the data obtained from the Corruption Monitoring 
System (CMS)1, which has been used to study the structure and dynamics of 
corruption for ten years now, make it possible to outline more clearly the 
new challenges before anticorruption policies and actions. The most notable 
findings regarding corruption levels and trends can be summed up in several 
general conclusions:
Firstly, the alarming tendency noted since 2004 of increasing corruption 
victimization (as measured through the incidence of corruption-related 
payments made by businesses and private individuals) appears to have been 
reversed. Compared to November 2005, the level of corruption victimization 
of business dropped by half. The index reflecting this level fell from 1.1 to 
0.5.2 With the general population, the drop in the value of this index is 
smaller and it reached 0.6.
Secondly, the number of businesses and citizens experiencing corruption 
pressure from the administration is dropping. The value of the synthetic 
index showing the level of corruption pressure on business organizations fell 
from 2.1 (November 2005) to 1.4 (January 2007). The corruption pressure 
exerted by public sector officials over Bulgarian citizens equally came down to 
a level of 1.5. Yet, the corruption pressure on citizens by certain occupational 
1. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN BULGARIA IN 2006-2007
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3 The term “corruption transaction” refers to any instance of informal giving of money, gifts 
or favors by citizens or businesspersons regardless of the sphere where this occurs – the 
legislative, executive, or the judiciary branches of power; public services; business; the 
civil sector.
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groups (e.g. doctors, police officers, magistrates) remained unchanged or 
even increased.
Thirdly, the perceptions of the Bulgarian citizens and company managers 
regarding the state of the social and business environment in terms of 
corruption are improving.  The value of the index reflecting the perceptions 
of the spread of corruption dropped from 6.0 (November 2005) to 5.4 
(January 2007) in the economy, and among the general population – from 
6.9 to 6.5.
Fourthly, Bulgarian citizens and entrepreneurs demonstrate increasing 
confidence that it is possible to significantly curb corruption in this 
country. The value of the index on the expectations of the business community 
regarding the possibility to reduce corruption displayed a positive change 
from 5.8 in 2004 to 5.1 in January 2007. Among the general population, the 
optimistic outlook that corruption can be curbed marked a slighter increase - 
from 5.7 to 5.5.
Fifthly, corruption is less commonly perceived as an effective problem-
solving instrument by Bulgarian citizens and company managers. The index 
reflecting the dynamics of these attitudes displayed a positive change and 
dropped from 5.6 in 2004 to 4.7 in January 2007 in the economic sphere, 
and from 7.1 to 6.5 among the population.
Against the background of these positive developments, there also emerged 
some alarming tendencies. Unlike the perceived drop in administrative 
corruption both in business and among the population, grand political 
corruption (among members of the government, MPs, mayors) was perceived 
as growing. The opinions of the business community about the government’s 
efforts in the sphere of anticorruption remained critical and the latter were 
deemed insufficient.
In contrast to the unsystematic corruption deals, organized corruption is on 
the rise and increasingly takes place within corruption networks that have 
come to be known as “loops of companies”. The suspected concentration 
of corruption among top government officials and politicians is supported 
by the data pointing to a concentration of corruption within a more limited 
number of companies, while the size of corruption-related payments in 
connection with securing public procurement contracts is increasing.
When analyzing corruption levels in this country two main aspects are 
distinguished – the levels of actual and potential corruption. Acts of 
corruption that have taken place are designated as actual corruption 
while the solicitation of corruption transactions3, as potential. The level 
of the latter reflects the amount of corruption pressure exerted by those 
1.1. Levels and Dynamics 
of Actual and 
Potential Corruption
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soliciting bribes or other benefits. The level of actual corruption is largely 
measured by three indicators:
• Frequency of acts of corruption;
• Number of corruption transactions for a period of time;
• Size of corruption payments.
Corruption Victimization of the Population and 
the Business Sector 
The general levels of actual and potential corruption are measured 
by two synthetic corruption indexes:
1. Involvement in corruption transactions. This index is calculated 
based on the frequency of self-reported instances when citizens 
and businesses informally provided money, gifts, or favors in 
order to have a problem solved. It reflects the level of actual 
corruption in the country over a definite period of time.
2. Corruption pressure. It is constructed on the basis of the 
frequency of self-reported cases when citizens and businesses 
were asked for money, gifts or favors in order to have a problem 
of theirs solved. It reflects the level of potential corruption in 
this country over a period of time.
These two corruption indexes do not reflect opinions, assessments, 
or perceptions, but self-reported involvement in specific types of 
acts of corruption. The corruption indexes concern primarily the 
so-called “petty” (administrative, unorganized) corruption occurring 
in citizens’ interaction with public sector employees and officials 
at the lower levels of the public administration. Information about 
“grand” (institutional, political) corruption is generally not obtained 
by representative surveys of the population and only to some 
extent by surveys of the business sector.
Source: Corruption Monitoring System
The main tendency marking the period 1998-2007 has been the 
gradual decline in both real and potential corruption among the 
Bulgarian population (Figure 1). In 2004-2005, however, there appeared 
some alarming indications of increased numbers of corruption transactions. 
In January 2007, the Involvement in Corruption Transactions index 
again displayed lower values both in business and among the general 
population.
FIGURE 1. DYNAMICS OF THE INVOLVEMENT IN CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS 
AND CORRUPTION PRESSURE INDEXES – POPULATION 
(MIN=0, MAX=10)*
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS
(*)The minimum index value is 0, when no corruption transactions at all have been concluded and the 
maximum is 10 - when all citizen interactions with the administration involve a corruption element.
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FIGURE 2. AVERAGE MONTHLY NUMBER AND RELATIVE SHARE OF 
CONCLUDED CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS4
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS
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4 The calculations of the number of corruption transactions are based on the data from 
the population census of March 2001, according to which the Bulgarian population aged 
18 and over was 6,417,869 and thus 1% of the sample represents 64,180 people.
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Whereas in 1998-1999, the 
average monthly self-reported 
cases of involvement of adult 
Bulgarian citizens in corruption 
transactions amounted to 180-
200 thousand, in the period 
July 2003 – March 2004, their 
number ranged about 80-90 
thousand per month (Figure 2). 
In 2005, the instances of corrup-
tion pressure by public employ-
ees and the actually concluded 
corruption deals reverted to the 
higher average values (around 
140 thousand a month) char-
acteristic of the earlier 1999-
2001 period. In early 2007, 
the average monthly number 
of corruption transactions in 
which Bulgarian citizens were 
involved dropped to 110-115 
thousand.
The index of actual corruption 
has been falling more substan-
tially in business than among the 
general population – from 1.1 
in November 2005 to 0.5 in 
January 2007, i.e. the level of 
corruption victimization has 
dropped by half (Figure 3). Cor-
ruption pressure by the ad-
ministration on companies has 
been weakening, too. The value 
of the index showing the level 
of corruption pressure dropped 
from 2.1 (November 2005) 
to 1.4 (January 2007). With 
the loosening of corruption 
pressure on companies, ever fewer businesspersons say it is an established 
practice in their sector to make extra informal payments in running their 
business. Equally on the decline are the assessments of the incidence of 
informal payments and the share of those who believe the number of 
corruption transactions is growing.
FIGURE 3. DYNAMICS OF THE INVOLVEMENT IN CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS 
AND CORRUPTION PRESSURE INDEXES – BUSINESS 
(MIN=0, MAX=10)
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS (Corruption Surveys of the Bulgarian Business Sector)
Base: All respondents 
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5 There is a reduction in corruption propensity among Ministry of Interior officials which 
could be attributed to the measures for enhancing professional ethical standards and 
discipline. In the period 2002-2006 a total of 412 officers had been dismissed for 
corruption, while files on 224 officers had been sent to the prosecution.
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1.1.1. High-Risk Occupational Groups as Regards Petty 
Corruption
The level of corruption victimization is unevenly distributed across the 
various occupational groups, with some of them perceived as exerting 
significant corruption pressure (Table 1). In early 2007, it was highest 
among doctors, police5 and customs officers. These emerge as the highest-
risk occupational groups in terms of petty, administrative corruption. 
Relatively high and even growing is the corruption pressure exerted 
by magistrates, ministry officials, the fiscal administration, mayors, and 
municipal councilors. Positive changes, in varying degrees, were registered 
in the groups of university lecturers and secondary school teachers, 
and the lowest corruption pressure was still found to be exerted by 
representatives of non-governmental organizations.
TABLE 1. CORRUPTION PRESSURE EXERTED OVER THE POPULATION BY 
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS* (%)
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS
(*) Proportion of those who have interacted with the respective group over the past year and have been 
asked for money, gifts, or favors.
November
2004
November
2005
January
2007
Doctors 22.5 26.2 30.1
Police officers 22.2 27.7 26.7
Customs officers 13.8 22.1 23.8
Lawyers 16.5 22.0 18.9
Prosecutors 5.1 1.2 14.3
Investigators 5.0 1.3 13.3
Judges 5.8 3.4 11.7
Ministry officials 6.3 8.2 11.5
Tax officials 5.1 8.1 11.3
University lecturers 12.6 15.3 10.7
University  employees 9.0 10.1 9.8
Mayors and municipal councilors 6.6 6.5 9.8
Municipal officials 10.3 9.5 9.5
Politicians and political party 
leaders
5.0 2.5 7.7
Secondary school teachers 6.2 6.0 4.0
NGO representatives 1.3 1.5 2.5
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In line with the registered decline in corruption victimization in this 
country, public perceptions of the spread of corruption in Bulgarian 
society have also changed in 2007 (Figure 4). Citizens appear less tolerant 
of corrupt practices and less susceptible to involvement in corruption 
transactions. They are also less inclined to accept as normal various 
forms of corruption and to resort to corruption as a problem-solving 
tool.
1.2. Assessments of the 
Spread of Corruption 
by Citizens and the 
Business Community
FIGURE 4. ASSESSMENTS OF THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AND ITS 
PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY BY THE PUBLIC
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS
Base:  All respondents
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FIGURE 5. ASSESSMENTS OF THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AND ITS 
PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY BY THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS (Corruption Surveys of the Bulgarian Business Sector)
Base: All respondents
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Similar conclusions are suggested by Bulgarian businesspersons’ opinions 
about the spread of corruption in the economy (Figure 5). 
1.2.1. Heightened Public Sensitivity to Grand Political Corruption
In Bulgaria, there still prevail public perceptions that corruption is a 
widespread phenomenon at all levels of government and in all areas of 
public life. Bulgarian citizens’ assessments of the spread of corruption 
among the various occupational groups show that people’s subjective 
assessments do not match the data about actual acts of corruption 
and corruption pressure exerted (Table 2). For example, politicians, MPs, 
TABLE 2. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG 
THE VARIOUS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS * (%)
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS
(*) Proportion of respondents who said “nearly all” or “most” are involved in corruption
November
2005
January
2007
Customs officers 71.8 78.0
Judges 59.3 67.5
Prosecutors 57.1 66.9
Police officers 56.1 65.4
Lawyers 54.7 64.5
Doctors 54.5 64.1
Tax officials 53.5 63.8
MPs 53.4 63.8
Politicians and political party leaders 51.6 62.7
Ministers 51.1 61.7
Investigators 50.5 60.3
Mayors and municipal councilors 47.5 58.0
Ministry officials 44.4 50.8
Municipal officials 43.4 43.8
University lecturers 29.9 32.3
NGO representatives 26.6 31.7
Secondary school teachers 14.4 15.7
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ministers, and magistrates are perceived as being more involved in corrupt 
practices than evidenced by the data about acts of corruption committed 
and corruption pressure exerted by them. The firmly entrenched assumption 
that they are corrupt in some cases even grows stronger and the negative 
assessments of the spread of corruption in these groups increased in late 
2006. The explanation for these divergences between actually committed 
acts of corruption and the predominating negative public perceptions 
of the spread of corruption can be sought along several lines:
Firstly, the assessments of the spread of corruption are greatly influenced 
by moral, ideological, and political factors. They rather reflect citizens’ 
attitudes to and trust in the performance of government authorities and 
assess their efficiency. In this sense, the low level of trust in the institutions 
of government in turn aggravates public perceptions of the corruptibility 
of Bulgarian politicians, high-ranking government officials, and magistrates.
TABLE 3. BUSINESS MANAGERS’ ASSESSMENTS OF THE SPREAD OF 
CORRUPTION AMONG THE VARIOUS OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS * 
(%)
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS (Corruption Surveys of the Bulgarian Business Sector)
(*) Proportion of the respondents who said “nearly all” or “most” are involved in corruption
April
2004
January
2007
Customs officers 81.1 67.8
Politicians, political party leaders 54.4 58.3
MPs 51.4 57.0
Mayors and municipal councilors 47.1 53.3
Ministers 45.4 52.3
Prosecutors 51.0 51.5
Judges 52.7 51.3
Police officers 56.0 50.8
Tax officials 51.1 50.8
Investigators 44.0 47.5
Doctors 50.2 45.0
Ministry officials 41.6 44.5
Municipal officials 47.1 43.5
Lawyers 50.0 42.7
Administrative officials in the judicial system 33.4 42.5
Businesspersons 37.0 39.7
NGO representatives 23.9 30.4
Bankers 33.2 25.9
Journalists 14.2 12.3
SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN BULGARIA IN 2006 – 2007 17
Secondly, corruption transac-
tions in the sphere of political 
corruption all too often are of 
voluntary rather than coercive 
nature and are associated with 
significant gains for both parties 
involved. The established clien-
telist networks underlying this 
type of corruption make ad-
mission of involvement in such 
transactions rather unlikely.
Thirdly, the public exposure of 
a number of corruption scan-
dals and allegations of corrup-
tion against high-ranking of-
ficials and politicians that fail 
to be proven in court and do 
not entail any formal conse-
quences affect adversely public 
assessment of the political gov-
ernment’s resolve to counter 
corruption. The public’s belief 
that there lacks resolute po-
litical will to fight corruption 
does not affect the indicators 
measuring corruption victim-
ization levels but generates 
public distrust of high-ranking 
government officials and politi-
cians. This is another reason for 
the unfavorable public opinion 
about the prevalence of cor-
ruption among the members of 
the political elite.
The shift of public attention to 
political corruption is particular-
ly conspicuous among business 
managers (Table 3). According 
to their subjective perceptions, this type of corruption is on the rise 
whereas administrative corruption (for ex., among customs and police 
officers, tax and municipal officials) is on the decline.
1.2.2. Types of Corruption Affecting Business
The financing of political parties and election campaigns, privatization, nepotism 
and public procurement procedures are being noted by the business managers 
as the most common areas for the occurrence of corrupt practices (Table 4). 
About two-thirds of the business managers believe corruption is very widespread 
in these areas. A considerable proportion of business representatives point 
TABLE 4. SPREAD OF VARIOUS CORRUPT PRACTICES IN BUSINESS (%)
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS (Corruption Surveys of the Bulgarian Business Sector) 
Base: All respondents 
Corrupt practices
December
2002
November
2003
April
2004
January
2007
Low 
spread
High 
spread
Low 
spread
High 
spread
Low 
spread
High 
spread
Low 
spread
High 
spread
Financing of political parties and of election 
campaigns for the advancement of private agendas
8.1 81.3 5.2 75.8 8.3 79.0 1.1 68.7
Nepotism in the appointment of family and 
friends to high office
4.0 85.1 5.3 83.3 8.5 81.0 1.3 68.2
Acceptance of bribes by officials and politicians 
in conducting privatization tenders
4.0 85.1 3.1 83.8 4.8 80.1 1.1 63.0
Acceptance of bribes by officials and politicians to 
influence the granting of procurement contracts 
5.1 82.3 4.3 81.2 5.6 76.1 1.8 59.7
Acceptance of money or gifts to secure 
favorable outcome of criminal trials
5.1 82.3 8.6 60.4 9.2 60.4 1.9 52.3
Acceptance of bribes by officials and politicians in 
issuing licenses or authorizations for legal activities
8.1 81.3 7.8 79.6 14.8 74.3 2.5 43.7
Acceptance of money or gifts in performing 
official duties
15.7 73.8 14.7 73.0 17.1 68.8 3.8 38.3
Acceptance of bribes by officials and politicians 
in connection with tax evasion or deductions
18.5 67.7 17.6 65.6 22.2 61.3 4.9 28.7
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to the prevalence of corruption in connection with tax evasion, ensuring a 
favorable outcome of litigations, etc. In the past two years, however, there 
has emerged a positive tendency of perceived decline in all of the more 
common corrupt practices in which businesses are typically involved.
1.3.1. Public Significance of Corruption
Since 1998, corruption has invariably been perceived as one of the 
gravest problems faced by Bulgaria. In 2004-2007, as a result of the 
stable macroeconomic situation in the country and rate of economic 
growth, and the active social policy of the government, concerns such 
as unemployment and poverty diminished in urgency. However, the 
importance of corruption as a problem of society rose and in early 2007 
it was ranked first on the public agenda in this country.
1.3. Public Values 
and Attitudes to 
Corruption
FIGURE 6: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION AS A PROBLEM OF 
SOCIETY (%)*
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS 
Base: All respondents 
*Proportions of respondents who cited the respective problem as the most critical concern of Bulgarian society
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The priority of corruption as 
a social problem is sometimes 
played down with the argument 
that subjective assessments all 
too often are at odds with 
the actual corruption situation. 
However, the data indicate that 
public perceptions quite close-
ly match the achievements or 
failures in the various sectors 
of society. Thus, for instance, 
the positive developments in 
terms of alleviating poverty and 
unemployment were accompa-
nied by a matching decline in 
their perceived public impor-
tance. Yet, public perceptions 
of corruption display different 
dynamics. Though paradoxical 
at first glance, the coexisting 
trends of decline in corruption 
victimization of the population 
and the business sector and 
heightening public sensitivity to
corruption can be accounted for along several lines. First of all, the 
public’s higher expectations for a tangible curbing of corruption still re-
main unmet and the drop in the actual level of corruption is deemed 
insufficient. Secondly, the public appears rather critical of the effective-
ness of government anti-corruption policy and its will to curb corruption 
in its midst. Thirdly, public opinion hardly discerns any practical steps 
to expose and punish political corruption. The corruption-related public 
scandals have so far not led to any convictions. Against the background 
of the high expectations and the proclaimed European standards of 
transparency of governance and uncompromising stance on abuse of 
power, the realities are rather disappointing to a large portion of the 
Bulgarian population.
1.3.2. Public Intolerance of Corruption
The Corruption Monitoring System incorporates two sets of indicators of 
corruption-related values and attitudes:
1) level of tolerance of various forms of corruption;
2) citizens’ inclination to resort to corrupt practices to solve arising 
problems.
6 The indexes assume values from 0 (minimum) to 10 (maximum). The minimum value is obtained 
when various corrupt practices are deemed unacceptable or when no one is inclined to resort to 
corrupt practices in their interaction with the administration.
FIGURE 7. ACCEPTABILITY IN PRINCIPLE AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION 
(POPULATION)6
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS
Base: All respondents
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Corruption Indexes of Public Attitudes to Corruption
1. Acceptability in Principle of Corruption – reflects the degree 
of acceptability within the value system and tolerance of 
corruption in various areas of the public sector;
2. Susceptibility to Corruption – assesses the inclination of citizens 
and business representatives to resort to corrupt practices in 
addressing private problems.
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS
In the period covered by regular monitoring of the values of these two 
corruption indexes, there has emerged a trend towards growing moral 
rejection of corruption (Figure 7). Since 2001, public tolerance of the 
forms of corruption has remained essentially unchanged at a relatively 
low level.
Business managers’ inclination to engage in corruption transactions has 
been declining, too, with the value of this index reaching an all-time 
low for the entire period covered by the monitoring (Figure 8). At the 
same time, the business sector demonstrates growing tolerance of certain 
soft forms of corruption (a free lunch, gifts offered to public sector 
employees, providing various favors, etc.).
FIGURE 8. ACCEPTABILITY IN PRINCIPLE AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION 
(BUSINESS)
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS (Corruption Surveys of the Bulgarian Business Sector)
Base: All respondents 
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The monitoring and measuring of corruption does not only have a 
national, but also an international comparative aspect. In this sense, it is 
important to assess the spread of corruption in Bulgaria in relative terms 
compared to other countries, including within the European Union. The 
international comparative surveys make it possible to better identify the 
corruption-related problem areas in the individual countries, as well as 
any existing good anticorruption practices.
International Comparative Surveys of Corruption
Although there is no clear-cut, uniform definition of corruption and 
its forms are constantly evolving, in the past few years, considerable 
experience has been accumulated in the implementation of 
international comparative surveys of corruption.
1. The International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) have been conducted 
since the late 1980s and make it possible to assess acts of crime, 
including corruption, on the basis of their objective parameters rather 
than perceptions. In Bulgaria, ICVS has been conducted three times 
since 2002 within the framework of the National Crime Survey (NCS) 
by the Center for the Study of Democracy and Vitosha Research.
2. Based on the methodology of the international victimization surveys, 
the EU International Crime Survey was implemented in 2005. In 2007, 
it is expected to be conducted in Bulgaria, as well, thus providing 
a reliable foundation for assessment of the country’s position in 
terms of the rate of various criminal, including corrupt, practices.
1.4. Corruption in 
Bulgaria: the 
International 
Comparisons 
7 Anticorruption in Transition. A Contribution to the Policy Debate, The World Bank, 2000; 
Anticorruption in Transition 2, The World Bank, 2003; Anticorruption in Transition 3, The World 
Bank, 2006
8 IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2006, p.377
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3. Since 1995, the international anticorruption organization 
Transparency International (TI) has been publishing its annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), and since 1999, the Bribe 
Payers Propensity Index (BPI). Notwithstanding the reservations 
expressed by a number of experts concerning the methodology 
of calculation of the TI corruption indexes, they make it possible 
to conduct international comparative studies of the rate of 
corruption depending on the perceptions of businesspersons, 
experts, risk analysts, and citizens.
4. The World Bank has been conducting surveys of enterprises 
assessing the economic environment and the obstacles to 
business development. These surveys also collect data about 
the rate of corrupt practices and their impact on the business 
environment. Bulgaria was included in the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES) carried out in 2001, and in all 
three regional surveys of the countries in transition - Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) in 
1999, 2002 and 2005. The data from these surveys have served 
as the basis for three World Bank reports on corruption in 
transition countries7.
5. In 2006, Bulgaria was included for the first time in the ranking of 
the Institute for Management Development (IMD) in Lausanne, 
assessing the competitiveness of the economies of 61 countries. 
It incorporates a component reflecting the rate of corruption8.
All of these international comparative surveys help answer the question: 
“Where does Bulgaria find itself in terms of the rate of corruption?”
Based on the data from the EU International Crime Survey of 2005, it 
was found that a high rate of corruption is not only characteristic of the 
new EU members.
9 The surveys in the various countries were conducted in 2005. In Bulgaria, it was carried 
out in 2004. The respondents were asked the question: “Corruption among government 
and public officials is known to exist in some places. In the past year [2003 for Bulgaria; 
2004 for the rest], has it ever happened to you for a public official (e.g. customs officer, 
police officer, inspector) in your own country to ask for or expect you to offer a bribe 
for a service?”
10 The Burden of Crime in the EU, A Comparative Analysis of the European Crime and Safety Survey
(EU ICS), 2006, p.55; www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu/euics_rp.htm 
FIGURE 9: PROPORTION OF SELF-REPORTED CASES OF CORRUPTION IN SOME 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (2004)9
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High levels (above the EU average – 25) of corruption victimization are 
registered in Greece, Poland, Hungary, Estonia10. The proportion of cases of 
corruption in Bulgaria, as registered by the National Crime Survey (NCS), 
dropped from 10.9 in 2001 to 7.9 in 2003 and to 7.2% in 2006, which 
is below the level found in older EU member countries such as Greece.
Similar data were registered by the annual corruption perception indexes 
(CPI) published by Transparency International.
TABLE 5. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI) * IN SOME EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES
Source: Transparency International
*CPI measures corruption levels in a given country as perceived by businesspersons and risk analysts ranging from 10 – low level of corruption – to 0 – extremely high level 
of corruption.
Country 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998
Levels of corruption in some EU countries
Finland 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.9 10.0 9.8 9.6
Denmark 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.8 10.0 10.0
Sweden 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.0 9.4 9.4 9.5
Netherlands 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.9 9.0 8.8 8.9 9.0 9.0
Hungary 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.0
Italy 4.9 5.0 4.8 5.3 5.2 5.5 4.6 4.7 4.6
Czech Republic 4.8 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.8
Greece 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.9 4.9 4.9
Bulgaria 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.3 2.9
Poland 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.6
Romania 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.0
Levels of corruption in the Balkan countries
Croatia 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.7 2.7 NA
Serbia 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.3 NA NA NA NA NA
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.3 NA NA NA NA NA
Macedonia 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.3 NA NA NA 3.3 NA
Albania 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 NA NA 2.3 NA
11 www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006
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The TI data on the 1998-2006 period indicate that from a country 
with systematic corruption problems (index lower than 3) Bulgaria is 
turning into a country with moderate corruption level. By 2006 data, 
Bulgaria finds itself in the same group (CPI values from 4.0 to 4.9) as 
Greece, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Italy. More 
unfavorable values were obtained for other EU member countries, such 
as Poland (3.7) and Romania (3.1). Far more serious corruption problems 
are faced by the countries of Southeast Europe– Croatia (3.4), Serbia 
(3.0), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2.9), Macedonia (2.7), Albania (2.6)11.  
The World Bank report Anticorruption in Transition 3 (2006) presents 
comparative data on corruption levels in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey conducted among close to 10,000 companies.
12 World Bank (2006): Anticorruption in Transition 3: Who is Succeeding ... and Why, Washington, 
DC, p. 11.
FIGURE 10. BRIBE FREQUENCY*, BY COUNTRY, 2002 AND 200512
Source: BEEPS 2002, BEEPS 2005
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Bulgaria is among the countries displaying the most significant drop in 
the number of cases when businesspersons paid bribes in connection 
with their activity. Bribery in the economy in Bulgaria is less frequent 
than in countries such as Greece, Lithuania, and Romania, and is 
comparable to the rates found in Poland, Turkey, and Portugal.
The national and international surveys of corruption conducted in this 
country in recent years have reported similar tendencies and findings.
The chief conclusion of all authoritative national and international surveys 
is that the rate of corruption in Bulgaria has been on the decline. Its 
level is in fact comparable with that in a number of old and new 
EU member countries such as Italy, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech 
Republic, and under several indicators, it is lower than in countries 
such as Greece, Poland, and Romania.
It is equally important to note that the curbing of corruption in 
Bulgaria has been achieved in a context of a lower level of economic 
development which is an indication of higher intensity of anticorruption 
efforts. Notwithstanding the favorable tendencies and the achieved drop 
in corrupt practices in this country, corruption levels in Bulgaria are still 
higher than the EU average.
FIGURE 11. AVERAGE ANNUAL INCIDENCE OF CORRUPTION TRANSACTIONS 
AND CORRUPTION PRESSURE OVER BULGARIAN CITIZENS AND 
CPI FOR BULGARIA13
Source: Vitosha Research/CMS and Transparency International
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13 Average annual figures for the incidence of corruption transactions or corruption pressure 
have been provided for each year in the period 1999-2004 due to implementation of 
more than one survey in the respective years.
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The standards for assessing anti-corruption progress are getting higher 
and, rather than comparisons to the past, they are increasingly based 
on European practices. The study and analysis of corruption and the 
collection of viable information about its dynamics are crucial for the 
implementation of successful prevention and control policies. Thus, the 
elaboration of a special European Union methodology for assessment 
and measurement of corruption, as has been the practice of the 
European Commission in other areas, would be a next logical step. The 
adoption of modern diagnostic tools would significantly enhance trust 
in EU policy against corruption and would contribute towards improved 
effectiveness in the implementation of international standards.
14 See Table 3 in section 1.2. above.
15 The term “legal corruption” has been introduced by Daniel Kaufman from the World Bank 
Institute, defining it as the opportunity for the political elite to hide corruption away from 
the population in the form of legislative provisions ensuring the possibility for payments 
between businesses and politicians. The most widely spread form of legal corruption is 
seen by Kaufman in the granting of preferences with regard to public procurement and 
other public resources. See Kaufman, D., P. Vicente, Legal Corruption, February 2006.
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2. CORRUPTION AND SHADOW ECONOMY – RISKS FOR 
THE EU INTERNAL MARKET
Notwithstanding the reduction of the administrative corruption and the 
shadow economy by 2007, Bulgarian entrepreneurs deem that political 
corruption in Bulgaria remains unchanged14. The actual impunity of 
political corruption and the lack of capacity of the Bulgarian government 
to put together and implement transparent public policies create the real 
threat that the benefits offered by the country’s EU membership would 
be captured by few politically connected elites. Such a development 
could revive administrative corruption after the new EU-internal rules are 
mastered. By the end of 2007, the disciplining effect of rigorous external 
monitoring on the Bulgarian government’s activities on anti-corruption 
will be removed, while the demand for public resources (funds from the 
budget, land and real estate) and the volume of the resources at the 
government’s disposal will grow.
The experience from previous waves of enlargement has demonstrated 
that EU membership does not automatically results in a reduction 
of political corruption. The financial and economic stability guaranteed 
through the EU membership generates a huge inflow of financial 
resources to the poorest Member States. These are channeled into the 
few sectors which ensure high rates of return and liquidity: typically, 
tourism and real estate. This trend reinforces the corruption pressure on 
the government to redistribute the scarce resources to local businesses 
which are politically connected and non-competitive on the European 
market, through public procurement, concessions, real estate and land 
swaps. The same is also true for the business environment in the 
individual Member States. Although competition on the EU internal 
market is expected to reduce the administrative barriers to business, 
the lack of sufficient political accountability in some new democracies 
leads to monopolization of certain lucrative business activities through 
legal corruption15. As far as Bulgaria is concerned, very indicative in 
this respect is the legislation adopted in 2006 to regulate the privileged 
position of duty-free shops with regard to the trade in excise goods.
Since the privatization process has been completed and the customs 
monopoly control at the national borders was removed in 2006 and 
16 On the Eve of EU Accession: Anti-corruption Reforms in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of 
Democracy, Sofia, 2006.
17 The World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Bulgaria for the Period FY07 
– FY09, May 16, 2006. International Monetary Fund, Country Report No 06298, August 
2006.
18 International Monetary Fund, Bulgaria: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country 
Report No. 06/299, August 2006.
19 The World Bank, Anti-Corruption in Transition 3: Who is Succeeding and Why, 2006, notes, for 
instance, that the level of corruption in public procurement in Germany is comparable to 
that in the new EU Member States.
20 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development strongly criticized the 
UK for the discontinuation of the anti-corruption investigation of the British company 
BAE Systems for corruption allegations involving public officials in Saudi Arabia in order 
to obtain public procurement orders in the military sector. According to Transparency 
International, France, Portugal and Italy in this order stand in the lower half of the 30 
largest exporting countries whose companies offer the greatest number of bribes abroad. 
Most of the action brought so far against EU companies under the OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, has been initiated in the United States, 
although 2006 saw some further corruption scandals in several European transnational 
companies.
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2007, there remain two major instruments for political corruption – 
the management of public property (including land and buildings) 
and the awarding of public procurement contracts and concessions. 
As mentioned in last year’s Corruption Assessment Report16, public 
procurement, including the management of EU funds, will be the main 
corruption risk factor for Bulgaria in the years to come. The exposure 
of massive corruption and fraud in the district heating company 
(Toplofikatsia) in Sofia, the political scandals concerning the concession 
on the Trakia motorway, the irregularities surrounding the construction 
of the new terminal of Sofia Airport, and the delayed and inefficient use 
of the pre-accession financial instruments are just few of the cases in 
2006 that come to show that these areas continue to be susceptible to 
corruption pressure and political influence. Similar are the conclusions 
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, emphasizing 
that the lack of adequate policies for structural changes in the Bulgarian 
economy could substantially limit the effect of the use of EU funds17. 
Experience shows that if EU funds are used inefficiently (i.e. through 
corruption), their positive impact would be limited to the demand side 
of the economy and would be short-lived. If there are no structural 
changes to strengthen the capacity of the supply side, EU funding 
could lead, in the long-run, to higher inflation, making Bulgarian goods 
more expensive and reducing the competitiveness of the economy, 
increasing aid dependence and undermining the efforts to improve 
governance18. Research at the World Bank19 and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development20 reveals that the European 
Union, too, lacks uniform practices to curb corporate corruption and 
corruption in public procurement, which means Bulgaria will not face 
strong enough pressure to improve governance in these areas.
By 2007, the administrative and tax barriers to doing business in 
Bulgaria have been reduced and the stable economic growth continues 
to generate further opportunities for the development of Bulgarian 
enterprises. As a result of the aggregate impact of all these factors, the 
shadow economy and its diverse forms of manifestation have been 
reduced. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian business environment continues 
21 Global Competitiveness Yearbook, IMD, 2006.
22 For the purposes of this report, the term stands for all companies registered and doing 
business within the territory of Bulgaria.
23 See section 1.3, Public Values and Attitudes to Corruption.
24 See Graf Lambsdorff, Johann, An empirical investigation of bribery in international trade, 1997 
and Smarzynska, Beata and Wei, Shang-Jin, Corruption and the Composition of Foreign 
Direct Investment: Firm-Level Evidence, World Bank Working Paper 2360, The World Bank, 
Washington D.C.2000.
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to be relatively less competitive than the EU average21. The continued 
increase of excise duties and the granting of exclusive rights on duty-
free trade at Bulgarian borders create prerequisites for a rebound in the 
shadow economy in cigarette, alcohol and fuel smuggling and for using 
the illicit profits thereof for maintaining political protection. The continued 
high taxation of labor without any prospects for its reduction during the 
first year of EU membership, coupled with the ongoing crisis and citizens’ 
distrust in main public services, such as health and education, imply that 
high informal or undeclared employment in the country will persist.
Bulgaria’s EU membership means also less opportunity for the Bulgarian 
government to control the elements of the business environment in the 
country and more channels for spill-over of influence from and to the 
Member States which stand closest to Bulgaria in economic terms. This is 
particularly relevant to the labor market and the development of business 
culture in the country; nearly half of the fixed capital of Bulgaria is under 
the control of business organizations incorporated in other Member States, 
and some 10 % to 20 % of the labor force of the country as estimated 
by the Centre for the Study of Democracy are already on the gray internal 
market of the EU. These developments imply the existence of spill-over 
of corruption culture and practices, which have already been observed 
in 2006 and 2007, including in the use of the EU pre-accession funds.
The reduction of the level of the shadow economy and corruption in 
Bulgaria’s business sector in 2006 and 2007 was a sign of the improved 
business environment in the country and the broader opportunities 
for market development available to Bulgarian entrepreneurs after 
the country’s EU accession. This trend could also be traced in the 
reduced susceptibility of Bulgarian businesses22 to corrupt practices; their 
expanded economic opportunities make them more confident in their 
independence from the actions of the national government23. The scale 
of reduction of corruption and the shadow economy in the Bulgarian 
business sector is the result of the complex interaction between the 
national and European policies undertaken in this field and the impact 
of the international business environment on the Bulgarian markets. 
2.1.1. Corruption and Foreign Trade
Corruption is a structural factor for international trade and investment24. 
Until the mid 1990’s, many EU Member States treated the payment 
2.1. Business Environment, 
Shadow Economy 
and Corruption
FIGURE 12. CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN TRADE OF BULGARIA
Source: BNB and Transparency International, 2006
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25 The Burden of Crime in the EU, A Comparative Analisys of the European Crime and Safety Survey 
(EU ICS), 2006, p. 55.
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of bribes abroad as a tax deductible expenditure. Thus many countries 
actually tolerated corruption as a strategic instrument for new markets 
penetration. For the big exporting nations, corruption, political influence 
and intelligence agencies played an essential part in the entry into a number 
of markets in the world, their development and defense. Empirical studies 
prove that there is a statistically significant correlation between the levels of 
corruption in importing and exporting countries and their trade portfolios 
and investment decisions; they prefer markets with similar features of the 
business environment, thus maintaining the corruption status quo in the 
respective country. Therefore, especially within the framework of a customs 
and monetary union, the level of corruption and the state of the business 
environment respectively determine the quality of investment and trade 
projects to be implemented in a given Member State. On the other hand, 
the potential impact of the anti-corruption reforms of each individual 
Member State are dependent on and constrained by the average levels 
of corruption of its major trade and investment partners.
According to the ranking of 
Transparency International two-
thirds of the Bulgarian foreign 
trade volume had an average 
weighed TI corruption index 
equal to that of the country 
itself in 2006, i.e. the posi-
tive anti-corruption impact of 
foreign trade on the business 
environment of the domes-
tic economy was very limited. 
Some 40 % of Bulgaria’s for-
eign trade in 2006 was gen-
erated by more corrupt coun-
tries, which probably resulted 
in the spill-over of bad business 
practices into the country and 
restricted the potential impact 
of the anti-corruption reforms pursued by the Bulgarian government 
(Figure 12). Given the expected relative increase of trade and investment 
activities with Russia, Turkey, China, Greece and Italy, the unfavorable 
trend from the period 2003 - 2006 towards reduction of the average 
corruption index of Bulgaria’s foreign trade partners will be retained in 2007.
Unlike trade, foreign direct investment in Bulgaria produced a positive 
anti-corruption effect. Over the period from 2001 to 2005 there was 
an increase of the average investment-weighed index of Transparency 
International for investor nations in Bulgaria by 10 percent. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the five largest investors in the country feature Italy, Greece 
and Cyprus (with a total of 31 % of the investments in the country for 
the last 15 years), which display some of the highest corruption levels 
within the European Union25, is indicative of the limits of the potential 
impact of domestic anti-corruption reforms. Without any prejudice 
26 Typically justified through the possession of exclusive rights, such as software copyrights.
27 Implemented either through non-transparent contribution of public property into a joint-
company, such as in the cases of Universiada Hall and the Plovdiv Fair, or through the 
assignment of the management of public projects to donor organizations without any 
competitive bidding so as to circumvent the provisions of the Public Procurement Act and 
to ensure more flexible management from the perspective of the relevant line ministers. 
FIGURE 13. CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Source: BNB and Transparency International, 2006
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FIGURE 14. CMS CORRUPTION INDEXES AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 
BULGARIA
Source: CMS, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2007
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to the responsibility of the national government for the success or 
failure of anti-corruption reforms in Bulgaria, these and other empirical 
studies show how important it is to undertake concerted anti-corruption 
reforms at the EU level. The lack of clear mechanisms to promote 
good governance and to punish corruption at the EU level leads to 
substantial discrepancies in the functioning of the Internal Market, 
which undermine the very essence of its four freedoms.
The tendencies in the impact 
of foreign investment on the 
business environment at the 
macro-level in Bulgaria can be 
traced down to the micro-lev-
el. The companies with foreign 
participation in Bulgaria are ex-
posed to less corruption pres-
sure on the part of the public 
administration (their corruption 
pressure index is twice lower 
on the average) and are much 
less involved in corrupt prac-
tices (their corrupt practices 
index is four times lower on 
the average) in comparison to 
domestically-owned companies 
(Figure 13 & 14). On the oth-
er hand, over the last five to 
seven years there have been 
many cases of multinationals 
operating in Bulgaria, which 
circumvent the ban on brib-
ery of foreign country officials 
through a flexible system of 
local partnerships, including 
those with the Bulgarian gov-
ernment in the implementation 
of big public projects. Diverse 
mechanisms have been em-
ployed for this purpose, rang-
ing from circumvention of the 
public procurement legisla-
tion in large-scale purchases26, 
through public-private partner-
ships with the establishment 
of joint ventures with ob-
scure financial perspectives27, 
TABLE 6. SHARE OF THE BULGARIAN COMPANIES WHICH MADE UNOFFICIAL 
PAYMENTS FOR THE FOLLOWING SERVICES (%)
Source: Vitosha Research CMS 
Base: All respondents 
November
2003
April
2004
January
2007
Registration of a company 2.9 2.5 0.5
Installation of a telephone post 4.5 2.9 0.8
Interaction with company 
departments in courts
2.4 2.1 1.0
Connecting to water supply 2.1 2.5 1.0
Connecting to power supply 4.8 3.8 1.8
In court proceedings 3.6 4.4 3.0
Obtaining of permits and 
licenses
8.6 8.2 3.0
Obtaining of building permits 7.8 4.6 3.8
28 At Siemens, Witnesses Cite Patterns of Bribery, by David Crawford and Mike Esterl, The Wall 
Street Journal Europe, January 31, 2007.
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to open conflicts of interest in the coordinating authorities of pre-
accession funds. In these cases, much better coordination is needed 
among the law enforcement and judiciary authorities of several Member 
States in order to effectively combat this type of crime. The alleged 
bribes which the German corporation Siemens used to obtain public 
procurement contracts and lucrative investment deals, including those 
in EU Member States, amounted to EUR 75 million annually – a sum 
which is substantial for the size of smaller countries28. 
2.1.2. Corruption and Shadow Economy
In 2006 and 2007, the downward trend for administrative corruption in 
doing business in Bulgaria has continued. The most substantial reduction 
over the last three years has been observed in unofficial payments for 
company registration, for obtaining permits and licenses, and in the 
relations with the utility monopolies. The smallest relative decline in 
administrative corruption has been registered with regard to unofficial 
payments in court proceedings and the issuance of building permits (Table 
6). On the one hand, this has been the result of the series of administrative 
reforms aimed at reducing the regulatory burden, improving the services 
to taxpayers, and the introduction of administrative electronic company 
registration outside of the courts as of 1 July 2007. On the other hand, 
external and internal pressure for the identification and punishment 
of specific culprits for administrative corruption has rendered the low 
and medium levels of corrupt 
administrative officials without 
political protection the most 
vulnerable, which has pro-
duced a disciplining effect on 
them thus reducing administra-
tive pressure on companies.
Similarly to corruption, the 
shadow economy continues to 
shrink in Bulgaria. Over the pe-
riod 2002 – 2007, the share 
of the shadow economy in the 
various economic sectors of the 
country has been reduced from 
29 % to 17.1 %, i.e. in 2007, 
approximately one in five 
levs of the economic turn-
over remains in the shadow 
economy (Figure 15). Another 
important conclusion from the 
available data is that perhaps a 
certain portion of GDP growth 
over the past years has resulted 
from the surfacing and official
FIGURE 15. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BUSINESSES OF THE SHARE OF THE 
SHADOW ECONOMY IN THE RESPECTIVE SECTOR IN BULGARIA
Source: Vitosha Research
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29 The Bulgarian lev is pegged to the euro at 1.95 levs to the euro.
30 About a half of this amount is registered by the National Statistical Institute in accordance with 
specific methods, which means that the shadow economy beyond the statistical registries is smaller. 
31 Detailed specific measures for the reduction of the shadow economy in Bulgaria are laid 
down in the previous editions of the Corruption Assessment Report since 2002 and in the 
special publication on the topic The Shadow Economy in Bulgaria, Centre for the Study of 
Democracy, 2004. Many of the measures suggested there and then are still on the agenda. 
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registration of shadow economic activities. Hence the real economic growth 
rates might have been lower than those officially registered, which does not 
bode well for the long-term competitiveness of the Bulgarian economy. The 
shadow economy continues to be a serious source of corrupt payments and, 
at the same time, provides grounds for reinforcing the policy of penalties 
and fines and greater administrative pressure favored by the Bulgarian 
government. By 2007, some twelve to fifteen billion levs29 or 25-30 % 
of the GDP30 is generated through the shadow economy of the country. 
Hence although the shadow economy has been reduced for the last five 
years its absolute size remains worrisome and is indicative of persistent 
institutional deficits in the country’s business environment. For the further 
reduction of the impact of the shadow economy to take place, the Bulgarian 
government should accompany the policies of liberalisation and reduction of 
tax rates by mesures to strengthen the institutional capacity in: the support 
of competitive market mechanisms for the delivery of public services; 
the judiciary; the formulation of long-term objectives and policies; etc.31
32 Biggest Cities Review: Regular Report on the Price of Labor, Industry Watch and Vitosha 
Research, Autumn 2006.
33 Interview of the Executive Director of the National Revenue Agency before Nova 
Television, 15 March 2007.
FIGURE 16. DYNAMICS OF THE BUSINESS INDEX OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY 
AND ITS COMPONENTS 
Source: Vitosha Research
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As to the main manifestations of the shadow economy according to 
the CMS business indexes, the most serious problem in Bulgaria 
continues to be the under-reporting of turnover. With regard to labor, 
the downward trend of undeclared employment without labor contracts 
continues. However, the relative reduction of undeclared employment 
of contracts with hidden clauses (employment contracts in which the 
actual remuneration is higher than formally stated) is smaller (Figure 16). 
According to Vitosha Research surveys in 2006, the real average monthly 
wage in the country was at least 600 levs32 though the official figure 
put it at some 400 levs. This discrepancy between official and unofficial 
levels of payment in the country reflects, on the one hand, the relatively 
high social security burden in Bulgaria, but, on the other hand, the lack 
of trust on part of the citizens and the businesses in the services they pay 
for in such spheres as social care, education and healthcare. Bulgaria’s 
accession to the European Union is likely to bring about partial transfer 
of informal employment to other Member States – a process which is 
already underway. The poor coordination and cooperation of the national 
tax administrations of the Member States create conditions for failure 
to report income received outside the home country. A reversal of the 
positive trend of reduction of the shadow economy can be expected in 
2007 with regard to the hiding of turnover and the VAT abuses. Reports 
on the VAT revenues during the first two months of the country’s EU 
membership showed poorer than expected performance even though 
planned VAT revenues for the 2007 budget had been conservative.33
The growing economic integration of Bulgaria in the EU and the gradual 
improvement of the administrative capacity and the remuneration 
of the national bureaucracy will lead to further reduction of the 
administrative corruption and the related shadow economy. At the same 
time, businesses deem that the spread of political corruption in the 
34 See Table 3, section 1.2. Perceptions of Citizens and Businesses of the Spread of 
Corruption in this report.
35 The corruption of elite cartels is practiced and supported by the maintenance of networks 
of political, economic, military, bureaucratic, and ethnic or community elites, depending 
on the specific culture of the country. Unlike cartels, in the case of oligarchs and clans 
power and the corrupt access to it are dominated by government officials or enterprising 
businessmen who are powerful personalities mastering many followers. According to 
expert studies, Bulgaria and Romania are in the group of countries characterized by 
corruption of oligarchs and clans. Poland and Hungary are in the group of countries with 
corruption of elite cartels. See Johnston, Michael, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power 
and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
36 See the Address of the President of the Republic after the oath-taking ceremony at the 
National Assembly, 19 January 2007: “In this respect, I would like to note that I do not 
find it proper to close the decision-making on key issues and even specific issues to the 
narrow circle of the Political Council. The replacement of democratic procedures – a 
process I observe in both government and opposition – can turn into a factor for growing 
mistrust in politics”.
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professional groups related to it is on the rise34. There is a growing 
tendency for the administrative apparatus to be partially replaced or 
sidestepped by appointments in the political cabinets and advisers to the 
ministers; sometimes even directors of directorates learn from the media 
about joint initiatives of their political bosses with private companies. 
The replacement of public administration with structures and networks of 
politically, economically or personally loyal individuals and organizations 
which are not constitutionally or legally regulated, poses the real threat 
of the creation of elite cartels and clans35 and the involvement of the 
administration into political corruption. The most visible manifestation of 
this trend in Bulgaria is the Political Council of the ruling coalition which, 
without any democratic legitimacy (one of its members does not even 
hold an election position), actually replaces the Council of Ministers in the 
decision-making process concerning some of the most important matters 
of government policy36. Such trends make it more difficult to reduce the 
shadow economy and administrative corruption as political corruption 
disguises them in formally legal shapes. For example, there are signs of 
the replacement of administrative corruption by emerging elite cartels 
in the duty-free trade and the management of state-owned and 
municipal land and property, as well as public procurement:
• As early as 2001, the Center for the Study of Democracy published 
reports, which revealed that the state budget was losing hundreds of 
millions of levs through smuggling carried out by duty-free shops and 
petrol stations. The surveys in the biggest cities of the country showed 
that up to 90 % of the imported cigarettes had labels indicating that 
they had been bought at duty-free shops. The model of duty-free 
shops relies on illegally returning to the country excise goods for 
duty-free sale (i.e.  sale in which no excise tax or VAT is due). 
In 2002, the Bulgarian government launched measures to bring the 
excise duties rates up to the average EU level, which made smuggling 
through duty-free shops and petrol stations even more attractive. 
Year after year duty-free sales of fuel break record levels, the biggest 
one reported in 2005, when annual sales reached 500 million levs. 
Similarly, budget losses from the smuggling of duty free cigarettes 
have been growing since 2002 but the record year was 2006 in 
the wake of the substantial increase of the excise tax on cigarettes. 
TABLE 7. TURNOVER OF DUTY FREE SHOPS AT BULGARIAN BORDERS
Source: Customs Agency and General Directorate of the Border Police
Year Packs of cigarettes sold
Cigarettes sold 
– statistical 
value (levs)
Alcohol sold 
– net weight 
(kg)
Alcohol sold 
– statistical 
value (levs)
Passenger flow 
registered at 
the Bulgarian 
state borders
2001 61,241,433 95,717,500 1,413,227 19,959,969 15,302,434
2002 46,119,000 84,831,963 1,191,953 14,941,031 17,183,454
2003 61,154,267 116,437,862 1,166,377 17,201,439 18,963,469
2004 87,643,200 152,356,553 1,420,344 20,877,585 21,392,003
2005 88,602,733 145,823,774 1,743,964 25,550,355 22,807,386
2006 339,734,333 559,202,707 2,451,012 33,882,982 23,252,594
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Cigarette sales of duty-free operators increased by over 380 % in 
2006 (Table 7), without any relevant increase of the passenger flow.
These excessive duty free sales are registered against the background 
of the requirement of the European Commission to close duty-free 
shops at the Bulgarian land borders after the country’s accession to 
the EU on 1 January 2007. The lobby (cartel) of duty-free operators 
has managed to effectively preserve the status quo. Indicative of the 
substantial influence of this shadow business on Bulgarian politics
is the fact that no political faction represented in Parliament opposed 
the bill which ensured the functioning of duty-free operators even 
after Bulgaria’s EU accession. Moreover, there is no other country, 
except for Turkey, which has duty-free shops and petrol stations at 
the Bulgarian borders. Thus during the first months of 2007 duty-
free shops and petrol stations continued to harm the budget of 
the country at the same rate which was observed in 2006, i.e. 
approximately 300 to 400 million levs in losses annually. 
• After the completion of the privatisation process and with the beginnign 
of the real estate market boom in the Bulgarian biggest cities and 
resorts over the recent years, state-owned and municipal lands and 
property have become the public resources in the highest demand 
and most exposed to corruption pressure. The investor pressure for the 
acquisition of state-owned and municipal land will grow steadily after the 
country’s EU accession. The experience of pervious EU enlargements has 
shown that corrupt deals for the acquisition of land and the construction 
and operation of property in the new Member States lead to a snowball 
effect in the number and volume of the bribes offered. 
In 2006, the Bulgarian media revealed many details concerning land 
swaps in the country. All of them followed a similar pattern: first, state-
owned land around high-value resort areas is swapped for private property 
located in less attractive or lower-priced parts of the country; second, the 
37 Net of VAT.
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private individuals or companies pursuing the swaps are closely related 
to the political elite (local and national) with the greatest number of 
swaps being carried out in the last days before the expiration of politcal 
terms of office; third, after the swaps, the status of the land is changed 
with the help of decisions of local municipal councils, if necessary, which 
substantially increased the price of the land. For the last three years, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has swapped over 800 hectares. 
Since the prices of land range from 4 to 400 levs per sq. m., depending 
on the location of the land, the opportunities for excess profits are 
quite big. For example, the re-sale of those 800 hectares swapped 
for the recent years at an assumed margin of 100 levs between the 
acqusition and selling prices can bring revenues of 800 million levs. 
However, the price margins in such swaps are likely to be higher since 
the land acquired is typically part of larger investment projects.
The experience of other EU Member States reveals that the swaps of land 
and real estate, together with the management of public procurement and 
concessions, will be a major corruption problem in the years to come. 
Therefore it has to be tackled in all its complexity and in connection 
with the construction and tourist sectors. The vigorous protests of land 
owners against the boundaries of the EU NATURA 2000 Programme for 
the protection of natural diversity and the hesitant and untimely response 
of the Bulgarian government to the dsiputes arising in this connection 
are indicative of the serious comercial and social interests intertwined in 
this sphere at both national and local levels. Hence a detailed analysis 
of corruption risks in this sphere is urgently needed to identify and 
to adopt effective counter-measures.
The Strategy for Transparent Governance, Prevention and Countering of Corruption 
2006-2008 identifies public procurement as the sphere with the highest 
corruption pressure. Together with concessions, public procurement is 
the main channel for directing public resources to the private sector 
which makes it most attractive for political corruption and abuse. Usually, 
corrupt practices in public procurement are intended to channel public 
resources to a specific, predetermined contractor by violating the rules 
of competition to the detriment of public interests and for the personal 
benefit of a given political or administrative official. Corruption affects 
not only contract award procedures but also the implementation where 
the contracting authority may choose to ignore deviations from the 
officially agreed parameters of the contract.
2.2.1. Level and Spread of Corruption in Public Procurement in 
Bulgaria
The value of the public procurement contracts awarded in 2005-2006 
was 15,176 million levs37 which is about 17% of the GDP generated 
2.2. Corruption in Public 
Procurement 
TABLE 8. TOTAL VALUE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS IN BULGARIA 
2005-2006 (MLN LEVS)
*Without Belene NPP; GDP forecast for 2006 is 48 billion levs
Source: Public Procurement Agency (PPA), National Statistical Institute and own calculations
2005 2006 2006*
Total Value 3,296.0 11,879.8 4,061.8
Share of GDP 7.9% 24.7% 8.5%
38 For the purposes of the assessment of the corruption risk in the public procurement 
market, it is defined here as the consumption of goods, services and construction works 
in the public and utilities sectors for which the law envisages the application of public 
tendering procedures for the awarding and implementation of contracts. In other words, 
the definition does not cover public consumption in which the choice of a supplier or a 
contractor does not require any procedure by law. The existing Bulgarian legislation reads 
that these are public procurement contracts worth less than 100,000 levs in the case of 
construction works or 30,000 levs in the case of the supply of goods or services.
FIGURE 17. STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT MARKET IN BULGARIA 
2005-2006 (% OF ALL CONTRACTS)
Source: PPA
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in these years. This number gives a somewhat distorted picture of the 
actual size of the public procurement market in Bulgaria since more than 
a half of it was accounted for by a single transaction, i.e. the contract 
for the construction of the two units of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant 
(NPP) worth 7,817 million levs which was concluded in 2006. Therefore 
the figures concerning the public procurement market are presented 
here with and without the NPP contract. Leaving Belene NPP aside, the 
value of the public procurement contracts signed in Bulgaria accounted 
for some 8% to 9% of the country’s GDP (Table 8).
The increased corruption risk in 
public procurement is largely as-
sociated with the fact that this 
market is strongly dominated 
by construction works. In 2006, 
construction works accounted for 
83% of the total value of all 
contracts but a longer period of 
monitoring would probably re-
veal that such a high percentage 
is rather an exception due to the 
contract for Belene NPP. Leaving 
that aside, construction works 
have accounted for half of the 
total value of the public pro-
curement contracts signed in 
Bulgaria for the last two years. 
One-third of all contracts re-
late to the supply of goods and 
about one-sixth cover the provi-
sion of services (Figure 17). The 
major groups of goods procured 
in Bulgaria are pharmaceuticals, 
equipment and fuels. The largest 
share in the public consumption 
of services is taken up by business 
services, waste management and 
environment protection, as well 
as repair and maintenance works.
These figures relate to the registered public procurement market in 
Bulgaria. The actual size of the market in public procurement is 20% to 
25% larger38. It includes transactions which are not subject to registration 
(for instance, those related to national defense and security), as well as 
transactions which are subject to registration but have not been registered 
39 See Bulgarian Industrial Association (BIA) Public Procurement Monitoring: The Most Common 
Violations and Corrupt Practices, Sofia, p. 4 (http://www.bia-bg.com/files/ZOP-broshura-
2005.rtf).
FIGURE 18. NUMBER OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS IN BULGARIA 
2000-2006
Source: PPA
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for various reasons. Last but not least, it includes transactions concluded 
without any tender procedure regardless of legal requirements for that. 
Thus the size of the public procurement market in Bulgaria today 
can be estimated at approximately 10% to 12% of GDP, i.e. 4.4 - 5.5 
billion levs in 2006 and 6 - 7 billion levs in 2007. 
The difficulties in the assessment of the volume of the public procurement 
market in Bulgaria are partially due to its high growth rates and the fact 
that it is far from its equilibrium state. Two years ago, the average annual 
size of the public procurement market was put at 1.8 - 2 billion levs (5 % 
of GDP)39. Today it is at least 2.5 times larger. Figure 18 displays the almost 
quadrupling of the number of contracts between 2000 and 2006. Part 
of that growth resulted from the increase in the registered contracts and 
perhaps covered mainly lower value market segments. Therefore growth 
rates were more modest in value terms but they were equally impressive. 
These high growth rates of the value of public procurement contracts in the 
initial years of Bulgaria’s EU membership will continue, coming closer to the 
EU public procurement average market size of 16.3% of GDP. Moreover, 
growth will be further fuelled by the drive for Bulgaria to overcome quickly 
gaps in its basic, communication and environmental infrastructure to meet 
the requirements of the European internal market. This is the purpose of 
the substantial amount of EU funding to be allocated to Bulgaria in the first 
7 years of its EU membership and distributed via the public procurement 
procedures. The public procurement market can be expected to grow 
by an average of 6% to 7% per annum during the first seven years of 
membership. According to the most conservative estimates (i.e. without 
sizable transactions of the Belene NPP type), this implies that the average 
annual volume of the market will reach 6 - 7 billion levs in 2007-2008.
It is only natural for this large 
and very dynamic market in 
the Bulgarian economy, which 
offers many opportunities for 
excessive profit and non-mar-
ket and/or non-regulated in-
come, to generate strong in-
centives for both suppliers of 
goods and services and con-
tracting authorities to resort to 
corrupt behavior.
The data from the Corruption 
Monitoring System (CMS) of 
the Center for the Study of De-
mocracy point to a downward 
trend in the number of com-
panies which have made unof-
ficial payments in public pro-
curement tenders. Five years 
FIGURE 19. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WHICH RESORTED TO BRIBES IN 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES
Source: Vitosha Research
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FIGURE 20. SHARE OF THE BULGARIAN COMPANIES WHICH PARTICIPATED IN 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES 
(% OF THE RESPECTIVE ENTERPRISE GROUP)
Source: Vitosha Research. The month and the year indicate the time of the survey, reflecting the experience of 
respondents from the previous year. 
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ago, every other company par-
ticipating in a public procure-
ment procedure admitted that 
it had to pay a bribe; in 2005, 
one in three companies shared 
such an experience, while in 
2007 only one in ten compa-
nies paid a bribe in public pro-
curement (Figure 19).
However, some qualifications 
need to be made to these posi-
tive results. Other CMS indica-
tors point out that instead of 
being indicative of reduced cor-
ruption in the public procure-
ment in Bulgaria these numbers 
might hint on the institution-
alization of corruption, i.e. its 
migration from the medium 
administrative to the higher 
political levels of the executive 
power and its transformation 
from occasional deals to closed 
corrupt networks known as 
“loops of companies,” discussed 
in section 1 of this report. Sev-
eral arguments tend to tilt the 
balance to the latter conclusion. 
First, the suspected concentra-
tion of public procurement cor-
ruption into the higher levels 
of government is corroborated 
by the reduced number of participants in public procurement tenders in 
Bulgaria. Fewer and fewer companies, especially new entrants, take part 
in the announced procedures. Since 2003, the share of the companies 
which have participated in public procurement procedures has fallen by 
two-thirds: from 42% in 2002 to 14% in 2007 (Figure 20). It has become 
a common practice for companies to take part in public procurement 
procedures only when they have guarantees that they will be the 
winners. Conversely, random players relying on unbiased ranking drop 
out. This assumption is supported also by the reported success rate of 
bidders. Winners (those awarded public procurement contracts over the 
period 2004 – 2006) were close to 100% of those which had taken part 
in a public procurement procedure at least once. This high success rate 
might somewhat distort the perceived level of concentration of suppliers 
to the public sector since each company might have participated 
in several procedures so that to win at least one. A more accurate 
measurement is the ratio between the number of contracts awarded and 
the number of participations. Even by that measure the rate of success is 
quite high – on average over 60% (the number of contracts compared 
to the number of procedures per company). The success rate is 52% 
FIGURE 21. SIZE OF THE BRIBE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT CONTRACT (% OF COMPANIES WHICH PAID A 
BRIBE TO GET A PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACT)
Source:: Vitosha Resarch
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FIGURE 22. PERCEIVED SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
ACCORDING TO THE BULGARIAN BUSINESS (% OF THE 
COMPANIES WHICH RESPONDED THAT IT IS WIDESPREAD)
Source: Vitosha Research
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FIGURE 23. SHARE OF DISCREDITED PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES IN 
BULGARIA (% OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
WHO HAVE REPORTED THE RESPECTIVE SHARE OF PROCEDURES IN 
THEIR INDUSTRY AS DISCREDITED)
Source: Vitosha Research
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for construction works, 60% 
for the supply of goods, and 
63% for the supply of services. 
This is indicative of the relative 
lack of competition for public 
procurement awards.
Second, the size of the bribes 
has increased (Figure 21). Finally, 
it should be remembered that 
the victimization surveys under-
lying the CMS give the best re-
flection of the personal involve-
ment in corrupt practices where 
respondents perceive themselves 
as victims. In other words, they 
reflect the intensity of administra-
tive corruption in the public pro-
curement sphere. Their capacity 
to gauge the political corruption 
in public procurement is limited; 
there businesses are accomplices 
rather than victims.
This is confirmed also by the 
CMS indicators, which show the 
assessment, rather than personal 
involvement, of entrepreneurs 
of the level and spread of cor-
ruption in public procurement. 
Although there are signs of a 
decline, 60% of the Bulgarian 
companies still assess corrupt 
practices in public procurement 
as “widespread” (Figure 22).
In fact, 84% of the participants in 
public procurement tenders have 
come across discredited proce-
dures (Figure 23) and they per-
ceive the frequency as quite high. 
42% of the Bulgarian entrepre-
neurs assess the share of discred-
ited procedures in their industry 
at more than 25%, and one in 
eight companies states that proce-
dures are strictly followed in less 
than 25% of the cases (Figure 23).
Besides sociological (soft) data, 
there are some hard data prov-
ing the relatively high levels of 
TABLE 9. FINDINGS OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT ON PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN 
BULGARIA
Source: PPA, PIFCA
2003 2004 2005
Number Million levs Number
Million 
levs Number
Million 
levs
Registered procedures (1) 6,572 6,801 10,583 3,296
Audited procedures (2) 6,096 729.1 5,624 988 6,399 1,200
Number of violated procedures 1,941 350 1,479 249.5 1,609 567.0
Number of revealed violations: 
Under the Law on Public Procurement
Under the Regulation on Awarding Small 
Scale Public Procurement 
2,154 2,551
651
1,900
567.0
515.3
51.7
Cases in which no public procurement 
procedures were initiated though they were 
due
820 85 484 79.8 641 98.5
Total violated and non-initiated procedures (3) 2,761 435 1,963 329.3 2,250 665.5
Share of audited in total procedures (2/1) 92.8% 82.7% 60.5% 36.4%
Violated/audited procedures ratio (3/2) 45.3% 59.7% 34.9% 33.3% 35.2% 55.5%
Violated/registered procedures ratio (3/1) 42.0% 28.9% 21.3% 20.2%
40 See Report of the Public Internal Financial Control Agency for 2005, Sofia, May 2006, 
http://www.advfk.minfin.bg/files/docs3_2005.pdf.
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corrupt practices and corruption risk in public procurement. For instance, 
a good measure for the substantial corruption risk in this sphere is the 
share of regulation violations actually detected by Bulgarian internal 
audit authorities (Table 9). The relative share of discredited procedures 
in public procurement in Bulgaria in value terms is more than 50% 
according to the findings of internal auditors. In 2005, the Bulgarian Public 
Internal Financial Control Agency (PIFCA) audited 6,399 procedures (some 
60% of all registered) at a total value of 1.2 billion levs and found out 
violations of procedures in 1,609 cases at a total value of 567 million 
levs. Some three-quarters of the revealed violations refer to small scale 
public procurement which account for only 9% of the violations in 
monetary terms. Over 91% of the value of revealed irregularities were for 
procedures regulated by the Law on Public Procurement (LPP)40. Furthermore, 
the internal audit found that authorities failed to hold public procurement 
procedures, although the grounds for holding them existed, to the amount 
of 98.5 million levs. This adds up to a total of 666 million levs in violated 
procedures and failure to hold procedures in 2005 or 56% of the value of 
all procedures checked by PIFCA. Such a high level of non-compliance 
can hardly be explained with procedural mistakes only as a result of 
legal incompetence or administrative inertia and lack of interest. Instead, 
it rather testifies to widespread corrupt practices.
FIGURE 24. SHARE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CARRIED OUT THROUGH OPEN 
OR CLOSED TO COMPETITION PROCEDURES
  (% OF THE NUMBER OF CONTRACTS SIGNED IN 2000 – 2006)
Source: Public Procurement Register (2000-2004); Public Procurement Agency (2005-2006). Negotiation 
procedures in 2005 and 2006 include those involving negotiations with and without announcement under 
the Law on Public Procurement and negotiations with invitation under Regulation on Awarding Small Scale 
Public Procurement.
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41 The Public Procurement Register does not provide such statistical information for 2000-
2004 (prior to the establishment of the Public Procurement Agency). The PPA data used 
here cover the period from 1 October 2004 to 30 June 2006.
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More valuable - from the corruption risk assessment perspective - are 
the figures about the share of public procurement procedures based on 
direct negotiation, i.e. without competitive bidding, in value terms. The 
estimates for 2005-06 (Figure 24) reveal that it is much higher than their 
share in the total number of procedures41. However, the data cover 
only a short period of time and, besides, they include the Belene NPP 
deal. Therefore they are used here rather as a point of departure in the 
corruption risk assessment and not so much as the basis for any firm 
conclusions.
Another indicator of the cor-
ruption risk level in public pro-
curement is the share of the 
contracts signed through vari-
ous forms of negotiation with 
the contractor allowed under 
the law, i.e. without full pri-
or disclosure of the param-
eters of the procurement in 
advance. First and foremost, 
it should be pointed out that 
such procedures are not only 
provided by law but, in the 
case of some complex trans-
actions, they are desirable to 
guarantee the best protection 
of public interest. From the 
entry into force of the Law on 
Public Procurement in 1999 to its amendment of 2004, however, the share of 
procedures employing negotiations rather than open competition tenders 
trebled, reaching a peak of 44% in 2003 before falling back again (Figure 24).
It is necessary to point out that this growth could possibly be the result 
of a more diligent reporting compliance (i.e. entering of the transactions 
in the Public Procurement Register). Nevertheless, these figures come 
to show that corruption pressure is concentrated largely in the 
negotiation type procedures of public procurement. The experience 
with the amendments of 2004, however, clearly shows that it can be 
substantially reduced through more strict regulations concerning the 
application of these procedures.
2.2.2. The Cost of Corruption in Public Procurement
The issue of the economic cost of corruption in public procurement is 
important from the perspective of the ex-ante impact assessment, i.e. 
the selection of anti-corruption instruments, and the ex-post assessment 
of their efficiency.
42 On the Eve of EU Accession: Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of 
Democracy, Sofia, 2006, p. 26.
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First and foremost, corruption in public procurement causes direct fiscal 
damage due to the artificially inflated prices of supplies, which include 
excessive profits for the suppliers and the corruption income of the 
responsible officials. The corrupt interaction does not necessarily lead 
to excessive costs. More often than not even the corrupt overcoming 
of competition in open tender calls for lower delivery prices. Then the 
excessive profit for the supplier and the bribe for the contracting authority 
result from the compromises with the quality and the parameters of the 
supply contract. In other words, there are no excessive fiscal costs but 
there are welfare losses because society does not receive the public goods 
in the quantities and with the quality it has paid for. Quite frequently 
these compromises could lead to higher costs in the operation or 
consumption of the goods and services supplied under a particular public 
procurement contract, i.e. transfer of budget spending forward in time or 
further to other institutions, beyond the time-line of the specific tender.
The accurate assessment of the fiscal cost in the form of excessive spending 
or loss of social welfare in public procurement is a difficult exercise 
based on many assumptions. A somewhat useful point of departure is the 
information from the Bulgarian internal audit agency with regard to the 
reported violations as set out in Table 9. The total value of the infringements 
of statutory requirements in 2005 was approximately 666 million levs 
or 56% of the total value subject to internal audit in the public 
procurement sphere. If this percentage is extrapolated to the estimated 
size of the whole public procurement market (4 - 5 billion levs in 2005), 
the total value of violated procedures would reach 2.2 – 2.8 billion levs.
This amount reflects the value of infringed procedures but not the 
value of the violations themselves, i.e. it is not equal to the fiscal 
damage caused by corruption. The fiscal cost of corruption is equal 
to the excessive rent - or profit - derived by representatives of the 
contracting authority and the contractor for their personal benefit due 
to the suppression of competition. The differential between the market 
price of the supply of the procurement and its tendering price (or the 
discrepancies in the quantity and quality of the procurement respectively) 
constitutes the real loss for society. The excessive rent/profit generated 
by corruption and the lack of competition, although more visible at the 
level of individual transactions, is difficult to calculate at the macro-
level. If we assume that it is divided equally between the parties to 
the corrupt deal, then the losses for the budget would be double the 
amount of bribes in this sphere. According to CMS of the Centre for 
the Study of Democracy in 2005, the average size of the bribe in public 
procurement accounted for about 7 % of the value of the contract42. 
This implies that, in the conservative scenario, the average amount of 
the excessive profit generated by corruption and the lack of competition 
in public procurement is approximately 15% of the total value of the 
procurement market in Bulgaria. Since the value of infringed procedures 
is 2.2 – 2.8 billion levs, the losses resulting from abuse in the public 
procurement sphere would range between 330 million levs and 420 
million levs annually for 2005 - 2006.
43 For example, the publicly commented case of the appointment of a minister and a 
deputy minister in a telecom operator immediately after the expiration of their term of 
office during which they made decisions to the benefit of the telecom.  
44 For example, the appointment of persons with serious charges of corruption and links 
with organized crime to diplomatic posts abroad. 
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The estimated amount of the losses should be considered as underestimated 
for a number of reasons. First, it reflects a conservative estimate of the 
potential size of the public procurement market at 4 – 5 billion levs. 
Secondly, it is based on a quite optimistic estimate of the efficiency of 
internal audit in Bulgaria. In other words, it builds on the assumption 
that the frequency of violations in the procedures outside the scope of 
the audit is similar to that in the audited procedures. In fact, if there 
was an efficient risk assessment and management system, the degree of 
deviation in the audited procedures should have been even higher than 
in the rest of the procedures. In this case, a lower estimate for the total 
number of irregular public procurement procedures would apply, say 
40 – 45% of the contracts awarded. This, however, would only be a 
realistic assumption in the case a politically independent inspection with 
proven professionalism and integrity existed in Bulgaria.
According to the latest available internal audit report, the procedures 
audited in 2005 accounted for some 60% of all procedures but only 
36% of their total value (Table 9). Some 75% of all detected violations 
were small-scale public procurement, as defined by the law, but they 
accounted for only 9% of the violations in value terms. Thus the 
internal audit covers primarily the small-scale procurement market 
segment, which usually involves only administrative corruption risk. 
Such a biased distribution of internal audit administrative resources 
towards small-scale procurement generates some doubts as to the 
political independence and the professional approach of the Public 
Internal Financial Control Agency. If these doubts are well-grounded, 
an assumption on a higher percentage of infringed procedures in value 
terms is due and would probably be closer to actual levels.
Last but not least, the assumption concerning the amount of the rent/
profit derived from corrupt practices in public procurement could also 
prove quite conservative. International studies show that the size of 
the bribe is usually very small compared to the benefit it provides for 
the supplier in public procurement. Moreover, in the case of political 
corruption, the classical cash kick-back has limited application, 
giving way to other types of benefits: support and financing for 
election campaigns, appointment after resigning from a government 
or administrative position43, scholarships for close relatives, safeguards 
against criminal prosecution44, etc. If this is the case, the more realistic 
estimate for the excessive profit generated by corruption on the public 
procurement market in Bulgaria could amount to 25% to 30%, which 
effectively doubles the assumption on the damage caused to society.
To sum up, if we abandon all conservative assumptions underlying the 
above mentioned optimistic estimate of the fiscal losses from corruption 
in public procurement, they could reach 1 billion levs annually, i.e. 
some 20 - 25% of the size of the market or approximately 2.4% 
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of GDP. All this leads to the conclusion that the actual size of the 
losses from public procurement corruption tends to come close to this 
level and it is commensurate to the size of the expected Cohesion and 
Structural Funds for Bulgaria.
Besides the direct fiscal damage of public procurement corruption, the 
public sector sustains losses from a possible relocation of budget spending 
to less transparent spheres with the aim of avoiding public control. 
Similarly, the sectors which have priority for Cohesion and Structural 
Funds financing (infrastructure investments and regional development, 
environment, energy) become an arena for acute political struggles to 
gain control over the EU resources and the national co-financing. In all 
these cases, it is actually corruption opportunities that determine the 
allocation of scarce public resources in the economy, diverging them 
from their most efficient uses.
Corruption in the public procurement sphere not only generates losses for 
the public sector but also inflicts economic damage to the private sector, 
which might be much greater and longer lasting than fiscal damage. The 
direct economic damage is associated with the losses of bona fide traders 
who could be more productive than those who win tenders through 
grafting. Because of corruption the market cannot recognize and reward 
their productivity. Market distortions occur and generate disincentives 
on the supply side and hence the damage is partially transferred to 
consumers through the prices charged on the market. Corruption in 
public procurement could also function for attaining oligopoly on some 
markets, where the excessive profit generated from the public sector 
make it possible for corrupt companies to sell to private consumers 
at lower prices and thus crowd out the other, especially smaller firms 
from the market. Hence the heavier damage which corruption in public 
procurement causes to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Another indirect cost for fair businesses is the increase in the 
administrative costs for participation in public tenders. This is the 
result of the attempts by the public authorities to apply more and more 
administrative measures to curb corruption and abuse which increases 
the compliance costs for the companies, especially smaller ones.
2.2.3. Areas of Increased Corruption Risk in Public Procurement
Most of the abuses in the public procurement field occur in the awarding 
procedures. These are the stages in which the tender documentation is 
prepared and bids are ranked. According to the CMS survey of January 2007, 
the most common infringements of rules, which participants in public 
procurement procedures in Bulgaria encounter are related to the ensuring 
of undue advantage to specific bidders, the lack of transparency or 
manipulation of the announced assessment criteria, etc. (Figure 25).
FIGURE 25. WHAT WERE THE MOST COMMON IRREGULARITIES YOUR 
COMPANY ENCOUNTERED IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES? 
(% OF THE RESPONSES)
Source: Vitosha Research
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What follows is a non-exhaus-
tive summary of the typical 
tools for restricting the range 
of participants and directing 
the outcome of the tender 
procedure to the benefit of 
a specific participant in pub-
lic procurement in Bulgaria.
Direct non-compliance. The di-
rect non-compliance is still 
widely spread through contracts 
awarded without any tendering 
or competitive bidding proce-
dure in violation of the law. 
Although this type of violation 
is observed mainly in the case 
of small-scale procurement of 
authorities in education, health 
and local government, the to-
tal effect of such violations is 
not small at all. In 2005, for 
example, PIFCA detected fail-
ure to hold due procurement 
procedures in cases worth 98.5 million levs, up from 80 million levs 
in 2004. In other words, about one-fifth of the value of all reported 
violations is due to brazen disrespect of the law. Even if we assume 
that the detection rate is much higher in this market segment due 
to the direct nature of the violation and the relative lack of political 
protection in comparison to big supplies, the relative weight of this type 
of violations in the total volume of damage (including the non-detected 
damage) seems significant. It is indicative of the insufficient deterrent 
effect of the sanctions compared to the benefits of the corrupt action. 
Although the action is most likely to be detected, the effective sanctions 
seem so soft that they could hardly compare to benefits. An additional 
motive for such behavior in the specific case of school headmasters and 
hospital managers is the low level of salaries and the diluted control 
shared by the central and local government, which makes them feel 
immune to penalties.
Circumvention of the law. Another way of awarding public procurement 
contracts to pre-determined bidders is by breaking them into smaller parts, 
which fall below the tendering thresholds stipulated by the law, allowing 
the public authority to go for direct awarding. One of the techniques to 
modernize the public procurement system in this country has been the 
raising of these thresholds in order to reduce the compliance costs for 
businesses in small-scale procurement. As a result, the current thresholds 
for obligatory tendering in public procurement are 100 thousand levs for 
construction works and 30 thousand for the supply of goods or services. 
These thresholds seem high for Bulgaria because they leave one quarter 
to one third of the public sector consumption beyond the scope of the 
Law on Public Procurement. The law can be circumvented also through 
45 BIA Public Procurement Monitoring: The Most Common Violations and Corrupt Practices, Sofia, 
p. 18 (http://www.bia-bg.com/files/ZOP-broshura-2005.rtf).
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the choice of direct negotiations with an alleged single bidder instead 
of resorting to an open bid procedure. The most typical arguments in 
such cases refer to an alleged exercise of certain exclusive rights, e.g. 
software copyrights. Whereas the fragmentation of contracts is often 
a sign of administrative corruption, the circumvention of the law 
through resorting to direct negotiations is typically connected to 
political corruption.  
Abuses in the definition of the parameters and technical specifications of public 
procurement procedures. It becomes increasingly difficult in most cases to 
ignore or circumvent the tender procedures prescribed by the Law on 
Public Procurement. Thus corrupt contracting authorities use an alternative 
set of tools to direct the procedure so that the preferred bidder wins. 
One of the tricks employed is to put down in the bidding requirements 
such parameters and specifications of the procured product or service, 
which though not essential for the quality of the public good provided 
rule out some bidders from the competition or directly prejudice the 
outcome. This is quite a widely used method in Bulgaria. Although it 
is relatively easy to detect it, it remains relatively unpunished. It is 
one of the methods which obviously hamper fair competition but it is 
rarely punished as a violation of the law. It is usually applied when the 
contractor is selected in advance at political level and the stakes are 
so high that neither the supplier can afford to lose nor the tendering 
authorities can afford the risk of failure for the conduct of an outright 
sham procedure with a pre-determined outcome. 
Abuses in the definition of the shortlisting and selection criteria. An alternative 
and not so overt instrument for directing the tender to the desired 
outcome, but also with a less clear result, is the definition of such 
selection criteria which leave sufficient room for subjective judgment 
and manipulation of results. Usually this is achieved by enhancing the 
share of qualitative indicators at the expense of quantitative ones, such 
as price and other measurable technical parameters. Some criteria could 
be too abstract or outright useless for the assessment of the relevance of 
the supplied product to the pubic consumer’s satisfaction. Examples of 
such criteria are “quality of the proposal” or “vision for the development 
of the sector”45. 
Others are related to the assessment of the supplier rather than 
the supplied good or service. These are for example all so-called 
“guarantees” for the capacity of the supplier to deliver the procured 
product in connection with specific experience, annual turnover or 
participation in similar tenders. The logic of such insurance on the part 
of the contracting authority is acceptable to a certain extent but, in 
practice, it restricts competition and confines the public procurement 
market to a narrow range of pre-selected eligible bidders. It leaves out 
companies which could offer better and more innovative solutions but 
lack the required eligibility.
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Even the quantitative parameters of public procurement can be deliberately 
manipulated to make direct comparison of bids more difficult and to 
increase the chance for applying administrative discretion in the selection 
procedure. Last but not least, even the price, which typically weighs a 
lot in the assessment (most frequently it forms more than 50 % of the 
final evaluation result), is only one of the cost elements. Manipulative 
pricing can often display publicly only the immediate costs of a facility 
without taking account of potential increase in the operational costs of 
the facility in the future. A more objective criterion would be the direct 
comparison of the overall net present value of alternative projects. It 
includes also the discounted future expenditures for the maintenance 
and operation, including warranty support, spare parts, consumables, 
etc.
Manipulation of the assessment and ranking. Next, even if all selection 
criteria are well specified, the end result can still be manipulated to 
the benefit of one or another bidder. A kind of guarantee against such 
practices seems to be the use of a pre-selected formula to calculate 
the final assessment comprising of all the quantitative and qualitative 
indicators with their respective weights. However, contracting authorities 
in Bulgaria rarely provide any written argument or statement to explain 
the assessment of the various components of the bid and the ranking. 
Thus the scores by individual criteria can be manipulated and adjusted 
to a desired final ranking. It is possible to do so because the individual 
components are not assessed and announced independently from one 
another, and also because the final assessment is not the result of 
independent expert appraisal.
Lack of transparency in the announcement of the bids and the ranking. The 
lack of transparency with regard to the parameters of the bids in tender 
procedures creates opportunities for further adjustment and improvement 
of certain bids before the final ranking is announced. Such a blackout 
is a condition and invitation to resort to corrupt manipulation of the 
tender procedure.
Other barriers to participation in public procurement. Sometimes the costs 
for participation in the tenders are artificially inflated to discourage 
‘accidental’ players. Although the Bulgarian law does allow the price of 
the tender documentation to exceed its production cost, in most cases 
it resembles more a participation fee rather than a charge to cover 
actual costs. In some cases it is excessive and functions as a filter at 
the input stage of the tender procedure. Similar barriers are also the 
unrealistically short deadlines for submission of bids, which can only 
be observed only by companies which have been tipped off in advance. 
This corrupt practice is related to leakage of information about the terms 
of reference to the benefit of a preferred supplier. 
Cancellation or discontinuation of tender procedures. Last but not least, if all 
these measures cannot ensure the victory of the preferred supplier, the 
contracting authority might terminate the procedure, citing as excuses 
either lack of financing or discrepancies between the bids and the terms 
of reference. In most cases, there are no clear arguments to support 
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such decisions and fair participants are left only with the incurred 
costs of bidding in the tender procedure and with a general feeling of 
distrust the official rules of the game. Such negative experiences from 
the participation in irregular procedures act to restrict competition and 
expand further the range of companies prepared to pay bribes in public 
procurement procedures.
All the above corrupt practices employed in Bulgaria are related to the 
directing and awarding of a contract to a preferred supplier ensuring 
personal benefits for the public officials representing the contracting 
authorities. They cover the stages of the preparation of the tender 
documentation and the ranking of the bidders in accordance with the 
announced criteria. But corruption risk in the public procurement sphere 
in Bulgaria does not end there. The stage of the implementation of 
public procurement contracts is not protected against the risk of abuse 
and corrupt practices either. 
Implementation of the contract. The most widely spread corrupt practices 
at the implementation stage of public procurement in Bulgaria is the 
re-negotiation (reduction) of the qualitative parameters of the contract 
or their outright neglect, or even the change in the price terms. Thus 
the contractor who has paid a bribe is able to offer much higher quality 
at a lower price in the bid, knowing that these bidding parameters are 
intended only to beat away the competitors and can be changed during 
the implementation phase. Indeed, the amendments to the Law on Public 
Procurement of 2004 tried to put barriers to the common practice of 
signing annexes to the contracts intended to change the initial terms of 
the public procurement contact. But, at the same time, the law does 
not include any provisions to ensure control over the implementation 
of the contract in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
the tender. In fact, LPP regulates the process until the signing of the 
contract. If there are no changes to the contract, the control over its 
implementation is left beyond the scope of the law.
The data of the internal audits in Bulgaria show that the corruption risk 
increases in line with the size of the public procurement value. Big 
corruption comes where big money is. Nevertheless, the public debate 
on this issue was focused for quite some time on the thresholds set 
out in the LPP and the negative effect of their increase. Most of the 
internal audit resources were also allocated in this area. Out of the 
2,551 violations established in 2005, 1,900 were in the category of low-
scale procurement but their total value was 51.7 million levs, i.e. 9% of 
the total value of uncovered irregular procedures. This distribution of the 
risk comes to support the idea that, from the viewpoint of the efficiency 
of control and business costs in the supply of goods and services 
to the public sector, it is better to raise the public procurement 
thresholds and to allocate the available administrative resources for 
the enforcement of the law into the biggest transactions. The optimal 
internal audit coverage target could be the transactions which constitute 
60% to 70% of the value of all procurement contracts signed. At 
present, the share of the audited procedures is some 30% to 35% in 
value terms.
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2.2.4. Reduction of the Corruption Risk in Public Procurement
The optimization of the regulations of public procurement tends to 
be considered more or less completed in Bulgaria. The most common 
argument is that the national legislation is almost fully harmonized 
with the acquis communautaire. Such an assertion should be accepted 
with some reservations. First, there remain some essential discrepancies 
between the national legislation and European standards. Second, the 
high levels of corruption risk and corrupt practices in this sphere reveal 
that the harmonization is not an end in itself but only a tool in the 
fight against corruption. The main objective of the harmonization of 
the Bulgarian domestic legislation with the acquis is to ensure the free 
movement of goods, services, people and capital within the European 
single market. Insofar as these freedoms are related to transparency, free 
and fair competition, and equal treatment of the suppliers of goods and 
services, they imply and require a corruption-free business environment. 
Moreover, the harmonization of the European legislation in the public 
procurement sphere is not a one-off act but a dynamic process of 
reflecting the continuous market challenges in the national legislation.
Recent developments of the public procurement legislation in 
Bulgaria
The Bulgarian public procurement legislation has been substantially 
improved in the harmonization process and many prerequisites for 
corrupt practices have been reduced. In accordance with the acquis 
communautaire, the existing Law on Public Procurement specifies three major 
principles underlying the legal regulation of public procurement: openness 
and transparency; free and fair competition; and equal treatment and 
non-discrimination. They shape the framework which this analysis uses to 
assess the efficiency of the public procurement legislation in Bulgaria. 
The scope of the public procurement legislation has been substantially 
changed. It has been expanded horizontally to cover not only conventional 
procurement authorities (government institutions and organizations) but 
also public law entities and the utilities, regardless of whether they are 
public or private. The expanded scope with regard to the contracting 
authorities promotes the equal treatment and competition on the public 
procurement market.
On the other hand, the scope of the law has been reduced with regard 
to the thresholds for its application. The modern understanding of 
legislative efficiency is increasingly concerned with the transaction costs 
for the contractors. In accordance with the EU Directives, the public 
procurement regime in Bulgaria has been liberalized. The thresholds 
above which the LPP applies have been almost trebled to 1.8 million 
levs for construction works, 150 thousand for the supply of goods, and 
90 thousand for the provision of services. Below these lower limits much 
easier procedural rules apply as laid down in the Regulation on Awarding 
Small-Scale Public Procurement (RASSPP). The thresholds below which no 
special procedure is required at all have been substantially increased 
(Table 10). 
TABLE 10. THRESHOLDS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES 
(IN LEVS, NET OF VAT)
Source: LPP, RASSPP
Type of 
procurement
Under the LPP Under the RASSPP
No special procedure required
3 quotes required 3 quotes not required
Construction works Over 1,800,000 100,000 - 1,800,000 45,000 - 100,000 Below 45,000
Supplies of goods Over 150,000 30,000 - 150,000 15,000 -  30,000 Below 15,000
Services Over 90,000 30,000 - 90,000 15,000 -  30,000 Below 15,000
Design competition Over 30,000 10,000 - 30,000 Below 10,000
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The purpose of these changes has been to facilitate the work of 
contractors and to lower their costs for participation in the procedures. 
At the same time, however, they have created more opportunities for 
discretionary and non-competitive selection of suppliers.
A similar divergent effect has been produced by the change of the legal 
framework concerning the types of public procurement procedures. The 
set of tools at the disposal of the contracting authorities has been substantially 
enriched in the recent years. On the one hand, its transparency has been 
boosted with the introduction of e-tenders and stock exchange trading. But, 
on the other hand, there has been a tendency to expand the application 
of direct negotiations. The existing legal framework provides for such 
instruments in the awarding of public procurement contracts and purchase 
of goods and services as competitive dialogue, direct negotiations with or 
without prior notice, dynamic supply systems, and framework agreements. 
All these forms are characterized by more or less restricted access of all 
bidders and more discretionary powers of the contracting authorities in the 
selection of the supplier/contractor. They increase the risk of corruption in 
public procurement in Bulgaria. This, however, does not come to say that 
they should be ruled out from the legal framework of public procurement.
From the perspective of public interest and maximum competition, 
it is important to ensure that there is equal treatment not only of 
the contractors but also of the contracting authorities in the public 
procurement process which have to compete on a level playing field 
with the other consumers in the private sector. Last but not least, it is 
important that the costs of both the public and the private sectors do 
not exceed the public benefit from the competitive awarding of public 
procurement contracts. These two principles of economic efficiency, 
which tends to be somewhat underestimated in practice, ensure that the 
public sector will not consume goods and services at prices which are 
higher than market prices. The problem is that they do not always imply 
solutions concurrent with the objective to provide maximum guarantees 
against corruption. This challenge becomes increasingly pronounced in 
the context of the development of the knowledge-based economy and 
the need for selection among high-tech solutions with high information 
asymmetry between suppliers and consumers. 
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This calls for new commercial practices in public procurement. Alongside 
transparency and competition (which should take the lead in non-
differentiated products) public authorities should increasingly rely on
partnerships, trust, information and expertise. In other words, the 
procedures involving direct negotiations serve public interest much better 
than conventional public tender procedures for the supply of many 
high-tech goods and services provided that there are no abuses. In this 
context, the challenge for the Bulgarian anti-corruption policy is to strike 
a proper balance between the corruption risks and constraints of the 
procedures and their economic efficiency. Thus, the issue at stake is not 
to outlaw direct negotiation procedures but to restrict the possibilities for 
undue application of these procedures. This makes the tasks of control 
in this sphere more difficult and requires greater weight on the checks 
of economic efficiency along with legality considerations.
More specifically, the legal framework of public procurement in Bulgaria 
needs careful review from the perspective of corruption risks along the 
following lines:
• Contract Implementation
The existing legal framework of public procurement covers only the 
selection procedures up to the time of the signing of the contract. 
The only safeguard against subsequent abuses is the ban on amending 
contracts after their signing. The purpose of this provision is to restrict 
the practices which were quite common until recently to sign annexes 
to the contracts so that to alter the parameters on the basis of which 
the contract was awarded.
However, the LPP provides no guarantees and control mechanisms 
against abuses in the implementation phase. There exist substantial 
risks of deviation from the agreed parameters of the contract with the 
tacit consent of the contracting authority, in particular in construction 
works and services which account for half of the value of all contracts 
in Bulgaria. Such corrupt practices remain outside the remit of financial 
audit control and sanctions for that matter.
• Appeal
The access to and the efficiency of legal remedies are among the most 
important guarantees against abuses in the public procurement sphere. 
Notwithstanding the drastic changes, the efficiency of appeal remains 
the most contentious issue in the Bulgarian legal framework on public 
procurement. After the unsuccessful assignment of arbitration functions 
to the Public Procurement Agency under a previous version of the Law 
on Public Procurement, today most experts are quite pessimistic as to 
the assignment of administrative appeal functions to the Commission 
for Protection of Competition (CPC). The arguments against such an 
arrangement vary from reasoning that first-instance proceedings cannot 
be assigned to a non-judiciary body to reasonable doubts that the 
CPC can never master the same capacity as the 112 district courts to 
examine appeals. 
46 For more details see Corruption in Public Procurement, Centre for the Study of Democracy, 
2007 (forthcoming).
47 At that time, Ruling No. 4/76 of the Supreme Court was adopted to summarize and 
streamline practices in the application of the Law on Administrative Procedures of 1971. That 
ruling gave guidance to the administrative process doctrine for decades, including the 
subsequent interpretative judgments relevant to the understanding of the lawful interest 
in challenging administrative acts.
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The appeal procedure before the CPC does not leave much chance to 
the plaintiff. If the latter does not want or cannot achieve suspension 
of the procedure, for which a CPC decision and a collateral equal to 
1% of the value of the procurement contract are required, the plaintiff 
could simply be preempted by the signing of the contract which makes 
it necessary to bring the case to the court and prove damage as a 
result of the selection of another contractor.
Access to legal remedies in Bulgaria remains quite limited. This is 
due, to a certain extent, to the gaps in the definition of the term 
“lawful interest” and the lack of the legal figure of the class action 
in the Bulgarian legislation46. It is a paradox that many acts of the 
highest bodies of the executive power cannot be challenged in court 
by anybody because for this to happen the claimant has to prove 
personal, direct and immediate interest in the repeal. This has been 
the consistent practice of Bulgarian courts since 197647. For example, 
the decisions concerning the largest investment projects supported 
or launched by the government of Bulgaria cannot be challenged at 
all because according to the prevailing Bulgarian court practice they 
do not affect any specific individual personally. The paradox is that 
precisely the decisions which affect everybody cannot be attacked by 
anybody. This is particularly relevant to projects in the energy sector. 
Each of them is worth hundreds of millions of euro and has financial, 
environmental and social consequences to be borne and paid by all 
consumers and taxpayers, including those unborn yet, for decades to 
come. Therefore each consumer of public services, or each taxpayer 
respectively, should be entitled to attack unlawful acts and/or actions of 
government authorities and monopolies. In this regard, a tangible step 
forward is the provisions on the principles underlying the lawful interest 
in attacking administrative acts under the new Code of Administrative 
Procedure (more specifically, Art. 147, para 1 and Art. 186, para 1). 
It is for the first time that the Bulgarian law-makers explicitly recognize 
the right of individual citizens or organizations whose rights, freedoms 
or lawful interests have been affected or could be affected to appeal 
against individual or statutory administrative acts.
Appeal mechanisms should be improved in the context of the new 
Code of Administrative Procedure and the functioning of the recently 
introduced administrative courts. The EC is also drafting a directive 
on appeal. In any case the existing arrangements are far from being 
optimal and they certainly are not final.
CORRUPTION AND SHADOW ECONOMY – RISKS FOR THE EU INTERNAL MARKET 55
• Control
The ex-post institutional control is entrusted to three agencies. The 
Public Procurement Agency at the Ministry of the Economy and Energy 
is responsible for the overall coordination and conduct of tender 
procedures. It keeps the Public Procurement Register (PPR). The National 
Audit Office performs an external audit function, i.e. it supervises the 
lawfulness of public procurement procedures However, it has no powers 
to impose sanctions when violations are detected; it can only advise the 
Parliament and the Ministry of Finance of such violations. The internal 
audit is assigned to PIFCA. It has greater powers to check not only the 
compliance with the legislation but also the quality and results of public 
procurement procedures. The process of absorption of national budget 
resources and EU funds will be monitored and audited also by internal 
auditors at the contracting authorities pursuant to the two new laws 
adopted in the beginning of 2006: Law on the Internal Audit in the Public 
Sector and Law on the Financial Management and Control in the Public Sector. 
Still, it is necessary to have intense public scrutiny over the internal 
audit efficiency. In this sense, it is necessary to use a modern risk 
assessment system and to expand the scope of auditing to include bigger 
public procurement transactions. This would allow internal audit and 
control to cover 60% of the value of all public procurement contracts 
at the contract implementation phase. Currently, it covers some 60% of 
the number of all contracts which account for about one-third of the 
total value.
• Sanctions
The applicability of criminal prosecution and deterrence of corruption 
in the public procurement sphere are somewhat limited. The reasons 
lie in the very nature of criminal law which is interested in behaviors 
that depend wholly or primarily on the ability to exercise conscious 
judgment and on the right of choice of the individual. Bribery is even 
more difficult to investigate, especially when it is indirect (through one 
or more intermediaries) or when it is paid within the framework of an 
organized group. As a result, criminal abuse in the public procurement 
sphere in Bulgaria remains unpunished thus blocking all possibilities 
for deterrence. The only possible outcome is the criminalization of 
conspiracy in the economy and the more persistent prosecution of 
money laundering.
The system of administrative sanctions laid down in detail in the existing 
Law on Public Procurement also deserves attention. Indeed, it explicitly 
provides for personal liability for the violations but the penalties are 
rather modest compared to the likely benefits of the corrupt action and 
can hardly be an effective barrier to corruption and abuse. For example, 
if the contracting authority unlawfully fragments the procurement in 
order to circumvent the requirements of the law or fails to observe 
statutory deadlines, the fine for the responsible official ranges from 200 
to 1,000 levs; the penalty for technical specifications giving advantage to 
a specific bidder is up to 1,000; the penalty for allowing discrepancies 
between the bid and the contract is up to 3,000; and the penalty is 
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up to 5,000 levs when the contract is awarded without a procedure or 
a contract is altered (or the signed contract diverges substantially from 
the framework agreement). In reality, all kinds of violations are quite 
difficult to establish because the penalty for failure of a public official 
to keep the documentation is only up to 1,000 levs. If the contracting 
authority awards the contract directly to a corruptor and destroys the 
documentation in the case of negotiations or a competitive dialogue, it 
is very difficult to prove the fault and corruption. The failure to submit 
the documents to PIFCA controlling authorities is punished with a fine 
of 100 to 200 levs. It is appropriate for the sanctions to be expressed as 
a percentage of the value of the public procurement contract; otherwise 
they are regressive, i.e. they encourage violations of bigger contracts 
because the percentage of the penalty is smaller in the total value of 
the violation.
Strengthening of the Administrative Capacity
Corruption-proofing of public procurement mechanisms not only calls 
for legislative changes but also critically depends on the strengthening 
of the administrative capacity to enforce them. The answers to these 
challenges in the Bulgarian anticorruption agenda would hardly come 
from outside Bulgaria, although the tendency to wait for the adoption 
of the respective EU directives and regulations for some of them (e.g. 
appeal) is understandable.
Adjusting administrative practices to changes in the legislation takes some 
time. Due to the dynamic nature of the Bulgarian public procurement 
legislation over the period from 1999 to 2007, the contracting authorities 
did not always manage to adjust their work to the new legislative 
requirements. However, as more experience is gained in the public 
procurement sphere, the time needed for adjustment is shortened. The 
most important achievement is the established organizational culture to 
use public procurement as a tool of the respective policies.
Most public administrations and other contracting authorities have used 
the time after the adoption of the latest version of the Law on Public 
Procurement for their own institutional development and strengthening of 
the administrative capacity in the public procurement sphere. Specialized 
public procurement units have been set up either specifically for this 
purpose or for the performance of other administrative functions as well. 
This has produced a positive impact on the accumulation of experience 
and specialized knowledge in the field of public procurement.
The application of the LPP and the RASSPP in their latest versions leaves 
less room for circumvention. Parallel to the growing public intolerance 
to corruption, this reduces the opportunities for practicing the familiar 
forms of corruption and the introduction of new ones. In order for this 
trend to deepen, public procurement policies should develop along 
the following lines: adoption and implementation of ethical rules in 
the public procurement sphere; elaboration of public procurement 
strategies (policies) and corporate plans of each administration, which is 
a contracting authority, and strengthening of the administrative capacity 
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to work on international projects with partial or predominant external 
financing  with a view to the access to the EU funds.
The introduction of internal rules for ethical behavior of the employees 
in public procurement is not yet widely discussed in Bulgaria. The acquis 
guarantees transparency and equal treatment of participants in public 
procurement procedures but everyday practices tend to deviate from 
these requirements, e.g. preferences are given to national participants 
or the applicable law is circumvented. It is codes of conduct that can 
reverse such negative trends and guide towards behavior conforming to 
the European and national public procurement legislation. Ethical rules 
should fill in the gaps in the Bulgarian public procurement legislation and 
help the proper understanding and interpretation of statutory provisions, 
as well as encourage their efficient application. The codes of conduct 
rules could serve as a criterion to assess the quality of administrative 
work. Their use for the purposes of the certification systems in the public 
administration could prove a powerful impetus not only to adopt them 
but also to implement them in the administrations’ daily operations.
Last but not least, for the strengthening of the administrative capacity in 
public procurement it is very important that the Bulgarian government 
gradually removes the channels for political influence in the 
contracting departments of public authorities through the development 
of a transparent and merit-based appointment system and by making the 
medium-level management in these administrations more independent. 
This refers also to the appointment of public procurement commission 
and their rules of operation. Their members should be independent from 
the respective political cabinets. All these measures can be accompanied 
by the appointment of compliance monitoring officers who could 
supervise the enforcement of the legislation and the codes of conduct 
in close interaction with civil society organizations and the media. Such 
positions could be introduced in the inspectorates of the public sector 
contracting authorities but also at utility regulators.  
The analysis of corruption in public procurement in Bulgaria generates 
justified concerns about the efficiency and transparency of the use 
of resources from the EU funds, which the Bulgarian government will 
distribute over the period 2007 – 2013. As early as 2007, the EU resources 
at the disposal of the Bulgarian government might reach 500 million 
to 1 billion levs, depending on the absorption capacity of the administration 
and the availability of co-financing for the projects from the national 
budget. These resources will increase by more than 600 million levs 
annually on the average over the period 2007 – 2009 (Figure 26). The 
corruption risks related to such a quick and substantial increase of 
public finances are reinforced by several additional factors:
• The lack of capacity of the Bulgarian government to put together 
public policies has left it to the Bulgarian public administration 
to work out the specific measures, activities and projects within 
2.3. Transparency and 
Expected Impact of 
the Management of 
EU Funds in Bulgaria
FIGURE 26. INDICATIVE ANNUAL ALLOCATION OF THE EU FUNDS FOR 
BULGARIA 2007 – 2013 (€)
Source: National Strategic Reference Framework
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the operational programs (the main programming documents for 
disbursing EU funds) for the management of the EU funds. The 
Bulgarian government has only adopted a most general vision on 
the national development over the period 2007 – 2013, which 
has not been complemented by specific policy guidelines. The 
vacuum between this broad vision and the specifics of individual 
actions and measures under the operational programs, i.e. the 
lack of clear and prioritized public policies, increases the risks 
for the development of corrupt relations among politicians, the 
administration and businesses, for channeling EU resources 
to prearranged winners, and for the emergence of cartels in 
specific areas. The lack of written public policies in the areas of 
EU funding implies that it is very difficult to judge whether the 
financing of a given activity is a response to a public need or it 
serves only specific vested interests. It has been widely announced 
in the Bulgarian media since the beginning of 2007 that there 
is preparedness to absorb 350 million levs from the EU funds 
over the period March – September 2007, without any clarity 
as to how such huge resources could pass through competitive 
tendering procedures, at the same time allowing sufficient time for 
applicants to prepare.
• The requirement for na-
tional co-financing of EU 
funding allocated to vari-
ous policy areas means 
that the increase in pub-
lic resources should be 
accompanied by either a 
substantial improvement 
of the administrative ef-
ficiency in the manage-
ment of public resources 
or a strengthening of the 
administrative capacity 
(Table 11). The gradual 
introduction of program 
budgeting since 2002 has 
created favorable condi-
tions for better planning 
of the national budget 
resources, as well as for 
an objective assessment 
of the efficiency in the 
spending of public funds. It was for the first time in 2007 that all 
Bulgarian ministries prepared their programming budgets, which 
revealed the very low policy formulation capacity of the Bulgarian 
government: the programming budgets did not follow any specific 
policy priorities but instead compiled a set of measures suggested 
by the various ministry directorates without even attempting to 
integrate them into a consistent and logical whole. The spending 
of budget resources without any distinct organic linkage to an 
48 Report on the findings of the performance audit of the main stages in the preparation for EDIS 
in the implementation of PHARE and ISPA projects at the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the 
Environment and Water, the Ministry of the Economy and Energy, and the Ministry of Transport for 
the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2006, National Audit Office of the Republic of 
Bulgaria.
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officially adopted policy creates opportunities for the development 
of clientele-type relations between individual directorates at the 
ministries and private organizations. Therefore the good practice 
of program budgeting should continue, seeking opportunities to 
improve the capacity of ministries to formulate public policies and 
to reduce public spending on the basis of more efficient use of 
resources. According to the Country Assistance Strategy for Bulgaria 
of the World Bank over the period 2007 – 2009 and the latest 
review of the Agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
in 2006, there is room for substantial cuts in public finances, 
which could release human resources and financing, which for 
example could be used for preparing better projects for European 
financing.
• Several Bulgarian executive agencies, which have been designated 
as managing authorities for EU funding, including the Central 
Finance and Contracting Unit, have not been accredited yet (end 
of March 2007) by the European Commission for decentralized 
management of EU resources, i.e. they are not allowed to approve 
the disbursement of EU funds yet. Although there were similar 
delays in the countries of the previous wave of EU enlargement 
in 2004, they increase corruption risks as they shorten the span 
of time between the announcement of the tendering procedures 
and the deadlines for the implementation of the activities under 
the tenders. The delays generate deficits both in the capacity of 
the public administration to process the tender applications and 
on the side of the bidders who do not have the time to prepare 
adequately unless they have been tipped off in advance. Such 
delays bring about many opportunities for corruption and abuse. 
Indicative in this respect was the experience with the management 
of pre-accession funds in Bulgaria in 2006, when the calls to 
tender and subsequent short-listing of bidders were delayed by six 
to nine months. For example, in the very last days of December 
public tenders worth dozens of millions of еuro were announced 
with implementation deadlines by the end of 2007. A further 
problem aggravating corruption risks in EU financing is the lack 
of transparency in the relations between the Bulgarian public 
administration and the European Commission, including its 
Delegation/Representation in Bulgaria. Thus pre-accession funds 
are allocated on the basis of non-transparent negotiations between 
two administrations – the Bulgarian and the European one which 
determine each step in the process of preparation and approval 
of the resources within the framework of the disbursement of EU 
funds. Both administrations are motivated to spend the resources 
in full in order to be able to defend their own budgets in 
the future. The delays in the spending of the resources48 often 
results from the desire of either administration to assert its own 
TABLE 11. INDICATIVE ALLOCATION OF THE AVERAGE ANNUAL NATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN SPENDING BY SECTORS49 (€ MILLION, 2006 PRICES)
Source: National Strategic Reference Framework
Sectors
Average annual resources 
2007-13 (plan)
Average annual resources 
2004-2005 (actual)
Growth rate
National 
+ EU
National National 
+ EU
National National 
+ EU
Basic infrastructure 657.9 365.1 463.0 320.1 134%
Transport 223.5 148.4 156.0 134.1 143%
Telecommunications 14.3 9.1 21.7 21.7 66%
Energy 159.1 1.2 134.0 1.1 119%
Environment and water 205.8 153.8 137.0 119.0 151%
Health 55.2 52.5 44.5 44.2 124%
Human resources 226.0 111.9 94.1 74.9 240%
Education 101.6 60.9 45.5 39.8 223%
Training 104.2 43.1 37.8 31.4 276%
Research and technological 
development
20.1 4.8 10.8 3.8 186%
Productive environment 396.3 183.0 137.0 129.7 289%
Industry 100.2 15.5 2.9 1.4 3,455%
Services 263.2 162.0 132.0 127.7 200%
Tourism 32.9 5.4 2.8 0.5 1,175%
Others 72.0 60.0 43.5 43.5 166%
TOTAL 1,352.2 720.1 768.0 568.3 176%
49 The National Strategic Reference Framework adopted by the Council of Ministers on 21 
December 2006 refers to these resources as “public or other equivalent expenditure for 
the Convergence of Regions objective”.
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view, including the selection of specific projects and/or bidders, 
on their absorption. This structure of the incentives, coupled 
with the lack of effective judicial oversight and redress of the 
activities of the two administrations, generates an exceptionally 
favorable environment for corruption. In the course of time a 
specific institutional culture of intended miscommunication and 
irresponsibility has developed between the two administrations, 
which, unless adequate measures are undertaken, is a cause for 
serious concerns over the efficient use of EU funds in the period 
2007 - 2013.
50 Bulgarian SMEs and their Participation in the Structural Funds, Ministry of the Economy and 
Energy, Vitosha Research, 2006. Assessment of the capacity of non-governmental organizations 
and businesses to participate in the absorption of the EU Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, 
UNDP, Bulgaria, 2006. 
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• Bulgarian businesses and other eligible organizations have only limited 
capacity for absorption of EU funds50. The Bulgarian economy is 
already operating close to its potential (there is an obvious shortage 
of skilled personnel), and a number of international organizations, 
including the European Commission, have warned against overheating. 
This creates a credible threat that businesses and the economy as a 
whole can effectively absorb the planned increase in EU financing, 
which might lead to crowding out of private investment. In such 
an environment it will be easy for corrupt political interests 
to siphon resources through shell companies or organizations 
specifically incorporated to absorb EU funds in Bulgaria. Thus the 
EU funds could end up being used for setting up and maintaining 
elite cartels based on legal corruption, restricting the competitive 
access to resources for all other companies.
The analysis of the structure of the planned allocation of resources from the 
EU funds, as presented in the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), 
the main document guiding the disbursement of EU funding, reveals the 
existence of a multitude of corruption risks at the macro-level. The biggest 
average annual increase of spending of national and European public funds 
is envisaged for the production sphere, i.e. for direct impact on the private 
sector. For example, the average annual resources allocated for the industry 
will increase 34 times, and for the tourism 11 times. It is very likely, especially 
in tourism, one of the industries with the best profitability in the private 
sector, that EU funding be used to replace commercially viable projects 
thus pushing out of the market commercially competitive but politically 
not connected companies. This is particularly relevant to the initial stages of 
the allocation of EU funding, when the administrative capacity will be the 
weakest (Figure 27). The NSRF does not provide for any clear cut linkage 
between the planned allocation of resources and clearly formulated 
public policies. Although this situation is similar to the one in the other 
new EU Member States, a more precise and policy-based allocation of the 
resources could reduce the opportunities for corruption and reinforce the 
positive effect of the resources spent. While it is understandable to seek 
maximum absorption of EU resources during the first year, even at the price 
of a higher corruption risk, it is necessary to gradually shift the thrust to the 
development and fine tuning of policies intended to channel resources into 
spheres with longer-term impact and rates of return, where businesses find 
it more difficult to invest, such as education, technological development, 
and innovation. At the same time, the experience with the management 
of the EU pre-accession funds in Bulgaria shows that the reduction of 
corruption risks in the absorption of EU funds calls for greater accountability 
and transparency in the relations between the national authorities and the 
European Commission, including its local Representation. It is important to 
put in place a reliable and independent system to monitor the attainment 
of the planned national targets for the management of the EU funds in 
close collaboration between the highest audit institutions of Bulgaria and 
the EU and the non-governmental sector.
FIGURE 27. INDICATIVE CHANGE IN THE PRIORITIES OF THE BULGARIAN 
GOVERNMENT AS REFLECTED IN THE SHARE OF THE VARIOUS 
SECTORS IN THE AVERAGE ANNUAL FINANCING FROM NATIONAL 
AND EU FUNDS OVER THE PERIOD 2007 – 2013
Source: USRF.
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Corruption risks within the EU funding instruments and mechanisms
Being the guardian of the EU Treaties and the key institution in the 
enforcement of the standards of the Union requires a high degree 
of transparency and accountability by the European Commission. 
By implication, this applies to its Delegations and Representations 
in member and candidate countries, in particular in instances 
where these are instrumental in monitoring the compliance with 
EU’s good governance standards. To this end, it is important that 
the image of these institutions is impeccable. 
Still, there is a concern among Bulgarian civil society that the EC 
Delegation/Representation in Sofia might have failed in a number 
of occasions to achieve the standards of transparency it advises 
Bulgarian institutions should live up to. 
Unresolved corruption allegations.  In 2005 the Chairman of 
Transparency International - Bulgaria accused the officer in charge 
of civil society at the EU Delegation, of corruption and clientelism 
in relation to the management of the Phare Civil Society Program. 
Documents disclosed by the media showed how expert evaluations 
of project proposals had been manipulated to ensure the awarding 
of the contract to the “right” candidate. This case provided strong 
evidence that the grants to the civil society organizations in Bulgaria 
might have not been allocated through a competitive bidding but 
seemed rather a result of a compromise between decision-makers 
in the EU Delegation and in the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance, 
each of them defending their own clientele.
51 Final Audit Report on the Request by the Republic of Bulgaria for the Conferral of Management of 
Aid Under Extended Decentralisation, Brussels, 19 January 2007, p.50 
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As a result of the public scandal ACCESS Foundation, a leading 
Bulgarian anti-corruption outfit, surveyed 250 Bulgarian civil society 
organizations who had been awarded Phare grants. One third of 
the respondents admitted that the selection procedures under the 
Phare Civil Society Program “lacked any transparency”. Despite 
these allegations, no action to clean the image of the Delegation 
had been taken thus far.
Lack of adequate oversight mechanisms. A serious deficiency 
of many programs funded by the EU in Bulgaria favorable for 
corruption  was the lack of adequate oversight. On the one 
hand, according to the applicable EU rules and procedures if the 
contracting authority was a national institution any appeal for errors 
or irregularities was subject to the beneficiary country’s national 
legislation. On the other hand, the relevant Bulgarian legislation 
and related case law excluded any funding from international 
organizations, including the EU, from any domestic supervision, 
including judicial control.
Conflict of interest risks. In the second half of 2006, the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement carried out an 
Extended Decentralised Implementation System audit of the of 
procedures and structures related to the implementation of all 
the National Programs in Bulgaria. Subject to audit were the 
Implementing Agencies for the EU assistance programs.
Among the initial findings of the auditors was a potential conflict 
of interest in the appointment of the Head of the Financial Unit 
of the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU) at the Ministry 
of Finance. Apparently, a former employee of a Greek consultancy 
firm was appointed Head of Unit of the CFCU three weeks after 
leaving the firm. This happened at a time of evaluation of a tender 
in which the consultancy was among the bidders. Two months 
after this appointment, the consultancy - Planet SA – was awarded 
the contract. 
In a letter (dated November 30, 2006, the date of award of the 
contract) quoted in the auditors’ report51 the Delegation of the 
European Commission denies the existence of any conflict of 
interest in this case, contrary to the findings of the Commission’s 
auditors. Particularly worrying in this case is that even EU institutions 
(in this case the then Delegation of the European Commission), 
which the public expects to be the guardian of the integrity of the 
spending of EU funds in Bulgaria, failed to act.
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In 2006, the institutions of the state focused primarily on fulfilling the 
urgent requirements for Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. One persisting 
challenge of Bulgaria’s membership of the Union was, among others, the 
attainment of specific results in preventing and combating corruption. All 
the three branches of power had to live up to serious commitments in 
that respect, including the promise to achieve genuine interplay among 
the anticorruption units existing inside each of those branches.
An assessment of the efficiency of the 40th National Assembly in terms of 
preventing and combating corruption should comprise the way in which 
the parliament’s fundamental function, viz. lawmaking, is fulfilled as well 
as the operation of some specialized parliamentary mechanisms, such as 
the standing and ad hoc committees, and the institutions elected by the 
parliament and vested with supervisory and monitoring functions.
3.1.1. Anti-Corruption Legislation and Lawmaking
• In 2006 the Law on Political Parties was amended to take on board the 
recommendations of the European Commission to Bulgaria formulated 
in the Commission’s Monitoring Report of 16 May 2006, and to meet 
the public expectations for wider transparency and control of political 
parties’ funding. 
The newly-introduced requirement for members of the governing and 
supervisory bodies of political parties, and for the representatives of such 
parties, to disclose their property, income and expenditure, both within 
the country and abroad, following the procedure set out in the Law on 
Property Disclosure by Persons Occupying Senior Positions in the State (article 
30(3) of the Law on Political Parties) can certainly be evaluated as a positive 
step. This requirement, however, does not apply to political parties which 
do not receive government subsidies. Those parties, albeit not represented 
in parliament, may have power in the local governments and this in 
itself requires that their income and assets be disclosed (article 30(4) 
of the Law on Political Parties).
A number of changes have been made relative to the property and 
funding of political parties. Thus, a political party’s own income may now 
also include yield from securities; the previous restrictions on the level 
3. STATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST 
CORRUPTION
3.1. The Legislature
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of donations that may originate from the same natural or legal person 
have been dropped off and the amount of government funding available 
to political parties has gone up. Allowing political parties to earn income 
from securities, however, runs the risk of making the avoidance of the 
prohibition on business operations easier. It could also prompt businesses 
to find new ways of influencing political parties.
A noteworthy sign of progress is the newly-introduced ban on political 
parties to receive funds from the following persons or entities:
– commercial companies with over 5 % of government or municipal 
interest or related persons from companies where the state has 
shares providing for special rights, as well as from state-owned or 
municipal enterprises, and
– bidders and participants in a public procurement procedure which 
has not been closed, where the deadline for appeals under the 
Law on Public Procurement has not expired; the same prohibition 
applies to any contractor under a public procurement contract as 
well as to the legal entities involved in privatization procedures.
Under the rules, the necessary publicity should be achieved via the 
website of the National Audit Office (hereinafter NAO) and information 
disclosed should cover the donors as well as the type and level of 
donations made. Likewise, an obligation has been introduced for political 
parties to file with the NAO a list of the natural and legal persons 
having made donations, the level or value and the purpose of such 
donations, plus a separate list of the not-for-profit legal persons acting 
as donors if a member of a governing or supervisory body of a political 
party or their children or spouses are founders and/or members of the 
governing or supervisory body of that legal person. The financial reports 
of political parties receiving government funding should be forwarded to 
the National Revenue Agency (hereinafter NRA) which should audit them 
in conformity with the Tax and Social Security Procedure Code. Political 
parties having failed to file their statements should be audited as well. 
At the same time, although the financial statements are to be filed with 
the NAO, which should audit and publish them in its bulletin and on 
the internet, the NAO has not had the practice of verifying the accuracy 
and comprehensiveness of the financial documentation it is provided 
with. Only the files that are affected by formal irregularities make their 
way to the NRA. Moreover, it is impossible to cross-check the source of 
funding if the political party has prima facie fulfilled its obligation to draw 
up a financial report which appears to be impeccable at first glance.
In order to encourage more substantial progress in the practice of 
funding political parties and to enhance public trust in that process, 
control over the implementation of the legal framework has to be 
strengthened and the framework itself should be further developed along 
the following lines:
– some existing sources of political party funding should be legalized 
and some of the existing legislative restrictions should be removed;
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– the potential diversity of the forms of funding should be taken 
into account, including the different forms of contributions made 
by third parties (basically legal entities), e.g. transport services, 
provision of halls and offices, printing services, access to digital 
media, outdoor advertising, etc. If these are explicitly mentioned 
in the law and are regarded as lawful donations, the effects 
would be positive indeed, provided that such donations are tied 
to matching - and reasonable - taxation rules. That would also 
facilitate the traceability of the funds in the context of other 
statutory requirements, such as the prohibition on political parties 
to obtain funding from foreign governments or from foreign legal 
persons;
– cash payments should be restricted and brought down to the 
possible minimum.
• After several years of legalistic and political obstructions, on 24 March 2006 
the National Assembly passed the Law on the Commercial Register. Its 
entry into force (1 July 2007) is expected to dramatically suppress 
any corruption-related pressures as regards company registration. In 
the meantime, a veto imposed by the President of the Republic has 
been overcome. The entry into force of the law would mark the 
beginning of a radical reform in company registration in this country, 
as the court-based incorporation of companies will be replaced by 
an administrative system of company registration whose core will 
be the Central Electronic Commercial Register to be kept by the 
Registry Agency with the Minister of Justice. The issuance of secondary 
legislation on the collection, storage of and access to information in 
the commercial register, complements the legal framework designed 
to bring forth a modern, reliable, easily accessible, efficient, swift, 
and corruption-proof system of company registration. That would 
enable the implementation of European standards and of the best 
practices existing in Europe and the world over. In addition, district 
courts would be relieved from the burden of processing company 
registration files. Although an essentially administrative task, company 
registration files stand for more than half of the average number 
of cases resolved by district court judges. A mighty resource would 
thus be freed as many highly-qualified judges would be able to 
concentrate on the administration of justice alone.
Advantages of the Central Electronic Commercial Register
• Quick registration that will take place virtually instantaneously
• Simplified registration procedures
• Much safer registration procedure
• Reliability of the information involved
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• Transparency and publicity of the register and free access 
thereto and to the information it contains
• Avoiding the duplication of information and consolidating all 
the existing registers into a single nation-wide register
• Lower costs and expenses of the parties concerned
• Possibilities for a future merger with other central electronic 
registers and bringing any registered particulars relative to 
persons or estates in an Electronic Registries Center 
The advantages of the Central Electronic Commercial Register would 
alleviate the burden on Bulgarian businesses and foreign investors and 
curb substantially the corruption associated with court-based company 
registration. Nonetheless, the feedback from various institutions, including 
the courts, remains ambiguous. The criticism ranges from genuine fears of 
a possible chaos during the transfer of the registers from the old place 
to the new one up to the sheer reluctance of some persons to lose the 
opportunities for additional “facilitation” payments. Hence, there are some 
important conditions for the reform to succeed: it is indispensable to have 
adequate support on the part of the state and the business community, 
to speed up the finalization of the legislative and technological setup and 
the procurement of equipment, and to provide for the necessary staff 
and for the training of the officials responsible for the registration. In fact, 
the delayed drafting of secondary legislation and the lacking technical 
preparedness to do the job (irrespective of the tendering procedures held 
and the funding allocated by the EU whose purposes and results have not 
been directly related to the overall concept of the reform) might not only 
slow down but even undermine the reform from the outset.
Technological basis of the registration reform
In December 2004, the Ministry of Justice held a tendering procedure 
for the computerization of the judiciary under the EU PHARE Program. 
Greek bidder Intracom whose bid amounted to EUR 900,000 
was selected as the contractor for Lot 3 – Development and 
Implementation of a Unified Register System that should bring together 
the current registers of pledges and the commercial register. As of 
April 2006, however, despite the fact that the system covered by the 
tender has been introduced in all district courts, except for that in 
Burgas, it actually operates only in the district courts of Pazardzhik 
and Sofia, and at the Central Register of Not-for-Profit Public Benefit 
Legal Entities kept by the Minister of Justice.
Source: Bulgaria’s position paper (21 April 2006) on the European Commission’s monitoring report.
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• The enactment of new procedural laws, viz. the Administrative Procedure 
Code (hereinafter APC), the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC), 
and the drafting of the future Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter CCP) 
have been aimed to accelerate the administration of justice and 
improve its efficiency, in parallel to lowering the level of corruption 
in general and within the judiciary.
– The newly-adopted Administrative Procedure Code (in force as from 
12 July 2006, except for its part on court proceedings, which is in 
force as from 1 March 2007) is the first thorough instrument designed 
to codify administrative proceedings in Bulgaria. It provides for the 
deployment of a comprehensive system of regional administrative 
courts and has introduced a possibility to streamline the case law 
of the courts through everyone’s power to seek from the Supreme 
Administrative Court an interpretative decision on any matter that 
has turned out to be resolved inconsistently by different courts. 
This possibility is a crucial vehicle to guarantee the stability and 
impartiality of justice as such interpretative decisions are binding 
on the courts. Moreover, the existing case law of the Supreme 
Administrative Court itself is inconsistent. The reasons for this 
situation may be attributed to the varying levels of professionalism 
the different judges have, as well as to their possible involvement 
in corruption schemes.
At the same time, the APC has failed to proclaim an important 
principle - that of implied consent, which would have substantially 
reduced the number of administrative cases. Instead, the code 
reiterates the major principle of administrative penalties which are to 
be imposed by the Minister of State Administration and Administrative 
Reform. The solution of having 28 regional administrative courts is 
equally inconsistent with the need for providing access to justice 
in administrative cases (such access could be ensured even if 
the regional administrative courts were fewer) and is rather the 
incarnation of personal ambitions cherished by some Members of 
Parliament and a few other players. The regional administrative 
courts are expected to assume responsibility for the majority of 
cases, including the appeals against acts signed by ministers, thus 
alleviating the workload of the Supreme Administrative Court. The 
jurisdiction of those courts should also cover disputes relative to 
concessions and tendering procedures. Such disputes are currently 
handled at first instance by the Commission for Protection of 
Competition. The Commission apparently lacks the capacity for 
this task which, moreover, brings it closer to special jurisdictions 
prohibited by the Constitution. The decisions of the Commission 
for Protection of Competition may be appealed against before a 
three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. Under 
the fully-fledged system of justice in administrative cases to be 
established, it would be a legal and factual absurdity for those 
disputes to remain within the competence of a centralized out 
of court regulatory body such as the Commission for Protection 
of Competition.
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In addition, the requests to repeal different provisions and 
regulations issued by the executive bodies will henceforth be dealt 
with at two instances. Administrative justice is an instrument of 
paramount importance and its anti-corruption potential should 
be strong enough to ward off the temptations to have some 
corruption schemes legitimized by way of involving the justice 
system therein.
– April 2006 saw the entry into force of the CPC (in force as from 
29 April 2006) which had been passed hastily and non-transparently, 
and has been seriously challenged already before it had taken 
effect. The enforcement of the CPC after its effective date has 
brought to light problems which have already triggered discussions 
and proposals to amend the text - extremely short deadlines for 
investigation; transferring almost all the investigations to the police 
without ensuring adequate staffing and level of professionalism; 
lack of clarity as to the institute of the supervising prosecutor, to 
mention but a few.
– The Draft Code of Civil Procedure has been adopted at first reading. 
Leaving aside the debate about whether the adoption of a new 
code is a must, or the effects pursued could rather be achieved 
by amending the existing code, the new procedural rules generate 
many expectations for positive changes in the realm of civil 
litigation, in particular that the process would speed up and 
improve, while those involved would find it more difficult to 
behave corruptly. The following solutions featuring in the draft 
could be singled out: focusing the procedural efforts on the 
first instance thus ensuring swift and exhaustive first-instance 
proceedings; review of court judgments by means of limited 
appeals or restricting the admissibility of new facts and evidence 
before the court of appeal (the court of appeal should only admit 
new evidence where the requesting party invokes new facts); and 
cassation appeals based on the preliminary selection of admissible 
cases, with the necessary prerequisites for the swift progress of 
the review proceedings, etc. All this is expected to curtail the 
excessive workload of the Supreme Court of Cassation so that it 
would be able to focus on interpretation - a sine qua non if court 
case law is to be uniform across the country. The enactment of 
the CCP would also boost the reform of the enforcement of claims 
whose institutional debut was the enactment and entry into force 
of the Law on Private Enforcement Agents back in 2005 (in force as 
from 1 September 2005). 
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3.1.2. Conflicts of Interest and Corruption
As to the legal framework concerning the restrictions to carry out 
specific activities (incompatibilities) and the conflicts of interest, clear-
cut positive developments are only found in few specific spheres:
• The Law on Amending and Supplementing the Law on Administration (in 
force as from 25 March 2006) seeks to prevent conflicts of interest 
in two ways:
– By introducing incompatibilities for single-member bodies of the 
executive, members of collegiate bodies, district governors and 
their deputies (article 19(6) of the Law on Administration). The progress 
here is serious and noteworthy as this is the first time that general 
rules of primary legislation have been enacted to affect the highest 
political levels of the administration (so far, this area has been 
covered by various special laws). Unfortunately, the incompatibilities 
are confined exclusively to doing business and participation in a 
company’s supervisory, governing and controlling bodies (except 
for those with state or municipal interests). No restrictions exist on 
work under service contracts in return for honoraria. Similarly, there 
is no clear-cut legislative mechanism for the mandatory divestiture 
of powers where a person holding any of the above-listed positions 
proves to have engaged in an incompatible arrangement (see article 
19a(2) of the Law on Administration).
– By setting up an Inspectorate General within the administration 
of the Council of Ministers (article 46a of the Law on Administra-
tion). The Inspectorate General is directly subordinate to the Prime 
Minister and acts as a Secretariat of the Commission for Preven-
tion and Countering of Corruption with the Council of Ministers. 
The key emphasis in the Inspectorate General’s work is to examine 
reports of conflicts of interest or other breaches of official duty, as 
well as any received reports of corruption affecting an executive 
body or a civil servant with managerial functions. While the aspira-
tion to have the fight against corruption and the conflicts of inter-
est institutionalized at the highest level of the executive should 
be supported, the staffing of the Inspectorate General – only six 
individuals on the payroll – fails to provide genuine guarantees
that this structure would have the administrative capacity required 
for its efficiency (Annex 3 to article 88(2) of the Organizational 
Rules of the Council of Ministers and Its Administration).
• The recently adopted Administrative Procedure Code enshrines a number 
of basic elements of relevance to the conflicts of interest:
– Provisions on the principle of impartiality. To ensure the 
implementation of that principle, article 10(2) of the APC prevents 
from participating in the proceedings any official who has a vested 
interest in their outcome or is related to an interested party in a way 
that may spark off well-founded doubts of his or her impartiality.
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– General rules on recusation (article 33 of the APC). Wherever 
a ground for recusation exists, the removal of an official from 
participation in the proceedings should be done either of that 
official’s own motion or at the request of a participant in the 
proceedings. Recusation should be invoked immediately upon 
the requesting party’s becoming aware of the ground for such 
reclusion and should be decided on by the immediate superior.
– Court proceedings to establish conflict of interest (Chapter Fifteen, 
Section I of the APC). It should be underscored that for the first time 
now anyone whose rights and lawful interests have been affected may 
request that a judge at the respective administrative court declare 
the existence of conflicting interests. Rather unreasonably, the scope 
of this proceeding is confined to the conflicts of interest affecting 
civil servants (article 251(2) of the APC). Thus, the cases of conflicts 
of interest affecting the political levels of the administration – 
government ministers and executives, their deputies and the members 
of political cabinets – remain beyond the purview of the rule. The 
binding nature of the court’s finding of a conflict of interests does 
not readily transpire either: under article 253(1) of the APC, the 
court shall “notify the competent authority so that the necessary steps 
could be undertaken”. These two drawbacks would certainly detract 
from the purported effectiveness of the proceedings in question.
Conflict of Interests Defined
Paragraph 43 of the Transitional and Final Provisions of the APC 
inserted a new paragraph 4 in article 29a of the Law on Civil Servants
(hereinafter LCS). Although the text is not located among the 
additional provisions of the law, where it belongs, in essence it is a 
legal definition of the concept of conflict of interest. The language 
mirrors an utterly casuistic approach which is not typical for such 
definitions. Thus, according to article 13 of Recommendation No. R 
(2000) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to the Member States on codes of 
conduct for public officials “Conflict of interest arises from a situation 
in which the public official has a private interest which is such as 
to influence, or appear to influence, the impartial and objective 
performance of his or her official duties.” Similar definitions exist 
in the legislations of Portugal, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia and other 
countries. Under the Bulgarian provision, in order for a conflict of 
interest to occur, two conditions should be present simultaneously:
• a civil servant, or a person related to a civil servant, should have 
not terminated, or should have acquired after their appointment, 
the capacity of a sole trader, partner, procurator, member of a 
governing or supervisory body of a commercial company;
• that commercial company/sole trader should carry out 
transactions or bid for or perform a public procurement contract 
as a contractor with the legal entity with whose manager the 
civil servant has a civil service relationship.
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The first condition refers to one sole scenario involving a civil 
servant’s personal/private interests, namely the business sphere. 
Thus, matrimonial and next-of-kin relationships, political 
influences or the holding of other positions in government are 
actually excluded as possible reasons for conflicts of interest.
The second condition narrows down unreasonably the possible 
scope of conflicts of interest, i.e. they may only arise in respect of 
bidding for, entering into and/or performing public procurement 
contracts. This leaves out some extremely important areas which 
represent a higher risk in terms of conflicts of interest and, 
hence, corruption, e.g. the granting of concessions, licensing, 
registration and authorization schemes, or the selection and 
recruitment of those working in the administration.
Overall, the scope of the concept of conflicts of interest defined 
in article 29a(4) is inconsistent with the tools embedded in the 
CSA for the management of such conflicts, e.g. the provisions on 
the incompatibilities applicable to civil servants which should bar 
potential conflicts of interest (article 7(2) of the CSA), and on 
recusation in the event of an occasional conflict (article 29a(2) of 
the CSA), which are much wider. As this definition would play a 
major part in the proceedings evolving from requests to declare 
conflicting interests (article 250 of the APC), such a narrow vision 
would certainly not contribute to identifying the genuine conflicts, 
widely varied as they are in real life, as it fails to provide for 
reliable tests for their detection. 
As regards Members of Parliament, there are still no adequate legal rules 
on avoiding conflicts of interest. Even patent situations of incompatibility 
and conflicts of interest alone are sufficiently scandalous to undermine the 
reputation of the nation’s supreme representative body. The negative and 
demoralizing effects of such parliamentary coziness, the lack of guarantees 
for impartiality and objectivity also spill over to other state institutions, 
and to the whole society. First, because the Members of Parliament pass 
the country’s legislation; second, as they elect the leaders and, at times, 
also the members of many other state institutions; and, third, as unlike 
the anonymous civil servants, the MPs are well-known and may only find 
shelter behind their own untouchability.  
A Parliamentary Ethics Committee was set up for the first time in the 
40th National Assembly with the key task to put in place ethical rules 
of conduct and measures for their observance. It was made the lead 
committee for the Draft Law on the Ethical Norms in the Work of Members of 
Parliament presented to parliament in April 2006 but that draft has not even 
made it to first reading yet. Currently, there are only a few isolated rules 
in effect which have a restricted scope and are scattered among different 
pieces of legislation, i.e. articles 101-103 of the Rules of Organization and 
Activity of the National Assembly and article 8 of the Annex to the Financial 
Rules on the Budget of the National Assembly. These provisions are far from 
exhaustive and are not worded in an accurate and specific language. Thus, 
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article 101 of the Rules of Organization and Activity of the National Assembly
fails to proclaim any restriction on the amount of additional remuneration 
(honoraria) received under service contracts (regulated by civil law), nor 
any prohibition on that remuneration becoming the primary source of 
income for an MP. By the same token, no attention is given to the 
possible conflict of interests between the work of an MP and the civil-
law relationships in which he or she might be involved. The rule on gifts 
contains no deadline and fails to define the total value of the gifts that 
an MP might be permitted to accept.
The provision of the Law on Property Disclosure by Persons Occupying Senior 
Positions in the State is equally broad – as representatives of different 
institutions file statements with the public registry – and fails to reflect 
the nature or the specificity of the different positions, nor does it deal 
with the business contacts of those people and the potential conflicts of 
interest there.
As regards the Members of Parliament, it is urgent to enact specific and 
detailed rules which echo the exceptional responsibility vested in them by 
virtue of their position as well as existing European standards applicable 
to Members of Parliament.
• Rules of conduct around the world. In the United States, 
both chambers of Congress – the Senate and the House of 
Representatives – developed their Codes of Official Conduct as 
early as the beginning of the 1960s and these, with minor changes, 
are still in effect today. Ever since, every member of the Senate 
or the House, before taking office, swears an oath to abide not 
only by the Constitution but also by the rules of parliamentary 
ethics. The committees on standards of official conduct are set up 
on the basis of parity and have unfettered powers to inquire into 
and check the deeds of every single member of Congress who 
has allegedly failed to comply with the standards enshrined in the 
codes of conduct.
The codes themselves are based on the premise that a public 
office is a public trust, which is the most important condition for 
Congress to function effectively. Quite like the International Code 
of Conduct, the US instruments contain rules on the prevention of 
conflicts of interest, members’ financial disclosure, the gifts that 
members and their families are entitled to accept. Besides, however, 
they also introduce a number of rules on campaign finance, the 
use of congressional resources, foreign trips, constituent casework, 
and the relationships with the executive bodies and agencies. As a 
result, in a country known for its traditional skepticism of written 
laws a solid body of formal standards has evolved and exists, 
and any violation may entail exceedingly negative consequences, 
including the disqualification of a member of Congress.
In the early 1980s similar ethics codes were adopted in Canada, 
Australia and a number of other countries, whereas the United 
Kingdom followed suit by first adopting a Code of Conduct
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applicable to both houses (in 1995) and later on replacing it by 
separate codes for the House of Commons (approved in July 
2005) and the House of Lords (adopted in July 2001). These rules 
made it incumbent for the first time upon Members of Parliament 
to abide by, inter alia, certain principles of behavior, such as 
selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty 
and leadership. Further, that was the first time that attention was 
given to the reasoning applied by Members of Parliament when 
pursuing legislative initiatives and addressing questions and queries 
to Cabinet members.
The first Code of Conduct adopted by the UK Parliament has 
influenced many European states which opted to incorporate 
some of its solutions in the rules of procedure of their own 
parliaments or to adopt their own ethics codes. In either case, 
these instruments have the effect of laws and may only be amended 
following a special procedure set out for that purpose rather than 
upon the expiry of the respective parliament’s term.
Resolution 51/59 of 1996 of the United Nations General Assembly
was used to adopt an International Code of Conduct for Public Officials. It 
urged all Member States to enhance accountability and transparency 
in governance, inter alia by introducing codes of conduct for public 
officials at different levels. The International Code of Conduct proclaims 
the following principles: prevalence of public interests over any 
private or political interest in any situation; a public office is a 
position of trust and the breach of trust undermines the reputation 
of the entire institution rather than that of the particular individual; 
public duties must be performed efficiently, effectively and impartially 
while equally observing the letter of the law and its spirit; the 
power, authority or information vested in or available to public 
officials may at no times be abused. As regards the implementation 
of these principles, the UN International Code of Conduct prescribes 
a system of rules to avoid conflicts of interest, to ensure financial 
disclosures by public officials, to regulate the acceptance of gifts 
and the use of official information. Under the influence of that 
resolution, a number of countries have adopted rules in the same 
vein over the past decade, both for their Members of Parliament 
and for government officials.
• Rules of conduct in the European Union. The European 
Commission adopted a Code of Good Administrative Behaviour in 
order to guarantee the independence of its members, to regulate 
their supplementary activities and also to reinstate its image after 
the events in 1997 when the whole Commission was forced to 
resign on allegations of corruption. The code attaches particular 
importance to the financial disclosures by Commissioners and 
to the regulation of Commissioners’ relationships with businesses 
and NGOs. Following suit, the European Parliament amended 
its Rules of Procedure to include a chapter on Members’ financial 
interests, standards of conduct and access to Parliament which has similar 
provisions.
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The adoption of a series of new and important laws in the course 
of the past year or two has displayed a few persisting deficiencies of 
the lawmaking process which are responsible for the poor quality of 
the legislative texts passed and not infrequently are conducive to the 
penetration of improper group or other interests. Therefore, in addition 
to the efforts to improve legislative drafting and to make lawmaking 
more transparent, rules are needed on the conduct of Members of 
Parliament so as to protect public interests and place them above 
anything else and to ensure their prevalence over the private interests 
of members of the legislature.
3.1.3. Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Committee
The Standing Anti-Corruption Committee of the 40th National Assembly 
has affirmed itself as the most pro-active anti-corruption parliamentary 
committee to date. Within the ambit of its powers, the Committee 
has been operating along three main lines: legislative amendments; 
parliamentary control; and inquiries into specific reports and 
allegations of corruption.
The Committee has examined the submitted proposals to amend 
eight laws relevant to areas prone to intense corruption risks, such as 
privatization and post-privatization control, state and municipal property, 
VAT, public procurement, etc. Other than that, the Committee’s agenda 
has been adjusted to include other proposed amendments bearing on the 
financing of political parties, lobbying, the restriction on cash payments, 
the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, etc.
In terms of its function of exerting parliamentary control, the Committee 
took stock of the developments in important areas which it deemed 
to be exposed to corruption and in need of legislative changes. Some 
of the major fields in respect of which the committee exercised its 
control powers referred to: VAT-related corruption schemes and frauds; 
problems of privatization and post-privatization control; pricing and 
other problems in the marketing of medicinal drugs and substances; 
flawed case law of the State Commission for Gambling; corruption-
fuelling conditions embedded in the EU-funds allocation procedures; 
improper exchanges of state-owned agricultural lands and forests in 
return for private land; corruption environment at the State Reserve 
and Wartime Reserve Agency; operation of the customs authorities and 
corruption activities of customs officers; implementation of the National 
Anti-Drug Strategy 2003-2008 and its Action Plan, etc.
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Decision No. 23
The Anti-Corruption Committee, in its meeting held on 13 April 2006, 
has made the following
Decision
1. As to the examination of a report alleging violations at the 
National Border Police Service:
1.1. It determines that the National Border Police Service has 
created conditions conducive to corruption activities, as a 
result of its failure to introduce measures for well-regulated 
accounting for state duty stamps within its units.
1.2. It determines that the penalties imposed on officials fail to 
match the violations committed and insists that the Minister 
of Interior undertake the requisite steps.
1.3. It insists that the management of the National Border 
Police Service should regulate not only the passport and 
visa controls applicable to Turkish citizens but also those 
applicable to any other foreign citizens in order to eradicate 
any conditions for corruption acts.
1.4. It shall provide the materials associated with the reported 
violations at the National Border Police Service to the 
Prosecutor General.
2. ...
Source: Report of the Anti-Corruption Committee adopted unanimously at the Committee’s meeting of 24 
August 2006 by Decision No. 36, presented to the National Assembly on 1 September 2006 and 
adopted at the Plenary Sitting of 28 September 2006.
• When examining specific reports and allegations, the committee 
determines itself the procedure to be followed. Reports raising 
issues of general validity are discussed at committee meetings 
whereas those affecting specific individuals are threshed out at 
expert level. In 2006, the Anti-Corruption Committee examined 
690 reports of alleged corruption; public meetings were held and 
specific decisions were taken in 15 high-profile cases. In addition, 
the Committee made inquires of its own motion into facts and 
corruption-related stories released in the mass media or reported 
by the National Audit Office. The Committee also set up seven 
temporary offices for receiving alerts from citizens: five on general 
issues (two in Sofia plus one each in Dobrich, Blagoevgrad, and 
Ruse) and two thematic (VAT-related corruption schemes and VAT 
draining, and issues of medicinal drugs policy).
52 Rules on the coordination and interaction, in the context of anti-corruption activities in the Republic 
of Bulgaria, among the Anti-Corruption Committee at the Fortieth National Assembly, the Council 
of Ministers’ Commission for Prevention and Countering of Corruption, and the Anti-Corruption 
Commission at the Supreme Judicial Council
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The Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Committee has reinforced its 
cooperation with the civil society. The Civic Advisory Board created 
with the committee and bringing together representatives of lead 
NGOs involved in the fight against corruption has continued to actively 
contribute to committee’s proceedings on different topics, e.g. lobbying, 
marketing of medicinal drugs, reducing the use of cash payments, VAT-
related frauds and VAT draining, abuses accompanying the absorption of 
EU funds, etc.
The Civic Advisory Board initiated the establishment of a mechanism to 
coordinate the operation of the three major anti-corruption bodies 
in the country which function within the legislature, the executive, and 
the judiciary. Further to the consultations performed, a set of rules was 
developed52 which, when officially signed on 9 June 2006, became the 
basis for uniting the efforts of the three bodies and might contribute 
to the avoidance of duplication of activities and functions and to the 
achievement of concrete results.
3.1.4. The Ombudsman of the Republic of Bulgaria
The ombudsman institution, conceived as an additional mechanism for the 
protection of human rights and a guarantee for good administrative service 
delivery and countering of corruption, has existed in Bulgaria since recently. 
The lengthy debate about its pros and cons delayed the passage of the 
relevant law for years, the drawbacks of the legislation and the prevalence 
of political bargaining delayed the timely election and constitution of the 
institution, and the lack of commitment on behalf of the executive to 
provide for appropriate working conditions for Bulgaria’s first ombudsman 
hindered the timely launch of his operations.
Despite all challenges and delays, as of early 2006 the ombudsman has 
been making ever more tangible contributions to the efforts to protect 
human rights and to combat corruption. The following facts merit particular 
attention:
• The ombudsman established cooperation with the Parliamentary 
Anti-Corruption Committee based on a Memorandum of Under-
standing between the Ombudsman and the Committee signed on 
16 February 2006. The interplay between the two institutions has 
materialized in a number of important ways, e.g.:
– exchanging information on corruption-proofing of existing 
legislation and proposing the indispensable adjustments;
– cooperating in the examination of individual instances of 
corruption;
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– proposals from the ombudsman to place certain draft laws, 
including anti-corruption ones, on the Committee’s agenda;
– participation by the ombudsman in Committee discussions on 
various draft laws;
– joint anti-corruption initiatives with the civil society.
• The ombudsman has also cooperated with the government 
Commission for Prevention and Countering of Corruption. The 
ombudsman was added to the institutions responsible for the 
implementation of the Strategy for Transparent Governance, Prevention 
and Countering of Corruption 2006-2008. He is equally involved in 
the pursuit of the following measures:
– developing several draft laws of anti-corruption relevance, such 
as the laws on lobbying, on the declassification of the State 
Security files, on the energy supply, etc.;
– assessing the implementation of the Concept Paper on Enhancing 
Administrative Service Delivery based on the One-Stop Shop 
Principle;
– developing internal administrative procedures to provide 
assistance and encourage compliance with the recommendations 
of the national ombudsman;
– preparatory steps for devising a mechanism of interaction 
between the national ombudsman and the local public mediators 
with a view to preventing and countering corruption.
The ombudsman has also actively supported the establishment of good 
governance in agriculture, an area where corruption practices have 
abounded. In that respect, the Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Ombudsman and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has paved 
the way to joint endeavors by both institutions, e.g. joint review of the 
legal framework and of the legal and administrative procedures applicable 
to restitution and the ownership of land, as well as joint examination of 
individual complaints of maladministration and corruption.
Once the third amendment to the Constitution empowered the 
ombudsman to refer matters to the Constitutional Court, he actively 
availed of this new power between the end of 2006 and early 2007. 
Complaints have already been submitted to the Constitutional Court 
concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of several legislative acts which 
seem to violate important individual rights and might invigorate abuse or 
corruption. The following are particularly worth mentioning:
• The complaint against the right of heating supply companies to 
collect money owed by their customers only based on statements 
of amounts due (right enshrined in article 154(1) of the Law on 
Energy). The problem here is that the consumers have no legal 
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possibility whatsoever to claim damages against the heating supply 
companies on any extra-judicial ground, let alone statements of 
amounts owed or paid. It is the ombudsman’s view that any 
heating supply provider is placed in a more advantageous position 
than any customer. This violates article 56(1) of the Constitution
as heating supply providers are in a privileged position compared 
to their customers. The 7-day deadline in which consumers may 
challenge a bill before the court is not a genuine remedy as 
the invoice contains no evidence of whether or not the heating 
whose payment is sought was actually supplied; whether or not 
the methodology of calculating the amount was properly applied; 
whether or not the distribution of expenses amongst different 
consumers in the same building was fair enough, to mention just 
a few problems. The ombudsman believes that article 154(1) of 
the Law on Energy also runs counter to EC competition rules as 
the companies which provide heating supply services are placed 
in a more beneficial position than the companies engaged in any 
other business. The disputed rule also infringes article 19(2) of 
the Constitution which purports to ensure a level playing field for 
all businesses and to prevent monopolistic abuse. Based on the 
complaint by the ombudsman, the Constitutional Court opened 
Constitutional Case No. 10 of 2006.
• A complaint to declare the unconstitutionality of articles 143(4) 
and 186(1) of the Administrative Procedure Code. The provisions 
in question deprive the majority of citizens of any possibility to 
challenge before the Supreme Administrative Court instruments of 
secondary legislation, regulations and ordinances, and reserve that 
right only for concerned or affected parties. The ombudsman has 
invoked the inconsistency of the said provisions with article 4(1) of 
the Constitution which proclaims the principle of the rule of law by 
stating that governance shall be based on the accurate compliance 
with the Constitution and the laws. The ombudsman invokes 
arguments to the effect that the contested provisions are inconsistent 
with the fundamental right of defense proclaimed by article 56 of 
the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and with the right 
of every citizen and legal entity to appeal against administrative 
acts, as enshrined in article 120(2) of the Constitution. According 
to human rights lawyers the disputed amendment restricts the 
constitutional right of citizens and introduces procedural censorship 
plus a solvency test. Moreover, the people whose appeals are 
dismissed will be paying the costs of the proceedings incurred 
by the government, including attorneys’ fees. A constitutional case 
was instituted based on that application and the latter has been 
admitted for consideration on the merits.
• The ombudsman challenged a text of the Law on Value Added Tax
(in force as from 1 January 2007) according to which VAT shall be 
charged on income earned by representatives of the professions, 
including attorneys’ fees and the fees charged by notaries and 
enforcement agents. The complaint seeks a declaration by the 
Constitutional Court to the effect that article 3(2) of the law is 
STATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 81
unconstitutional, inasmuch as it reads “as well as the practice 
of a liberal profession, including that of a private enforcement 
agent and a notary”. The reasoning advanced by the ombudsman 
is that, while the occupation of a lawyer, notary or private 
enforcement agent is not a business operation and does not 
generate added value, charging their services with VAT would affect 
virtually every single Bulgarian citizen. The legal certainty which 
notaries guarantee in different types of transactions in commercial 
turnover, the enforcement which the state has entrusted to private 
enforcement agents, the legal defense offered by lawyers are all 
intrinsic elements of a state governed by the rule of law. For 
those activities, which are intimately connected with the operation 
of the system of justice in general, the citizens pay taxes to the 
government, so they should not be forced to pay VAT as well. 
Constitutional Case No. 1 of 2007 was instituted based on that 
complaint and the latter was admitted to consideration on the 
merits.
The ombudsman’s steady efforts to protect human rights and to exercise 
independent control of the administration can also contribute a great 
deal to curbing political and administrative corruption. For that purpose, 
the following is deemed necessary: a more active cooperation with the 
civic organizations in the field of anti-corruption; full-swing operation 
of the newly-established Public Advisory Board with the ombudsman, 
a mechanism created to inquire into cases of maladministration, so 
as to identify the presets for corruption and ease its prevention and 
suppression, with the involvement of the civil society and of a vast 
range of experts; joining efforts with the local public mediators; adopting 
and strictly adhering to internal procedures obliging the administration 
to provide the ombudsman with any assistance and to abide by his 
recommendations. That would certainly contribute to affirming the 
institution of the ombudsman as a genuine guarantee of human rights 
and a shield against corruption trespasses to those rights.
3.1.5. The National Audit Office
An important activity of the NAO which bears directly on the fight 
against corruption is its control of political parties’ funding. The majority 
of political parties registered in this country fail to comply with the 
statutory requirements and avoid submitting the required reports of their 
financial operations. The data of the NAO suggest that in 2006 only 63, 
out of a total of 357 political parties, sent in their financial reports for 
the previous year. The remaining 294 parties either failed to report at all 
or filed reports inconsistent with the prescriptions of the Law on Political 
Parties. In contrast to previous years, however, the NAO now has an 
effective tool to penalize the blameworthy political parties. Since the 
changes in the legal regime of financial control introduced by the new 
Law on Political Parties Act (in force as from 1 April 2005), the NAO has 
been issuing certificates of the financial reports submitted to it as from 
the date of registration of the political party in question but for no more 
than three years before the certificate date. The lack of such a certificate 
TABLE 12: DISCLOSURE REPORTS BY INDIVIDUALS OCCUPYING SENIOR 
POSITIONS IN THE STATE
Source: Bulletin of the National Audit Office under the Law on Property Disclosure by Persons Occupying Senior 
Positions in the State
Year
Public officials Judges, prosecutors and investigators
Reporting 
individuals
Individuals 
having 
failed to 
disclose
Reporting 
individuals
Individuals 
having 
failed to 
disclose
2001 721 40 – –
2002 751 86 3,312 32
2003 1,986 18 3,397 3
2004 2,249 35 3,588 3
2005 2,152 3 3,777 8
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bars the respective political party from participating in the elections 
as the document is a sine qua non for its registration by the Central 
Elections Committee. This means, in practical terms, that all the 294 
political parties which failed to produce their reports for 2005, would be 
able to participate in elections in 2009 at the earliest and only if they 
submit on time their financial reports for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
This sanction, coupled with the power of Sofia City Court to dissolve a 
political party which has not participated in elections for more than five 
years, is expected to legitimately lower the number of political parties. 
Last but not least, this would get in the way of using bogus political 
parties as vehicles for corruption and money laundering.
Specifically designed to serve the fight against corruption are also the 
powers of the NAO vis-ђ-vis the public disclosures owed by individuals 
in senior public positions. This specific instrument, which was introduced 
by the Law on Property Disclosure by Persons Occupying Senior Positions in the 
State in 2000, aims at making transparent the financial status of senior 
civil servants and of magistrates. Although the list of reporting individuals 
under the law has been extended by several successive amendments, 
the disclosure obligation only applies to the respective individuals, their 
spouses, and their children under age. The anti-corruption potential of 
the law is thus somewhat mitigated as plenty of possibilities to conceal 
income through other related parties remain beyond its scope (e.g. 
parents and/or other relatives).
The sole positive trend has been the decreasing number of cases where 
reporting individuals fail to make disclosures or disclose the relevant 
information after the statutory deadline.
On 1 January 2007, the next 
round of amendments to the 
law took effect after their pas-
sage by the parliament in Sep-
tember 2006. These refined the 
list of reporting individuals to 
bring it into line with other laws, 
and a number of new catego-
ries were added, i.e. members 
of the political cabinets of the 
chairpersons of state agencies 
and of the district governors; 
members of the governing bod-
ies of the National Social Secu-
rity Institute (only the governor 
of the institute was required to 
report before); directors of the 
local health insurance funds; 
other individuals subject to a 
statutory requirement to this ef-
fect, etc. In order to facilitate 
the identification of newly-appointed or newly-released officials falling 
within the purview of the law, the heads of the respective authorities 
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are now duty-bound to notify the NAO within 14 days of issuing the 
respective order (to appoint or release the individual concerned). Likewise, 
the deadlines for making the annual disclosure filings and for modifying 
the information initially provided therein have been shortened.
The amendments to the law have brought to an end the frequently 
criticized limitations on access to the public disclosures register. Access 
to the details on the register is now available to anyone, without any 
restrictions, rather than to a few state bodies and the media represented 
by their senior editors as it was the former arrangement (which, however, 
will still apply to disclosure statements filed before 31 December 2004). 
Still, it is not clear to what extent the new procedure would work in 
practice. Under the law, unlimited access may be obtained in one of two 
ways: under the Law on Access to Public Information or via the website of the 
NAO which should show all the statements filed plus the names of those 
who failed to make a disclosure. The explanatory report accompanying the 
draft law read that “at present the National Audit Office has no technical, 
administrative and financial capacity to establish the required information 
system to release the data on the web which might necessitate that the 
effect of the amendments be postponed”. This actually means that access 
to the public register is currently only possible under the Law on Access 
to Public Information. The latter, however, states that such access may be 
refused if the interests of a third party are affected and that third party 
has not expressly consented in writing to the provision of the information 
sought. 
Another major change has been the long-awaited verification of the 
content of all disclosure reports, a measure that had been repeatedly 
proposed by a number of civic organizations. No such verifications took 
place before January 2007 which made the disclosure a merely formalistic 
obligation detached from any form of control. After the amendments, 
the law already requires the NAO to conduct a documentary verification 
to corroborate the accuracy of the facts reported in the statement and 
subject to registration at, notification to or certification by another body. 
The verification process does not apply to disclosures made before 
1 January 2007 and in fact consists in matching the information in the 
disclosure statement filed by the reporting individual with any information 
that individual may have provided to other bodies where the same 
details had to be registered, notified or declared. Should a mismatch 
be found, the NAO should notify the executive director of the National 
Revenue Agency who should then launch an inspection or an audit. 
Despite the positive estimation the introduction of verification deserves, 
its effective application may be doubted given the scarce resources of 
the NAO, including its limited staff. In that respect, adequate steps 
should be made to align the capacity of that institution to the novel 
powers vested in it. One is also perplexed by the provision that, in 
relation to pecuniary amounts, receivables and debts in excess of 5,000 
levs (or foreign currency equivalent) the verification of the reported facts 
shall end with a finding of compliance even in the event of a mismatch 
provided that the difference between the amounts reported to different 
bodies does not exceed 10,000 levs. Given that the number of reporting 
individuals for 2005 was next to six thousand (and is even higher in 
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respect of 2006), this provision means that in a certain context the state 
could actually turn a blind eye to violations worth up to 60 million levs, 
and these violations might as well be related to corruption.
The amendments also heightened the sanctions for failure to make a 
disclosure on time, a measure designed to encourage the reporting 
individuals to abide by the statutory deadlines. While on the whole very 
few reporting individuals fail to file their disclosure statements, many times 
the filings are made after the deadline which frustrates the work of the 
NAO, especially given its new power to verify the accuracy of the facts 
declared (Table 12).
3.2.1. Commission for Prevention and Countering of Corruption
At the outset of 2006, the Council of Ministers approved of a Strategy for 
Transparent Governance, Prevention and Countering of Corruption 2006-2008, 
and an implementation program for 2006. To ensure the controlled 
and coordinated implementation of the strategy, the government issued 
a decision of 2 February 2006 whereby it set up the Commission for 
Prevention and Countering of Corruption which replaced the previous 
anti-corruption structure whose official name was Anti-Corruption 
Coordination Commission. The following important legislative and 
institutional measures have been taken to ensure the pursuit of the 
measures in the strategy and of its goals:
The new wording of article 46 and the newly-introduced article 46a of 
the Law on Administration reveal an aspiration to provide for a stronger 
role of the internal control units in terms of monitoring the operations 
of the administration and preventing corruption. 
Under the first provision, the inspectorates within the ministries should be 
directly subordinate to the corresponding government minister and shall 
have inter alia the powers to analyze the efficiency of the administration’s 
work; monitor compliance with the administration’s internal rules and 
regulations; propose the initiation of disciplinary proceedings in the event 
of established violations of official duties, including violations of the Code 
of Conduct for Officials in the State Administration; carry out inspections based 
on reports, applications and complaints alleging unlawful or incorrect 
acts or omissions of members of the administration.
In parallel, an Inspectorate General has been set up within the Council 
of Ministers. It is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister and 
should coordinate and support the controlling activities of the other 
inspectorates and propose to the Prime Minister, for his approval, 
methodological guidance to enhance the functions and the working 
procedures of those inspectorates. Some of the most essential powers 
of the Inspectorate General are to examine reports of conflicts of 
interest and other violations of official duties, to examine allegations of 
corruption involving executive bodies and civil servants in managerial 
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positions, to conduct inspections and inform the Prime Minister of its 
findings, etc.
What lies behind the total of 115 cases (32 complaints, 10 applications and 
73 alerts, including anonymous ones) received by the Inspectorate General 
between 31 March and 31 December 2006, and what are the results of 
the inspections carried out? The working of the Inspectorate General is 
not open and transparent enough, so it hardly lends itself to any objective 
appraisal. The inspectorates at the different ministries have websites with 
broad information on their functions and on the ways in which matters 
can be referred to them but the sites do not display details of any specific 
proceedings or their outcome. The websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Interior form the only positive exceptions.
While the fight against high level corruption is a key focus of the 
government strategy, more than one year following its adoption many 
individuals who may be defined as holding top positions within the 
executive remain beyond the reach of any immediate control and 
sanctioning. On the one hand, the Inspectorate General and most of 
the inspectorates lack capacity and, on the other hand, there is this 
want for adequate legal framework and government will to really crack 
down on high level corruption. Thus, based on a recommendation from 
the European Commission two documents were developed. The first 
one is the Program for the Transparent Operation of State Administration and 
of Persons Occupying Senior Positions in the State drafted by the Minister 
of State Administration and Administrative Reform in conjunction with 
the Minister of European Affairs. The second relevant document was the 
Code of Ethics for Individuals in Senior Positions in the Executive Branch.
Individuals in Senior Public Positions under Bulgarian Law
The persons holding senior positions in the executive branch are 
defined in different ways in the Code of Ethics for Individuals in Senior 
Positions in the Executive Branch and in the Law on Property Disclosure 
by Persons Occupying Senior Positions in the State. Under the Code, 
those individuals are deemed to be the Prime Minister; the deputy 
prime ministers; the ministers; the deputy ministers; the district 
governors and their deputies; the chairpersons of state agencies 
and their deputies; the chairs, deputy chairs and members of state 
commissions; the executive directors of implementing agencies and 
their deputies; the heads of government institutions created by 
virtue of a law or of a regulations of the Council of Ministers and 
performing functions associated with the exercise of the executive 
power; the heads of political cabinets, and the parliamentary 
secretaries. The Law, on its part, furthers that list by adding all 
the members of political cabinets; the secretaries general in the 
administration of the executive, the mayors and deputy-mayors of 
municipalities and boroughs, the directors and deputy directors of 
the security services and services in charge of public order, and so 
on and so forth. These have been unduly excluded from the scope 
of application of the rules of ethics.
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This only feeds the impression that many measures existing on paper are 
only a formalistic response to external pressure but do not intend the 
genuine introduction of more stringent restrictions with respect to all those 
individuals so as to prevent actual or potential conflicts of interest and 
the reaping of undue benefits from one’s official position, nor do they 
provide for severe sanctions, in particular removal from office, in the event 
of violations. Similarly, no convincing case law has been developed on 
the enforcement of the existing, albeit deficient, legal rules on conflicts of 
interest at lower levels, including the 2004 Code of Conduct for Officials in the 
State Administration.
Assessing the efficiency of anti-corruption policies and of the trends in the 
spread of corruption is a key element of the strategy. In the implementation 
plan of the strategy for 2006 provision was made for the development of a 
system of indicators to monitor the level and efficiency of its fulfillment. Based 
on the cooperation between the Commission for Prevention and Countering 
of Corruption and the civil society, a monitoring system, developed by the 
Center for the Study of Democracy, was adopted in mid 2006.
Monitoring System
The Monitoring System (MS) consists of several basic components 
and aims to assess several aspects of the anti-corruption policies 
and measures of the government.
First, assessment of the progress made by the government and the 
other bodies of the executive (ministries, agencies, departments, 
services, etc.) with the implementation of the measures 
envisaged in the program. This aspect of the MS measures the 
implementation progress of sets of concrete tasks. The basic 
indicators for assessing the implementation in this respect are: 
availability of the laws, programs, analyses, plans, measures, etc. 
envisioned for development; relevance of the measure adopted; 
timeframe compliance/non compliance of the respective measure; 
implementation progress; quality of the elaborated laws, programs, 
analyses, plans, measures, etc.; quantitative indicators measuring 
the outcome of the adopted measure; effectiveness.   
Second, assessment of the progress towards the goal set forth in 
the program and/or strategy – decrease of the level of corruption. 
This result directly depends on the degree to which the policies and 
measures envisioned in the strategy are relevant to the achievement 
of its main goal. The basic instrument in this respect is the system of 
indicators and measuring tools known as the Corruption Monitoring 
System (CMS). The CMS is a tool for assessing the level of administrative 
corruption in the relations between government institutions on the 
one hand, and the citizens and the business community, on the other.
The third component of the MS measures the progress of achieving 
the European standards of good governance (the progress made in 
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short-term or long-term perspective). It consists of tools assessing 
the actual functioning of the administrative authorities in the 
country. The main idea behind such an assessment is that it 
represents an independent evaluation of the operation of the 
administration measuring the level to which the administration 
delivers its services to the citizens. The reason for introducing such 
an assessment is that the administration should not self-assess itself 
but should rather be assessed on the basis of the satisfaction of the 
users of its services (the citizens and the business community).
The assessments of the MS will rely on information collected 
through the following basic methods:
• expert opinions (assessments and analyses by independent 
experts and representatives of non-governmental organizations 
and civil society associations);
• self-assessments by the institutions and agencies involved in 
the implementation of the strategy and the program;
• analysis of data from official statistical surveys, the information 
systems of various government agencies, national and 
international surveys;
• national representative surveys of the population and the 
business community;
• service delivery surveys of the users of administrative, social, 
health and education services;
• mystery customer service for public services;
• monthly monitoring of publications in the press, radio and 
television.
Source: Monitoring of Anticorruption Reforms in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2006
3.2.2. Commission for Establishing Property Acquired through 
Criminal Activity
The Commission for Establishing Property Acquired through Criminal 
Activity (hereinafter CEPACA) was formed in 2005, following the entry 
into force of the Law on the Forfeiture to the State of Property Acquired
through Criminal Activity (in force as from 29 April 2005). The purpose of 
that law was to introduce new tools for cutting off the economic roots 
of crime, in particular top-level corruption, and to make those tools 
applicable as against the assets of individuals and entities, and against 
assets derived from crime abroad where the criminal activity in question 
falls outside the criminal jurisdiction of Bulgaria.
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The Commission for Establishing Property Acquired through Criminal 
Activity is a specialized state authority in charge of inquiring into the 
property of certain individuals in respect of whom the conditions 
depicted in the law are satisfied, i.e. acquisitions of substantial value 
which can be reasonably presumed to have criminal origin, where 
a criminal prosecution has started for any of the criminal offences 
under the Criminal Code listed exhaustively in the law (e.g. terrorism, 
terrorist financing, money laundering, preparation to commit money 
laundering and criminal association for that purpose, etc.), or where 
the criminal proceedings have been terminated or suspended or 
cannot be instituted.
CEPACA operates as a college consisting of five members. They are 
appointed or elected, as the case may be, for a term of five years 
by different bodies: the chair is appointed by the Prime Minister, the 
deputy-chair and two members are elected by the National Assembly, 
and one member is appointed by the President. Due to its mixed 
formation, the Commission does not fully fit either in the legislature 
or in the executive branch. The Commission is expected to draw 
up a yearly report of its activities and present it, up until March of 
the subsequent year, to the National Assembly, the President of the 
Republic, and the Council of Ministers. This is where the provisions on 
its reporting obligations end.
Regardless of the initial delay in the provision of its facilities and 
equipment, the Commission now avails of considerable human and 
financial resources, i.e. fully-fledged general and special administration 
structured into functional and territorial directorates, and a budget of 
5,747,000 levs for 2006 and 7,982,000 levs for 2007.
In 2006, the Commission received a total of 38,947 notifications, of 
which: 
• 26,596 notifications from courts concerning individuals convicted 
for criminal offences within the scope of the Law on the Forfeiture 
to the State of Property Acquired through Criminal Activity;
• 1,245 notifications concerning individuals convicted in 2006;
• 8,706 notifications from pre-trial authorities concerning individuals 
subject to criminal prosecution for relevant offences, or concerning 
substantial property which can be reasonably presumed to have 
criminal origin where no criminal proceedings could be launched 
or the proceedings opened have been suspended or terminated;
• 2,400 notifications concerning individuals against whom criminal 
proceedings started in 2006.
During the same period, the inspectors at the Commission’s 11 territorial 
directorates processed notifications concerning 21,483 individuals (55 %), 
FIGURE 28: REASONED REQUESTS FOR INJUNCTIONS FILED BY THE CEPACA 
IN 2006, BY TYPE OF OFFENCE
Source: Commission for Establishing Property Acquired through Criminal Activity
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15,329 of which were falling outside the scope of the law (71 % 
of the notifications handled). Throughout that period, the Commission 
instituted 100 proceedings to establish property, acquired through 
criminal activity, and in 42 of them a decision was made to seek 
court-ordered injunctions by filing reasoned requests. The Commission 
submitted a total of 51 reasoned requests for injunctions to 18 different 
district courts across the country (Figure 28). Three refusals by the 
courts to order the injunctions sought were successfully challenged 
by the Commission before the relevant court of appeal; in one case 
the respondent challenged the injunction before the Supreme Court 
of Cassation which upheld the order of the court of appeal. Out of 
all Commission’s requests for injunctions, 16 were challenged by the 
respondents and all these appeals were dismissed by the corresponding 
court of appeal. In 2006, the Commission distrained 169 real estates 
and attached 73 motor vehicles; it also garnished the equity of 17 
commercial companies and the shares of two more. The underlying 
value of the injunctions ordered at the Commission’s request stood at 
21,771,057 levs in that year.
During the period in question, the Commission brought a total of 12 
lawsuits seeking the forfeiture of criminal assets worth a total of 
3,985,870.40 levs (Table 13).
An important factor for the effective interaction between the commission 
and the other institutions which are relevant to the outcome of its work 
is the instruction governing the interaction in the event of criminal assets 
confiscation signed in September 2006 by the Commission’s chair, the 
Prosecutor General, the Director of the National Investigation Service, 
and the Ministers of Interior and of Finance. 
In order for the tools existing in the legislation to be used efficiently, the 
legislative provisions, including those on the relationship between the 
Law on the Forfeiture to the State of Property Acquired through Criminal Activity
and some other laws, in particular the Law on Measures against Money
TABLE 13: REASONED REQUESTS FOR FORFEITURE TO THE STATE OF 
PROPERTY ACQUIRED THROUGH CRIMINAL ACTIVITY FILED BY THE 
CEPACA IN 2006
Source: Report on the activities of the Commission for Establishing Property Acquired through Criminal Activity for 
the period January – December 2006, Sofia, 2007
Civil Case No. Court Application amount
Civil case No. 75/2006 Pleven District Court 389,634.97 levs
Civil case No. 112/2006 Lovech District Court 103,800 levs
Civil case No. 2475/2006 Sofia District Court 390,157.16 levs
Civil case No. 84/2006 Ruse District Court 259,781 levs
Civil case No. 171/2006 Gabrovo District Court 187,700 levs
Civil case No. 10191/2006 Haskovo District Court 170,900 levs
Civil case No. 849/2006 Stara Zagora District Court 458,000 levs
Civil case No. 2/2006 Pleven District Court 190,786 levs
Civil case No. 195/2006 Lovech District Court 80,810 levs
Civil case No. 2968/2006 Plovdiv District Court 832,462.27 levs
Civil case No. 732/2006 Sliven District Court 756,747 levs
Civil case No. 231/2006 Blagoevgrad District Court 165,092 levs
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Laundering, the procedures for 
ordering injunctions, etc., need 
some fine-tuning. A revision of 
the status of the Commission is 
also recommended. The quota-
based principle of appointing/
electing its members may have 
aimed to endow it with an 
inter-institutional or even su-
pra-institutional nature but the 
actual result has rather been 
lack of accountability similar 
to other bodies constituted on 
the quota-based principle. The 
Commission could be com-
posed entirely by the National 
Assembly or by the Council 
of Ministers but it should be 
clear to whom the Commis-
sion reports and what would 
be the effects of its failure to 
perform or of the delayed or 
imprecise performance of its 
duties. The fears that the Com-
mission’s composition might 
be politicized, should such an 
approach be taken, are hardly 
well-founded as even now the 
parliament elects three of the Commission’s members and its decisions 
are made by a simple majority, i.e. they need three votes to be validly 
taken.
3.2.3. An Independent Anti-Corruption Agency: the Pros and 
Cons
The unsatisfactory results of the fight against corruption, and political 
corruption in particular, have rekindled the public debate about whether or 
not an independent anti-corruption agency should be created. Advanced 
for the first time by the President of the Republic in early 2003, the idea 
to set up such a structure could long not raise the support it needed 
to materialize. It was only in 2006, when the President reiterated his 
proposal that the other relevant institutions came back on track to some 
extent. The idea to create an independent anti-corruption agency was 
endorsed by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of Interior who 
chairs the Commission for Prevention and Countering of Corruption. It 
was also embraced by the then newly-elected Prosecutor General who 
thought that only such a body could effectively pursue the onslaught 
upon political corruption as any steps in that respect would affect by 
definition high level politicians from both the ruling majority and the 
opposition, amongst others. In spite of the political will thus declared, 
which was demonstrated even by fixing a deadline for the independent 
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agency to be created (October 2006), no practical follow-up ensued. 
This notwithstanding, the lingering problems of the fight against political 
corruption and the persisting lack of criminal cases against magistrates 
and senior civil servants dictate compellingly that the setting up of 
such a service or another machinery, for example a specialized anti-
corruption prosecution office, be seriously discussed both at expert 
level and with the public at large.
The bodies of the judiciary and law enforcement implement directly 
the state’s criminal justice policy in the field of anti-corruption and 
have a very specific part to play in the detection and punishment of 
corruption crimes. This part has gained in importance in the context of 
Bulgaria’s membership of the European Union and is connected with the 
enforcement of the acquis communautaire, with the cooperation, security 
and other related commitments Bulgaria has subscribed to in its capacity 
as a European Union Member State. The unresolved problems of justice 
and home affairs, combined with the new challenges ahead keep the 
need for further reforms in this area high on Bulgaria’s agenda.
„Now there is much better cooperation between the police and the 
public prosecution which is vital for bringing to justice those guilty 
of crime. The courts, however, must accelerate the proceedings. 
Arrests are not sufficient in themselves, we are expecting sentences. 
This is crucial... We will note in our report that more has to be 
done in the fight against small-scale corruption, money-laundering 
and the link between money laundering and organized crime, 
the public murders, the need to speed up the investigation 
process...”
Source: Mr. Franco Frattini, Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Freedom, Security 
and Justice, at a press conference during his visit to Bulgaria, Sofia, 19 February 2007.
Different aspects of the judiciary formed the core of three, out of a total 
of four, amendments to the Constitution enacted over the past four years. 
The novice constitutional texts, however, do not result from a coherent, 
comprehensive philosophy of judicial reform. Rather, they have been 
drafted and passed on a piece-meal basis and to respond to various 
remarks and recommendations in connection with Bulgaria’s accession 
to the European Union.
The first amendment (2003) adjusted the rules on the guaranteed tenure 
and immunity of judges, prosecutors and investigators, and introduced 
terms of office for the administrative managers of the bodies of the 
judiciary. The third amendment (2006) made the changes necessitated 
by the enactment of the new Criminal Procedure Code, in particular the 
role of the prosecutor as the dominus litis at the pre-trial stage and the 
curtailed powers of the investigative bodies within the judiciary, after 
3.3. The Judiciary and 
Law Enforcement 
in the Fight against 
Corruption
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more than 90 per cent of the investigations had been transferred to 
police investigators at the Ministry of Interior. Two of the amended rules, 
article 129(4) (providing a sui generis impeachment for the three senior 
administrative heads of the judiciary, i.e. a possibility for the President 
of the Republic to remove the chairs of the Supreme Court of Cassation 
and of the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Prosecutor General, 
on a proposal from, among others, one fourth of the Members of 
Parliament backed by a majority of two-thirds of all MPs) and point 5 
of the new article 130a (empowering the Minister of Justice to check 
the organization relating to the institution, progress and ending of cases) 
were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The fourth 
amendment, enacted in early 2007, introduced full functional immunity
(i.e. judges, prosecutors and investigators shall be free from criminal 
prosecution or civil liability only in respect of actions undertaken in their 
official capacity and of the acts they have issued provided, however, 
that they have not committed any intentional indictable offence in either 
of these contexts). Explicit provision has been made for the following 
powers of the Supreme Judicial Council (hereinafter SJC): to adopt the 
draft budget of the judiciary; to appoint, promote, demote, transfer, and 
remove from office judges, prosecutors, and investigators; to impose the 
disciplinary sanctions of demotion and removal from office on judges, 
prosecutors, and investigators; to organize the qualification of judges, 
prosecutors, and investigators; to hear and adopt the annual reports 
submitted by the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative 
Court, and the Prosecutor General on the enforcement of the laws and 
on the operation of courts, prosecution offices and investigative bodies, 
and to present those reports to the National Assembly. The fourth 
amendment envisioned the setting up of an Inspectorate with the SJC
to consist of an Inspector-General and ten inspectors. The Inspector-
General shall be elected by a majority of two-thirds of the Members of 
Parliament for a term of five years, whereas the inspectors shall have 
4-year terms of office. 
The key power of the Inspectorate with the SJC is to monitor the 
operations of the bodies of the judiciary, with no interference whatsoever 
with the independence of judges, jurors, prosecutors or investigators in 
the exercise of their functions. The Inspectorate shall act of its own 
motion or on the initiative of citizens, legal entities or state authorities, 
including judges, prosecutors, and investigators. The provisions require 
the Inspectorate to submit an annual report of its activities to the SJC as 
well as to make referrals, proposals and reports to other state authorities, 
including the competent bodies of the judiciary. The information on the 
Inspectorate’s proceedings shall be public. At the same time, leaving 
aside the members’ election by a qualified majority, there are no 
guarantees whatsoever for the proclaimed independence of that new 
structure or against its possible interference with the independence of 
the judiciary, and there are even less guarantees for its accountability 
and efficiency. Other questions may be raised for good reason as well, 
such as how the functions of the newly-introduced Inspectorate would 
correlate to those of the existing inspectorate for the public prosecution 
office; or if it is really appropriate to have all the three branches of 
the judiciary controlled by the same body; or whether that body does 
FIGURE 29: CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR CORRUPTION OFFENCES AND 
DYNAMICS OF THE INDEX FOR THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION 
(2001-2006)
Note: Due to the lack of judicial statistics for 2007 the comparison covers only the period 2001 – 2006 
Source: Ministry of Justice, Vitosha Research/CMS
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not reproduce the model of the judiciary itself with the common 
management of its three branches, often labeled “erroneous”, and so 
forth. It is clear even now that the specific provisions of the future 
Law on the Judiciary would hardly answer these questions. Paradoxically, 
despite the numerous suggestions to introduce external and independent 
control over the functioning of the judiciary so as to strike a better 
balance between the three branches of power in the state, the solution 
chosen is to create a body that has no counterpart in any other country, 
that is certainly unprecedented in the earlier constitutional tradition of 
Bulgaria, and whose powers might eventually be used to address some 
negative phenomena and consequences in the judiciary but cannot do 
away with their underlying reasons.
Judicial reform remains one of the most sensitive spheres in terms of 
the requirements posed by the European Union. When assessing the 
circumstances and the dynamics of that reform, however, two factors 
should be born in mind: firstly, its results are largely predetermined 
by, inter alia, the action or inaction of the institutions belonging to 
all the three branches of power; and, secondly, the reforms in the 
three separate branches of the judiciary itself – the courts, the public 
prosecution, and the investigation – are marked by each area’s own 
problems and dynamics, and are interdependent, which requires not 
only general but also specific solutions.
3.3.1. Efficiency of the Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Criminal 
Legislation
Despite the chain of reforms 
implemented in recent years to 
enhance the efficiency of the 
state’s criminal justice policy 
corruption crime and politi-
cal corruption in Bulgaria have 
gone unpunished for all practi-
cal purposes. The increase in 
the number of criminal cases 
between 2002 and 2006 and 
of individuals convicted of cor-
ruption offences still does not 
correspond to an increased 
number of instances of corrup-
tion as well. Thus, despite the 
enhanced efforts on the part of 
the state in line with the pub-
lic expectations, the proportion 
between the number of corrup-
tion transactions and of crimi-
nal cases for corruption actually 
remains unchanged. This means 
that the preventive effect of 
the criminal justice policy re-
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mains the same and there is indeed no intensification of the criminal 
prosecution (Figure 29).
The data analysis makes it clear that, still, a tiny fraction of the 
occurring corruption transactions are actually detected, investigated 
and punished by the competent authorities. Thus, the results of the 
Corruption Monitoring System suggest that by July 2006 the average 
monthly number of corruption transactions had been 147,616 (compared 
to 126,437 in November 2005). At the same time, Ministry of Justice 
data show that in 2006 a total of 233 court proceedings were launched 
country-wide for corruption offences (compared to 214 throughout 
2005) and 188 individuals were convicted (compared to 143 in 2005). 
According to the data provided by the National Statistical Institute, in 
total, from 1996 to 2005 Bulgarian courts issued only 669 convictions 
and sentenced 657 persons for the most typical corruption offences – 
bribery, trade in influence and crimes related to official capacity.
Judicial Statistics
The detailed and objective statistics about the performance of state 
authorities in terms of detecting, investigating into and punishing 
crime in general and corruption in particular are vital to identifying 
the existing deficiencies, enhancing the operations of the state 
machinery and formulating the government policy in response to 
crime. In Bulgaria, though, this matter is still unduly neglected. 
Due to the lack of uniform criteria for the collection of data, each 
institution defines itself the indicators it will use, the period to be 
covered by its statistical reports, etc. The data thus could not be 
compared or crosschecked and becomes virtually unusable. For 
example, for the year 2005 the data of the National Statistical 
Institute show that 93 individuals have been convicted for bribery 
and crimes related to official capacity, while according to the Ministry 
of Justice their number is 143 (for the year 2004 these numbers are 
respectively 127 and 68, for 2003 they are 90 and 75, etc.). The 
indicators selected by each institution create certain difficulties as 
well. For example, the Ministry of Justice collects information on 
the number of corruption related offences having fruited in verdicts 
but does not collect statistics on whether these are convictions or 
acquittals. The penalties imposed (especially non-custodial ones) 
are reported in different ways depending on where the information 
comes from the regional courts or the district courts. In some cases, 
the data provided is broken down by type and degree of offence 
whilst in others it covers entire divisions of the Criminal Code. Last 
but not least, the information is inherently inconsistent which raises 
doubts as to its reliability (for example, a report from the Ministry 
of Justice on criminal proceedings at regional courts stated that at 
the outset of 2002 there had been one unfinished criminal case for 
bribery in the private sector under article 225c of the Criminal Code
but the provision of article 225c itself was enacted in 2002!).
FIGURE 30: RELATIVE SHARE OF VERDICTS FOR AND INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED 
OF BRIBERY, TRADE IN INFLUENCE AND CRIMES RELATED TO 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY FOR THE PERIOD 1989-2005 (PER CENT)
Source: National Statistical Institute
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The lack of reliable statistics on the detection, investigation into and 
punishment of crime bring to mind once again the problems with 
the Unified Information System against Crime which has been 
expected to emerge for nearly ten years now. As early as December 
1997, the parliament adopted a decision whereby it obliged the 
government and the National Statistical Institute, in conjunction with 
the judiciary, to develop and implement such a system. Rules on 
the operation of the system were first added to the Law on Statistics
(1999) and then moved to the Law on the Judiciary (2002), with the 
Ministry of Justice shown as the institution in charge. Throughout 
that period, various government strategies, programs and plans set 
different deadlines for the implementation of the system but most 
of those were never met.
Corruption-related offences account for a virtually negligible share 
of the total number of criminal offences detected and punished 
in Bulgaria. Against the backdrop of an ever rising total number of 
criminal cases and convicted persons in the country over the past 
years, corruption-related offences have a share of less than 0.5 % of 
all sanctioned criminal offences (Figure 30). This is a clear sign that the 
state’s criminal justice policy is not efficient in suppressing corruption 
unlike some forms of crime in other spheres of public life.
The expectations that the im-
proved substantive criminal 
norms would entail more ef-
ficient criminal prosecution of 
corruption related crime have 
not materialized. The efforts 
of the state on this front have 
brought forth major amend-
ments to the Criminal Code, as 
far as corruption-related offenc-
es are concerned:
• More heavily punishable 
forms of crimes related 
to official capacity were 
introduced in connection 
with privatization, restitu-
tion and licensing regimes or with organized crime (1997) as well 
as crimes committed by those in charge of activities involving drug 
substances and precursors (2000);
• The rules on bribery were substantially changed which entailed 
higher penalties, criminalization of the making or acceptance of 
a proposal for or promise of a bribe, and the fine-tuning of the 
provocation to bribery to the effect that the person provoked to 
give or accept a bribe now also faces criminal liability (2000). 
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• The scope of bribery was extended to include intangible benefits 
and heavier penalties were introduced for bribery committed by 
judges, prosecutors, investigators, jurors, arbiters or attorneys-at-
law (2002);
• The trade in influence was equally criminalized as a new corruption 
offence (2002).
Anti-Corruption Instruments and Policy of the European Union
As from 1 January 2007, a number of EU instruments directly 
bearing on the fight against corruption are binding on Bulgaria. 
They, together with some conventions developed by other 
international organizations, represent the EU legal framework to 
suppress corruption. The framework actually comprises three major 
clusters of instruments:
1. Legal instruments
1.1. Protection of Financial Interests
• Convention on the Protection of the European 
Communities’ Financial Interests 1995 and the 
Explanatory report thereon
• Protocol of 27 September 1996 to the Convention on 
the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial 
Interests 1996 and the Explanatory report thereon
• Protocol of 29 November 1996 on the interpretation 
of the Convention by way of preliminary rulings, by 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities
• Second Protocol of 19 June 1997 to the Convention on 
the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial 
Interests
1.2. Officials of the European Communities or officials of Member 
States
• Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving 
officials of the European Communities or officials of 
Member States of the European Union 1997 and the 
Explanatory report thereon
• Council Decision 2003/642/JHA of 22 July 2003 con-
cerning the application to Gibraltar of the Convention 
on the Fight against Corruption involving officials of 
the European Communities or officials of Member 
States of the European Union
1.3. Private Sector Corruption
• Joint Action of 22 December 1998 adopted by the 
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on corruption in the private sector 
(repealed)
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• Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 
2003 on combating corruption in the private sector
2. Policy Statements
• Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee on a comprehensive EU policy 
against corruption (COM (2003) 317 final)
• Annex 1 “The Hague Programme – strengthening free-
dom, security and justice in the European Union” of 
the Presidency conclusions of the Brussels European 
Council of 4/5 November 2004
• Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament: The Hague Programme: 
Ten priorities for the next five years – The Partnership 
for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (COM (2005) 184 final)
• Council and Commission Action Plan implementing 
the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, 
security and justice in the European Union (Press 
Release 8849/05 Justice and Home Affairs Council, 
Luxembourg, 2-3 June 2005)
• Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee on Developing a Strategic Concept 
on Tackling Organised Crime (COM (2005) 232 final)
3. Legal Instruments of Other Bodies
3.1. Council of Europe
• Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption 1999 (ETS No. 173, published, SG, issue 
73 of 26 July 2002)
• Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 1999 
(ETS No. 174, published, SG, issue 102 of 21 November 2003)
• Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 191, published, 
SG, issue 35 of 22 April 2005)
3.2. OECD
• OECD Convention on combating bribery of foreign 
public officials in international business transactions 
1997 (published, SG, issue 61 of 6 July 1999)
3.3. United Nations
• United Nations Convention of 12 December 2000 
against transnational organised crime (published, SG, 
issue 98 of 6 December 2005)
• United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003 
(published, SG, issue 89 of 3 November 2006)
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In implementation of the recommendations of the Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO) with the Council of Europe and of the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery, legislative rules have been enacted 
to provide for corporate liability for offences committed to the benefit 
of the respective legal entity, including corruption offences. The new 
provisions enacted by the amendments to the Law on Administrative 
Offences and Penalties in September 2005 envision fines of up to 1 million 
levs for legal entities which have been enriched or would have enriched 
themselves by certain types of criminal offences, where those offences 
were committed, incited to or aided and abetted by the legal entity’s 
senior officers, representatives, governing bodies members or other 
officials or employees. The sanctions are to be imposed by the district 
courts on a proposal from the competent prosecutor and the judgments 
shall be subject to appeal solely before the respective court of appeal. 
The practical enforcement of the new texts is still limited and the effects 
of the changes cannot be assessed objectively. It is worth noting that 
the list of crimes for which the legal entities unjustly enriched can be 
held liable does not include all corruption offences. Thus, most crimes 
related to official capacity remain beyond the scope of the law (the 
only scenario on the list is the situation where officials use their status 
to obtain an illicit benefit for themselves or for a third party).
The Ratification of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption
On 3 August 2006, the National Assembly ratified the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption which was signed by Bulgaria on 
10 December 2003. The Convention has been operational since 
14 December 2005 but, on account of its belated ratification, it is 
only in effect for Bulgaria as from 20 October 2006. Nonetheless, 
the Bulgarian legislation, practices and institutional framework match 
to a very high degree the standards enshrined in the convention 
which is the most comprehensive legally binding anti-corruption 
instrument developed so far. The text embraces a multi-disciplinary 
approach and has rules on the prevention and criminalization of 
corruption, on international cooperation, on the recovery of assets 
acquired through corruption, on technical cooperation and the 
exchange of information. It also provides for an implementation 
mechanism.
The legislative amendments enacted in relation to the punishment of 
corruption crime have propelled the harmonization of Bulgaria’s domestic 
legislation with the current international instruments designed to combat 
corruption. None of those amendments, however, has impelled the 
increase in the number of cases and convictions aspired at (Figure 31).
No doubt, the challenges inherent in the detection of and investigation 
into corruption related crimes, which ensue primarily from the mutual 
interests of the parties involved in a corruption transaction, are a major 
factor for the continued inability of the state to adequately sanction 
FIGURE 31: NUMBER OF CONVICTIONS AND CONVICTED INDIVIDUALS FOR 
CRIMES RELATED TO OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BRIBERY AND TRADE IN 
INFLUENCE (1989-2005)
Source: National Statistical Institute
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corruption. Often it is easier 
for the investigative authori-
ties to detect and prove any 
other offence connected with a 
corruption transaction than the 
transaction itself. This, however, 
limits the possibilities to detect 
and punish corruption offenc-
es, especially where corruption 
practices as such are discon-
nected from any related crimi-
nal or other offence.
The introduction of some new 
methods for the collection of 
evidence by the new Criminal 
Procedure Code (enacted in 2005, 
in force as from April 2006) was 
an attempt to surmount the 
problem of proving corruption related and some other difficult-to-be-shown 
offences. The new methods, which include undercover officer (an officer 
of the competent services, authorized to make or keep contact with a 
controlled individual with a view to obtaining and uncovering information 
about serious intentional crimes and the organization of criminal activity), 
controlled delivery (import, export, carrying or transit transportation by the 
controlled individual through the territory of the country of an object of a 
criminal offence, with a view of detecting those involved in a trans-border 
crime) and trusted transaction (conclusion by an undercover officer of an 
apparent sale or another type of transaction involving an item with a view 
to gaining the trust of the other party involved in it) have been successfully 
used in a number of countries and form part of the international legal 
assistance in criminal cases. The scope of the new methods, however, 
is severely limited as they have been defined as “special intelligence 
means” and may only be used in relation to serious intentional crimes 
(i.e. offences which entail under the law imprisonment longer than five 
years, life imprisonment or life imprisonment without parole). Indeed, 
most corruption practices are defined by the Criminal Code as serious 
offences, but some of them are not and are therefore not eligible for the 
novel methods of evidence gathering. This is true, for example, for the 
mediation for and provocation to bribery, for all instances of bribery in 
the private sector, for some crimes related to official capacity, as well as 
some forms of trade in influence (offering, promising or giving a present 
or any undue benefit to a person claiming that he or she may exert 
influence). The new investigative techniques are inapplicable to all these 
corruption crimes for which we have the lowest number of triggered 
proceedings in general (information from the Ministry of Justice suggests 
that, since the criminalization of private sector bribery in 2002 until the 
end of 2006, only ten criminal cases were launched for this category 
of offence and only ten defendants were convicted). Moreover, there is 
still a want for well-prepared experts who would successfully employ the 
special intelligence means devised to detect, investigate into and prove 
corruption. It ought to be emphasized that overall, other than the use of 
FIGURE 32: DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR CRIMES RELATED 
TO OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BRIBERY AND TRADE IN INFLUENCE 
(2002-2006)
Source: National Investigation Service, Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation, Ministry of Justice
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special intelligence means, the existing legal framework on the provocation 
to bribery effectively inhibits the detection of corruption.
The small number of criminal cases for corruption offences increases the 
perception of impunity for corruption crime in the country. Therefore, 
albeit modern and harmonized with international standards, the criminal 
legislation fails to effectively hit its targets: it neither contributes to 
punishing the actual perpetrators of corruption offences, nor deters 
potential offenders. Such a climate of impunity translates into a slim 
public confidence in the efficiency of the judiciary and law enforcement 
and in itself helps perpetuate corruption.
The mismatch between the quality of substantive criminal legislation and 
the practical results in terms of detecting, investigating into and punishing 
corruption crime makes it apparent that the fundamental problems of the 
state’s criminal justice policy relate primarily to the enforcement of the 
criminal rules in practice. The lack of ostensible results from the otherwise 
serious amendments to the Criminal Code sends a clear message that 
substantive law is not sufficient in itself to score successfully in the fight 
against corruption. Inefficient enforcement virtually negates the efforts made 
to draft and enact modern criminal norms and converts the legislation 
from a strict system of rules to punish the perpetrators of crimes into a 
compilation of wishful texts disjointed from any genuine criminal sanctions.
The review of the work of different state authorities involved in the 
detection, investigation into and punishment of corruption demonstrates 
that even the scanty pre-trials initiated for corruption offences do not 
entail convictions by default. Many proceedings end at a far earlier stage 
of the criminal process. Some of them do not even make it to court but get 
terminated already at the pre-trial phase with no results (Figure 32 and 33).
FIGURE 33: DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR CRIMES RELATED 
TO OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BRIBERY AND TRADE IN INFLUENCE 
(2002 – 2006)
Source: National Investigation Service, Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation, Ministry of Justice
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53 See: Celik, G., To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations 
of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes, University of British Columbia, 
Department of Economics, Vancouver, BC.
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As shown by statistical data, varying numbers of cases end at different 
stages of corruption related criminal proceedings. The final calculation 
is that only around one-forth of the preliminary proceedings launched 
go all the way to a verdict and only 40 % of the individuals indicted 
at the pre-trial stage are later punished by virtue of a final conviction. 
Although the reasons for these results are specific and vary from one 
stage of the process or from one institution involved to another, the 
outcome eloquently shows how the complex and expensive (in terms of 
finance and staffing alike) machinery of the criminal process is used in 
vain in a colossal number of cases.
The cost-benefit of bribery
Researchers apply various approaches and formulas to calculate the 
benefit of giving/taking bribes53. By using that experience together with 
data from official statistics and the results of CMS one could calculate 
under what conditions bribery in Bulgaria would become unprofitable.
For instance, by using official statistics for the year 2006 and based 
on the criminological survey Court Case Law on the Enforcement of 
the Rules on Bribery, articles 301-307a of the Criminal Code, During the 
Years of Transition (1989-2003) published by the Ministry of Justice the 
average value of a bribe in Bulgaria could be estimated to amount 
to 312 levs. Although at present conditional verdicts prevail (i.e. 
the punishment is initially postponed for a certain period of time 
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and is executed only if the convict commits another crime during 
that period) for the purpose of this calculation it is assumed that 
the average penalty is one year of imprisonment. Since the average 
monthly salary in Bulgaria for the year 2006 was about 400 levs then 
one year of imprisonment would be equal to 4,800 levs of future 
earnings. Assuming that finding a new job would be more difficult after 
the verdict and the serving of the penalty the probable losses from 
such a verdict could increase up to several times, e.g. if the person 
could not find a job for two years he/she would lose 14,400 levs.
For the one bribing, the bribe would be economically profitable if 
the value of the benefit received (e.g. a fine evaded) is higher than 
the sum of the bribe plus the respective penalty foreseen for bribing 
multiplied by the probability of its enforcement. For the one receiving 
it, the value of the bribe is the benefit received, while the “expenses” 
include the respective penalty multiplied by the probability of its 
enforcement. Applying this formula to the available data shows that 
each bribe exceeding 0.34 levs is economically profitable for a bribe 
taker in Bulgaria taking into account the chances for the person to 
be prosecuted. For those who bribe, it would make economic sense 
to do it if the benefit received in this way exceeds the amount of 
the bribe by at least 0.34 levs. 
These calculations rely on certain strong assumptions but nevertheless 
provide an additional alternative approach to measuring the efficiency 
of the criminal prosecution of corruption in Bulgaria. They confirm 
the necessity for improving criminal legislation and its consistent 
implementation in order to make bribery economically unprofitable 
in this country.
Before the new Criminal Procedure Code entered into force in April 2006, 
the major investigative authorities handling corruption offences were 
the investigators at the National Investigation Service and at the district 
investigation services. The investigation authorities within the judiciary 
channeled almost all pre-trial proceedings for the most typical corruption 
offences (crimes related to official capacity, bribery, trade in influence, 
etc.). At that time, the officers of the Ministry of Interior were competent 
to investigate into such offences only by way of exception, in the form 
of police investigation or summary police proceedings.
Data released by the National Investigation Service for the period 2000-2006 
indicates that the number of preliminary proceedings for corruption offences 
(crimes related to official capacity, bribery and general economic crime) that 
have ended by an opinion to submit the case to court are two to three 
times less than the proceedings having ended by a recommendation to 
have the case terminated or suspended (Figure 34). In practice this means 
that in most cases the steps undertaken and the evidence gathered by the 
investigative authorities do not provide a solid basis to continue the case by 
pressing charges and maintaining the indictment in court, so the investigative 
body itself chooses to propose that criminal prosecution be abandoned.
FIGURE 34: BASIC INVESTIGATIVE INDICATORS RELEVANT TO CRIMES RELATED 
TO OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BRIBERY AND GENERAL ECONOMIC CRIME 
(2000-2006)
Note: Following the entry into force of the new Criminal Procedure Code in April 2006 the powers of investigators to deal with corruption related crimes are limited only 
to offences committed by persons enjoying immunity, members of the Council of Ministers or civil servants from the Ministry of Interior as well as crimes committed 
abroad.
Source: National Investigation Service
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Following the reforms of the pre-trial stage implemented through the 
adoption of the new Criminal Procedure Code, the powers to investigate 
almost all categories of criminal offences, including corruption ones, were 
transferred from the investigative authorities in the judiciary into the 
hands of Ministry of Interior police investigators. Before that, Ministry of 
Interior officers only had jurisdiction over a limited number of corruption 
offences (primarily crimes related to official capacity) for which the law 
envisaged inter alia police proceedings in the form of police investigation 
or summary police proceedings (Figure 35). However, since April 2006 
police investigators have the power to investigate all corruption related 
crimes except for offences committed by persons enjoying immunity, 
members of the Council of Ministers or civil servants from the Ministry 
of Interior and crimes committed abroad, which remain in the domain 
of the investigation services.
FIGURE 35: POLICE INVESTIGATIONS AND SUMMARY POLICE PROCEEDINGS FOR 
CRIMES RELATED TO OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BRIBERY AND TRADE IN 
INFLUENCE (2000-2006)
Note: The data for 2006 refer only to the period until the end of April.
Source: Ministry of Interior
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Reporting Allegations of Corruption
In 2006 the Ministry of Interior received 8,230 allegations of 
corruption. The largest number – 359 – concerned officials of the 
Ministry of Interior, 141 were against municipal officials, 88 related 
to the judiciary, 21 were relevant to the sphere of education. 130 
of the reports concerning the Ministry of Interior were confirmed, 
30 of them were forwarded to the public prosecution office while 
investigation is still in progress in respect of 48 referrals.
Source: Statement by the Minister of Interior and Chair of the Commission for Prevention and Countering 
of Corruption at the Round Table on Benchmarking Corruption in the European Union, Brussels, 
14 February 2007
Changes in criminal procedure bear directly on the work of the public 
prosecution as well. By transforming the prosecutor into a lead figure 
of the pre-trial stage the Bulgarian lawmaker has actually vested the 
responsibility for the swift and good-quality conduct of the investigation 
exactly in the public prosecution. On the other hand, whether or 
not a criminal case (including any corruption offence) would proceed 
from pre-trial to trial virtually depends on the prosecutor alone. Such 
a key role attributed to the prosecution system not only increases its 
responsibilities but also makes it one of the links in the chain of criminal 
process most likely to be exposed to corruption pressures.
FIGURE 36: BILLS OF INDICTMENT AND ACCUSED INDIVIDUALS AT THE PRE-
TRIAL STAGE IN CASES FOR BRIBERY, TRADE IN INFLUENCE AND 
CRIMES RELATED TO OFFICIAL CAPACITY (2002-2006)
Source: Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation
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Since 2002 (the year where the 
Supreme Prosecution Office of 
Cassation started collecting and 
summarizing statistics on the 
work of the public prosecution 
in corruption related cases) un-
til the end of 2006, the pros-
ecutors presented a total of 
970 bills of indictment against 
1,416 accused individuals for 
crimes related to official capac-
ity, bribery or trade in influence 
(Figure 36). At the same time, 
the number of indictments 
presented to court was nearly 
20 % lower than the number 
of pre-trials concluded by an 
opinion to submit the case to 
court. Another worrying fact is 
that the public prosecution has 
not presented bills of indict-
ment in respect of more than 
10 % of the accused individuals 
in those pre-trials which ended by an opinion to submit the case to 
court. The reasons for that discrepancy may be either positive (e.g. 
resort, albeit still limited, to the possibility to plea bargain the case) or 
negative (deficient work done by the investigative bodies, mistrust by 
the prosecutor of the quality of the materials provided by investigators, 
possible existence of corruption practices, etc.). This problem needs to 
be addressed even more seriously given that, after the entry into force of 
the new Criminal Procedure Code, almost all crimes are now investigated 
by police investigators from the Ministry of Interior who do not possess 
yet the skills and the extensive experience of the investigators from the 
judiciary.
The Public Prosecution in the Fight against Organized Crime 
and Corruption
The Specialized Department to Combat Organized Crime and 
Corruption at the Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation, which 
was set up by order of the Prosecutor General dated 23 March 2006, 
oversees and supervises the legality of the pre-trial proceedings relating 
to pending files and cases for criminal offences that flag up elements 
of organized crime and/or corruption. The department consists of 
three sections, viz. an anti-organized crime, anti-corruption, and anti-
money laundering section.
The head of the department maintains direct contacts with the 
Ministry of Interior and, where necessary, puts together joint teams to 
inquire into allegations or to work on instituted cases.
106 ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN BULGAIRIA: KEY RESULTS AND RISKS
The head of the department issues, with the approval of the Prosecutor 
General, a circular letter laying down the procedure for setting up 
specialized anti-organized crime and anti-corruption units within Sofia 
City Prosecution Office and at the district prosecution offices.
As regards the countering of corruption, the department has 
introduced special reporting arrangements and monitors the files and 
cases against Members of Parliament, government ministers and their 
deputies, the heads and members of independent institutions set up 
by virtue of laws, the heads of state and implementing agencies and 
commissions and their deputies, district governors and their deputies, 
the mayors of municipalities with a population over 100,000, judges, 
prosecutors, investigators, senior officials of the Ministry of Interior 
and the Ministry of Defense, as well as public officials who have 
allegedly mismanaged EU funds.
The department is directly subordinated to the Prosecutor General. 
The head of the department and the prosecutors working therein 
are prohibited from taking instructions from any other prosecutor 
and from providing other prosecutors with any information about 
the department’s work. The mass media receive information from 
the head of the department in person, with the authorization of the 
Prosecutor General.
Source: Order No 905 of 23 March 2006 issued by the Prosecutor General
As regards the trial stage of the criminal process, the situation is not 
fundamentally different and the same alarming trends observed at the 
pre-trial stage can be discerned. Between 2002 and 2006, only 64 per 
cent of the total number of instituted trials ended by the courts’ issuing a 
verdict and almost 30 per cent of the defendants were not convicted.
While the number of verdicts issued for corruption offences has been 
growing, the share of discontinued proceedings and acquittals remains 
high (Figure 37). On the one hand, this demonstrates that in many cases 
the work of the investigative authorities is not efficient enough, as the 
case is presented to court through a bill of indictment but is nonetheless 
terminated or results in an acquittal. The large number of acquittals also 
implies criticism of the work of the public prosecution which masters the 
pre-trial investigation and maintains the indictment at trial. In addition, 
the spread of corruption amongst judges cannot be excluded a priori as 
a possible reason for the lean number of convictions for corruption.
The numbers concerning the administration of justice for corruption offences 
invite some other disturbing conclusions. There has been a persisting 
trend for only lighter cases of corruption to go to trial and eventually 
yield convictions. This is evidenced both by the level of the penalties 
imposed (mainly up to 3 years imprisonment) and by the large number 
of conditional sentences which shows that the convicted persons had 
never been sentenced to imprisonment before. Between 2001 and 2006, 
FIGURE 37: TRIALS IN CASES FOR BRIBERY, TRADE IN INFLUENCE AND CRIMES 
RELATED TO OFFICIAL CAPACITY (2001-2006)
Source: Ministry of Justice
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only 28 perpetrators of corruption offences were sentenced to a period 
in prison longer than three years. Although the 2000 Criminal Code
amendments extended (based on recommendations from, inter alia, civil 
society) the scope of the penalty of fine and it was made applicable to 
many corruption offences, including the different forms of bribery, the 
courts have imposed fines only sparingly to date. Of equally insufficient 
application is the penalty of disqualification envisaged for many corruption 
offences, although it could have a mighty deterring effect, especially 
where the convicted person is a public official.
Court Case Law in Criminal Proceedings for Bribery
In 83 % of the cases, the convictions for bribery were only 
issued against one defendant, in 11 % of the cases they were 
issued against two defendants and in 6 % of the cases they 
were against three or more defendants. Criminal cases were 
instituted around one year and a half after the commission of 
the offence, on average, and the verdicts were issued another 
half a year later on average. In 64 % of the cases the defendant 
pleaded guilty. The first instance courts found the defendants
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guilty in 94 % of the cases and innocent in 6 % of the cases. 
74 % of those convicted were found guilty of passive bribery, 
25 % – of active bribery and 1 % – of mediation to bribery. 
The most frequently imposed penalty was imprisonment – 71.6 % 
(with deferred execution in 81 % of the cases) followed by 
disqualification from holding a particular position or practicing a 
particular profession (42.1 %), fines (18.3 %), correctional labor 
(4.8 %), and confiscation (0.8 %). Of the verdicts at first instance, 
84 % were challenged by the defendant, 3 % were appealed 
against by the prosecutors and 13 % took effect without being 
brought before the second instance. Out of the verdicts appealed 
against by either the defendant or the prosecutor, 56 % were 
fully upheld on appeal, 32 % were upheld partially, and 12 % 
were repealed. Of the verdicts and criminal judgments made by 
second-instance courts, only 13 % were challenged before the 
Supreme Court of Cassation (94 % challenged by the defendants 
and 6 % challenged by the public prosecutor). In 98 % of the 
cases, the bribe consisted in money and in 1 % of the cases it 
took the form of another tangible benefit or service. The amount 
of the corruption transaction was up to $150 in 51.7 % of the 
cases, between $150 and $500 in 22.4 % of the cases, $500 
to $1,000 in 7.7 % of the cases, $1,000 to $5,000 in 11.2 % 
of the cases, $5,000 to $10,000 in 4.2 % of the cases, and the 
amount was in excess of $10,000 in 2.8 % of the cases. Of the 
convicted individuals, 81 per cent were males and 19 % were 
females. 40 % of the offenders had a university degree, 3 % 
had college education, 35 % had secondary education, 18 % 
had primary education, 3 % had elementary education, and 1 % 
were uneducated. In 98 % of the cases the perpetrators were 
Bulgarian nationals, 76 % of them were married, 84 % had jobs. 
Of all those convicted, 92 % had never been sentenced for 
another crime before.
Source: Criminological survey: Court Case Law on the Enforcement of the Rules on Bribery, articles 301-307a 
of the Criminal Code, during the years of transition (1989-2003), Ministry of Justice
3.3.2. Initiatives and Measures against Internal Corruption in the 
Bodies of the Judiciary
The measures to prevent and counter internal corruption within the 
judiciary are implemented through various mechanisms and tools some 
of which apply to the system as a whole while others only operate in 
specific branches of the system.
The Anti-Corruption Commission with the SJC was created in 2004 with 
a view to prevent and suppress instances of corruption within the judiciary. 
In harmony with its powers under the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme 
Judicial Council and Its Administration, the Anti-Corruption Commission for 
the judicial system, which is accountable to SJC, examines complaints 
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from citizens and state authorities against alleged corruption behavior of 
judges, prosecutors and investigators.
According to statistical data, between 17 December 2003 and 5 July 2006 
a total of 172 complaints were received of which 160 came from 
natural persons and 12 from legal entities. Measures were taken in 
respect of 87 complaints, and on grounds of article 20(5) of the Rules 
of Procedure of the SJC and Its Administration, the competent authorities 
were notified so as to conduct the inspections and checks. The Anti-
Corruption Commission replied to 52 complaints while advising the 
complainants of the respective measures taken in response to the 
allegations. 33 complaints were left unanswered, as the questions 
raised went beyond the competence of the Commission and at the 
same time there was evidence that the complainant had also contacted 
the competent authority.
Alerts from the Anti-Corruption Mailboxes Located in the Buildings 
of the Courts, Public Prosecution Offices and Investigation Services 
By Decision of the Supreme Judicial Council (Minutes No. 21 of 
3 May 2006), in line with article 20, point 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
SJC and Its Administration, an electronic register was set up for the alerts 
made by citizens through the anti-corruption mailboxes in the buildings 
of judicial bodies across the country. Between 9 December 2005 
and 5 July 2006, 44 instances of corruption in the judiciary were 
reported, all of them to the Anti-Corruption Commission at the SJC. 
On grounds of article 20, point 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the SJC 
and Its Administration, 24 alerts were forwarded to the competent 
authorities for inspections. Six written replies were received describing 
the outcome of the inspections conducted by the respective 
administrative managers. The complainants received replies to 
15 alerts, with specific opinions expressed by the SJC Anti-Corruption 
Commission and the statutory measures undertaken. Three alerts
were examined and dismissed due to the lack of statutory ground 
for the SJC Anti-Corruption Commission to intervene, and/or the lack 
of proof of corruption engaged in by the magistrates or court staff at 
the respective court.
In addition to preventing conflicts of interest, fair access to the profession 
and to career promotion is a major corruption preventive tool in the 
administration of justice. Nevertheless, the measures in that respect 
have not generated the expected results yet.
Thus, the adopted ordinances governing the career development of 
magistrates – Ordinance on the Professional Appraisal of Judges, Prosecutors, 
and Investigators, and Ordinance No. 2 of 28 June 2006 of the Supreme 
Judicial Council laying down the procedure for conducting competitions for 
judges, prosecutors, and investigators – are not applied in a way that 
guarantees observance of the rules. The competition based principle of 
recruitment and access to the profession continues to be tampered with 
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by acquaintances, kinship, and not infrequently, political considerations. 
The meetings of the Supreme Judicial Council are now public but 
serious criticism can be voiced of the transparency and objectivity of 
proceedings at the supreme administrative structure of the judiciary.
Conflicts of interest are often encountered in the system of the judiciary 
and within its supreme authority.
In December 2005, 92 judges from regional courts sent an open 
letter to the SJC against the absurdly quick promotion of a regional 
judge – the son of an SJC member from the parliamentary quota 
– who was appointed to Sofia City Court after having worked as 
a regional judge for less than a year.
In May 2006, 26 junior judges wrote an open letter, endorsed by 
the Bulgarian Judges Association, to the SJC on the appointment 
as a junior judge at Sofia City Court of someone who had not 
passed the competition for junior judges but had been ranked as 
a junior investigator in Stara Zagora and then directly appointed 
junior judge in Sofia. A good sign in that case was the support 
offered by a group of junior prosecutors to the initiative of junior 
judges.
Openness and transparency in the operation of the judiciary are 
important guarantees against internal corruption. In that respect, there 
has been a positive trend towards a more open public prosecution. After 
the new Prosecutor General took office (February 2006), a process of 
gradual changes has been deployed within that system. The proclaimed 
principles of the process are: accountability to parliament and society, 
wider openness and transparency, control by the public, political 
neutrality. The reforms and modernization of the public prosecution 
have already yielded results in some areas, although the process is not 
entirely problem-free and consistent and visibly needs to continue. The 
internal inspections and audits that were carried out identified different 
violations. The sanctions imposed for them varied from demotion to 
removal from office and may well translate into criminal prosecution. 
The relevant decision-making powers in that respect are vested in the 
SJC, which operates in its old composition, and this explains to some 
extent the prudent proposals for measures and sanctions to be adopted 
and imposed. None the less, the new approach taken on board by the 
Prosecutor General has gradually started producing effects in this area, 
too.
54 See Prosecutorial Reform Index for Bulgaria, June 2006, American Bar Association, Legal 
Initiative for Central Europe and Eurasia, p. 41.
STATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 111
In February 2007, a magistrate was detained for the first time: 
the Deputy District Prosecutor of the town of Oryahovo Dimitar 
Ninov, was accused of crimes related to official capacity and 
corruption. The prosecutor allegedly delayed and terminated 
dozens of proceedings, some of them relating to customs fraud. 
In line with the latest amendments to the Constitution, Ninov was 
arrested without the need to seek the lifting of his immunity as a 
magistrate by the Supreme Judicial Council.
Prosecutor Ninov concealed over 40 cases in order to spare the 
accused individuals from criminal prosecution. The cases were 
most diverse – from smuggling to fraud, and then to thefts, 
blackmailing, restitution of land, etc. The searches and seizures 
have unveiled next to €22,000 and 8,000 levs dispersed across 
some 50 hiding places. 
After many years of excessive secretiveness, during the past year the 
website of the public prosecution provides detailed information on 
its operation – anything from audit reports to internal regulations and 
documents is on the web. The Inspectorate at the Supreme Prosecution 
Office of Cassation, which was a separate unit before, has grown 
into a sector in the administrative department but is subordinated 
directly to the Prosecutor General. The inspectorate has powers to 
conduct inspections based on any complaints and reports received, 
even anonymous ones, and to handle allegations of corruption referred 
through the anti-corruption mailboxes in the public prosecution offices, 
the Ministry of Interior and the penitentiaries. Allegations against judges 
and prosecutors are inquired into as well. After the Inspectorate was set 
apart as an independent internal control structure within the system of 
the public prosecution, for less than half an year it received close to 
1,000 complaints, compared to just about 300 per year before. At the 
same time, the audits at the Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation 
and at various prosecution offices throughout the country have resulted in 
the National Investigation Service’s launching seven pre-trial proceedings 
against prosecutors for breach of their official duties54.
Any reform processes notwithstanding, corruption crime, including 
internal corruption, is difficult to detect and prove. This is an additional 
impediment to the efforts to counter political corruption and crime in 
general.
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55 “Whilst it is hard to know its extent, the persistent rumours about corrupt practices at 
various levels of the administration and the public sector in themselves contribute to 
tainting the political, economic and social environment.”, 2000 Regular Report from the 
Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession, 8 November 2000, p. 17
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BULGARIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
THE NEXT STAGE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION 
MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
Corruption has been a major preoccupation during the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements of the European Union and continues to dominate the 
agenda of the initial period of Bulgaria and Romania’s membership. Not 
being in the core of EU’s acquis, anti-corruption was a relatively new 
matter to tackle and, in contrast to other areas of EU competence, it had 
little specific guidelines to offer applicant countries. Still, the significance 
of transparent and accountable government for the functioning of the 
EU internal market and the delivery of its core policies required that 
anti-corruption be made one of the key requirements for membership. 
In this process, the European Commission advanced its capacity to 
evaluate anti-corruption progress. Following an initial focus on adherence 
to international standards and acceding to major conventions, attention 
later shifted to meeting specific good governance targets. Member states 
have also contributed to understanding corruption and recommending 
action through the mechanism of peer reviews.
Nevertheless, identifying anti-corruption progress remains largely 
arbitrary. Corruption – and this is true not just within the EU but 
worldwide - remains a fluid concept, signifying different things to different 
people. More importantly, it is an evolving concept. 
In its initial Progress Reports, the European Commission was skeptical 
about the measurability of corruption55. Afterwards, in its 2003 
Communication on an EU anti-corruption policy (its latest so far), the 
Commission believed an EU monitoring mechanism of corruption would 
be redundant, referring instead to the existing ones such as OECD, 
GRECO, etc. These, however, were designed to evaluate compliance with 
the provisions of the respective international conventions and did not 
attempt to assess the effect of anti-corruption measures on corruption. 
Thus, the focus was still on input indicators (nominal compliance to 
anti-corruption regulations, procedures, etc) rather than output indicators 
(impact on corruption).
By 2006 it was clear that the transposition of international legal standards 
into national legislation would not suffice. Although Bulgaria had acceded 
to and integrated into its law the provisions of all major international 
anti-corruption instruments (Bulgaria is among the few non-OECD 
56 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and 
the European Economic and Social Committee On a Comprehensive EU Policy Against 
Corruption, COM/2003/0317 final
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members to have ratified its Convention on combating bribery among 
foreign officials while not all EU member states had ratified it), concerns 
about corruption in the country remained. The emphasis needed to shift 
towards measuring impact.
As a result, in the September 2006 Report the Commission presented the 
Bulgarian government with new anti-corruption guidelines - a number 
of targets and/or tasks, which the Commission called benchmarks - to 
be completed by a certain date thus signifying the commitment of the 
government to anti-corruption reforms.
Thus, by implication the Commission signaled the need of a much 
more sophisticated tool for evaluating governance reform and progress 
among member-states – benchmarking. Unlike the targets/tasks set by 
the Commission for Bulgaria (and Romania), true benchmarking requires 
the availability of an instrument to measure performance which in turn 
is checked against an agreed standard or best practice (a benchmark). 
Applied to (anti)corruption this would imply the assessment of the 
impact of government policies on the prevalence of corruption, as well 
as public values and attitudes. Diagnosing the state of corruption and 
obtaining reliable information about its dynamics are crucial to the 
implementation of successful prevention and control policies within 
the EU.
*  *  *
The Bulgarian civil society-led experience in assessing anti-corruption 
progress has brought policy institutions and researchers both domestically 
and at European level a step closer to the development of a methodology 
for benchmarking corruption which could be the foundation of a 
future EU anti-corruption and good governance policy. Such a policy is 
warranted, above all, by the need “to reduce all forms of corruption, 
at every level, in all EU countries and institutions and even outside the 
EU.”56
The evolution of the EU’s policies in the area of anti-corruption suggests 
that the next logical step in this process is the development of EU’s 
own methodology for benchmarking corruption, as has been done in 
other areas important to the functioning of the Internal Market. This 
would entail a capacity to diagnose the spread of corruption through a 
common measurement technique and comparing it against a certain best 
practice standard. Having such a diagnostic tool would be instrumental 
in the run up to the 2008 EC Communication on a comprehensive EU 
policy in this area and would tie in with the work of the EC’s expert 
group on crime statistics.
Adopting a common corruption measurement methodology would offer 
a number of advantages:
• It would provide verifiable data about the prevalence of 
corruption and an insight into the mechanisms of corruption 
through the experience of the victims;
• It is context-neutral and could be utilized in any political, 
social or cultural environment thus being useful both during 
future enlargements and in countries where the Union provides 
assistance;
• It would allow international benchmarking to take place which 
is particularly useful in assessing the impact of international legal 
instruments;
• It is an instrument for risk assessment as it provides information 
about the worst affected sectors of the public administration; 
• It is an important overall indicator of the effectiveness of the 
Internal market and can be used as a fine instrument for targeting 
outstanding challenges.
*  *  *
What gets measured gets done. Having an EU corruption benchmarking 
instrument would strengthen  the effectiveness of the promotion of 
anti-corruption standards at home and in the countries where the EU 
provides good governance assistance. It would allow the Commission 
to acquire reliable detailed information for its evaluation efforts and to 
tailor its recommendations for action to specific local environments.
An advanced instrument for corruption diagnostics would significantly 
enhance the credibility of EU’s policies in this area. Anchoring assessments 
in hard data would significantly enhance the Union leverage in bringing 
about change as it would deprive corrupt governments of deniability 
about the magnitude of corruption in their countries.
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